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BROUWER’S FIXED-POINT THEOREM IN REAL-COHESIVE
HOMOTOPY TYPE THEORY
MICHAEL SHULMAN
Abstract. We combine Homotopy Type Theory with axiomatic cohesion,
expressing the latter internally with a version of “adjoint logic” in which the
discretization and codiscretization modalities are characterized using a judg-
mental formalism of “crisp variables”. This yields type theories that we call
“spatial” and “cohesive”, in which the types can be viewed as having indepen-
dent topological and homotopical structure. These type theories can then be
used to study formally the process by which topology gives rise to homotopy
theory (the “fundamental ∞-groupoid” or “shape”), disentangling the “identi-
fications” of Homotopy Type Theory from the “continuous paths” of topology.
In a further refinement called “real-cohesion”, the shape is determined by con-
tinuous maps from the real numbers, as in classical algebraic topology. This
enables us to reproduce formally some of the classical applications of homotopy
theory to topology. As an example, we prove Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem.
1. Introduction
On spaces, types, and ∞-groupoids. Homotopy type theory (UFP 2013) is an
emerging field that connects homotopy theory and higher category theory with con-
structive type theory. The homotopy-theoretic semantics for type theory (Awodey
and Warren 2009; Kapulkin and Lumsdaine 2012) enables us to view the types
in type theory as homotopical objects. This motivates new rules and axioms for
type theory, such as Voevodsky’s univalence axiom and higher inductive types,
which allow us to do synthetic homotopy theory. That is, we can construct ho-
motopical objects in type theory and prove theorems about them there, such as
calculating homotopy groups of spheres (UFP 2013, Chapter 8). The homotopy-
theoretic semantics imply that such formal theorems automatically yield proofs of
corresponding classical results.
However, it is important to understand that at least on the surface, a theorem
in synthetic homotopy theory is a different statement about different objects than
a theorem of the same name in classical homotopy theory. For instance, in the
synthetic theorem that π1(S
1) = Z (Licata and Shulman 2013):
• S1 is a higher inductive type, freely generated by a basepoint and a loop.
• π1(X) is the 0-truncation of the loop space Ω(X), where the 0-truncation
is a higher inductive type that “kills all information above dimension 0”.
This material is based on research sponsored by The United States Air Force Research Labo-
ratory under agreement number FA9550-15-1-0053. The U.S. Government is authorized to repro-
duce and distribute reprints for Governmental purposes notwithstanding any copyright notation
thereon. The views and conclusions contained herein are those of the author and should not be
interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies or endorsements, either expressed or
implied, of the United States Air Force Research Laboratory, the U.S. Government, or Carnegie
Mellon University.
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• The loop space Ω(X) involves “paths” that are an essentially undefined
primitive notion, like “point” and “line” in axiomatic geometry. They are
given meaning by the rules governing them (namely, those of Martin-Lo¨f’s
intensional identity type).
This should be contrasted with the meanings of the same words in the theorem of
classical homotopy theory that is denoted π1(S
1) = Z:
• S1 is the topological space {(x, y) ∈ R× R | x2 + y2 = 1}.
• π1(X) is the set of path-components of the loop space Ω(X).
• The loop space Ω(X) (and the notion of path-component) involves paths
that are defined as continuous functions [0, 1] → X out of the topological
unit interval.
Remark 1.1. In contrast to UFP (2013), I will use S1 for the topological circle
{(x, y) ∈ R × R | x2 + y2 = 1}, hoping that the font will serve as a mnemonic for
its relationship to the real numbers R. This leaves S1 for the higher inductive one.
The connection between these worlds that justifies using the same terminology
in both cases can be described as follows.
(1) In homotopy theory we study objects that may be called homotopy spaces
or ∞-groupoids, which have objects, identifications between those objects,
higher identifications between identifications, and so on.
(2) A topological space X gives rise to an ∞-groupoid, traditionally called
its fundamental ∞-groupoid, whose objects are the points of X , whose
identifications are continuous paths in X , whose higher identifications are
continuous homotopies in X , and so on.
(3) Type theory admits semantics in ∞-groupoids.
(4) Finally, the fundamental∞-groupoid of the topological circle S1 is the same
∞-groupoid that furnishes semantics for the higher inductive circle S1 in
type theory (and similarly for paths, truncations, and so on).
A classical algebraic topologist would not bring up ∞-groupoids, of course, but
just talk about topological spaces directly. However, I find it clarifying to do
so, because it enables us to distinguish ways in which topological spaces and ∞-
groupoids behave differently. Specifically, a topological space can be defined up to
homeomorphism, whereas an ∞-groupoid is (at least the way I use the word) only
ever defined up to homotopy equivalence. For instance, as topological spaces, a
cylinder is distinct from a Mo¨bius strip (e.g. one is orientable and one is not); but
they have the same fundamental ∞-groupoid (which is, in fact, also the same as
that of S1).
This is important because the homotopy-theoretic semantics of type theory lands
in ∞-groupoids, and not in topological spaces.1 Thus, inside of type theory we
should think of types as ∞-groupoids and not as topological spaces. In particular,
although it is common in homotopy type theory to use terminology borrowed from
topology such as “path” and “circle”, these words have a priori nothing to do with
1To be completely precise, at least with current technology (Kapulkin and Lumsdaine 2012) it
lands in simplicial sets, which are a different model for∞-groupoids. Like a topological space and
unlike an ∞-groupoid, a simplicial set can be defined up to isomorphism rather than equivalence;
but the notion of isomorphism for simplicial sets is totally different from the notion of isomorphism
for topological spaces. Moreover, at most a very small amount of this extra strictness of simplicial
sets beyond ∞-groupoids is visible to type theory, and conjecturally none at all.
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Figure 1. A retraction from a self-map
their topological versions which can also be defined inside of type theory. That is,
since type theory is rich enough to encode all of mathematics, we can define in
it the real numbers R and thus also the topological circle S1 = {(x, y) : R × R |
x2 + y2 = 1}; but this type is quite different from the higher inductive circle S1.
For instance, the former is a set (0-truncated) with infinitely many distinct points,
while the latter is not a set and has “only one point” (technically, it is 0-connected).
This frequently causes confusion among newcomers to homotopy type theory,
who struggle to understand the meaning of “path” because it both is, and is not,
like the topological concept after which it is named. For this reason among others,
in this paper I will say identification or equality rather than “path” when speaking
of the synthetic notion (i.e. elements of identity types).
More importantly, however, this means there is something missing from homo-
topy type theory, because there is more to algebraic topology than the study of
∞-groupoids in their own right. The process by which they arise from topological
spaces (the fundamental ∞-groupoid) is also important. This often becomes clear
when we are concerned with applications of algebraic topology to fields such as
geometry and physics, which have no intrinsic interest in homotopy theory. As
a simple example, consider the standard homotopy-theoretic proof of Brouwer’s
fixed-point theorem:
Theorem 1.2. Let D2 denote the topological disc {(x, y) ∈ R2 | x2+y2 ≤ 1}. Then
any continuous map f : D2 → D2 has a fixed point.
Proof. Suppose f : D2 → D2 is continuous with no fixed point. For any point
z ∈ D2, draw the ray from f(z) to z (which is well-defined since they are distinct)
and keep going until you hit the boundary of D2 (see Figure 1). Call that point of
intersection r(z); then r defines a continuous map from D2 to its boundary, which
is the topological circle S1. Moreover, if z ∈ S1 to begin with, then there is no need
to keep going once we get from f(z) to z, so that r(z) = z in this case. Thus, S1
would be a retract of D2. It follows that π1(S
1) would be a retract of π1(D
2); but
the latter is trivial while the former is not. 
Note how crucial it is that S1 is a topological space, with points that can be
specified exactly and not just up to homotopy. Indeed, the statement of the theorem
makes no reference to homotopy theory.
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With present technology, this theorem is completely inaccessible to homotopy
type theory. Of course, the use of proof by contradiction requires the law of excluded
middle, but this can be assumed, as discussed by UFP (2013, Chapter 3). The real
problem is that inside of type theory, we have no way to relate S1 to S1, so that we
cannot make the jump into homotopy theory in the last step. (We could, of course,
repeat the classical definition of π1 as a quotient of a set of continuous paths, and
likewise the classical proof that π1(S
1) ∼= Z, but then we would have gained nothing
from homotopy type theory.)
What we need is some way to define the fundamental ∞-groupoid inside of type
theory. The most natural way to interpret this is that given a topological space X
in type theory, we want a type whose synthetic paths (i.e. elements of its identity
type) are the topological paths in X (i.e. continuous maps [0, 1] → X), and so on.
It is natural to try to construct such a thing as a higher inductive type, but there
are at least two problems with this. Firstly, it seems that we would need infinitely
many constructors to handle paths of all dimension, which at present we do not
know how to do in the finitary syntax of type theory. And secondly, if we succeed in
doing it, it is not immediately clear how we would show that this construction takes
S1 to S1 without essentially copying again the classical proof, thereby negating any
benefit from synthetic homotopy theory.
Combining synthetic topology and synthetic homotopy theory. In this
paper we will take a different approach: we make the topology synthetic, as well
as the homotopy theory. That is, in addition to carrying a structure of synthetic
∞-groupoid, with identifications and higher identifications, every type also carries
a structure of synthetic topological space, with some sort of “cohesion” attaching
nearby elements together. (I am being deliberately vague here; I don’t want to
demand that a synthetic topology is necessarily specified in terms of open sets the
way a classical topology usually is.)
It is well known that type theory admits topological semantics, in which types
are interpreted by topological spaces or other similar objects. Indeed, this has been
known for much longer than the homotopical interpretations. Moreover, just as type
theory can be enhanced with homotopically motivated axioms such as univalence, it
can be enhanced with topologically motivated axioms such as Browerian continuity
principles or an axiomatic “Sierpinski space”, leading to synthetic topology (Bauer
and Lesˇnik 2012; Escardo´ 2004a,b; Taylor 2010).
What we will do is to combine these two kinds of interpretation, so that each type
will have both an ∞-groupoid structure and a topological structure. In contrast to
the situation in classical algebraic topology, where the same structure is viewed at
different times either as topological or homotopical, in our world the topological
and homotopical structures will be unrelated. The objects of our motivating model
will be topological ∞-groupoids, which can be thought of as ∞-groupoids together
with topologies on their points, identifications, higher identifications, and so on,
making all of the operations continuous. Here are some examples to get the reader’s
intuition up to speed.
• An ordinary topological space yields a topological ∞-groupoid with no
nontrivial identifications, in the same way that a set yields an ordinary
∞-groupoid.
• An ordinary ∞-groupoid can be given the discrete topology (in all dimen-
sions, i.e. on points, identifications, and so on).
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• An ordinary ∞-groupoid can also be given the indiscrete topology.
• Recall that an ordinary group G can be “delooped” to an ∞-groupoid
K(G, 1), with one point b and G forming the identifications from b to itself.
If G is a topological group, then we have an analogous K(G, 1) that is a
topological ∞-groupoid, but remembering the topology on G as the space
of identifications.1
Note that here it starts to matter even more that we distinguish between paths and
equalities: a topological∞-groupoid has both paths and equalities; and it can also
have equalities between paths, and paths between equalities.2
At this point we are presented with several problems.
(1) How should we define precisely what we mean by a “topological∞-groupoid”
(in set-theoretic foundations, to serve as semantics for type theory)?
(2) What new rules or axioms can we bring into type theory, motivated by such
a model, that will enable us to relate S1 to S1? Continuity principles and
the Sierpinski space are not well-adapted to saying interesting things about
types that are not 0-truncated.
(3) The classical proof of Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem uses the law of ex-
cluded middle. But unlike homotopical interpretations, topological inter-
pretations are generally incompatible with excluded middle; how can we
resolve this apparent contradiction?
Fortunately, all three have the same solution. Let us start with (3). The problem
with excluded middle in topological models is that it may not hold continuously:
e.g. a subspace U ⊆ X and its complement X \ U will together contain all the
points of X , but the map from their coproduct U + (X \ U) to X does not have
a continuous section because the topology on the domain is different. Thus, we
cannot expect to have the full law of excluded middle in a topological model.
However, we can recover a form of excluded middle if we enhance our model and
our type theory with the ability to talk about discontinuous functions in addition to
continuous ones. Then it will be consistent to say something like “discontinuously,
for all P we have P ∨ ¬P”. There are at least three ways to add discontinuous
functions to a world where everything is continuous: we could add a new basic
notion of “discontinuous map”, we could add an operation that retopologizes a
space discretely (since every function out of a discrete space is continuous), or we
could dually add an operation that retopologizes a space indiscretely (since every
function into an indiscrete space is continuous). In fact, we will do all three; we will
denote the two retopologization operations by ♭ and ♯, respectively. Categorically,
♭ is a coreflection and ♯ is a reflection; in type theory we call them modalities.
Now let us move on to question (2). Here our answer comes from Lawvere (2007)
(see also Lawvere and Menni 2015), who has proposed an axiomatization of “cat-
egories of cohesive spaces” based entirely on adjoint functors and their properties.
This is convenient because it is easy to generalize to homotopy theory (regarded as
1This is different from what a classical algebraic topologist means by “BG” for a topological
group G. The latter is the ordinary ∞-groupoid with one object whose identifications are points of
G, whose 2-identifications are paths in G, etc.—i.e. the delooping of the fundamental ∞-groupoid
of G.
2Modulo dealing correctly with endpoints, equalities between paths and paths between equali-
ties are actually the same, but are different from paths between paths and from equalities between
equalities.
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(∞, 1)-category theory), since we have well-behaved notions of adjoint∞-functors.
Lawvere has considered many axioms, but the basic setup is a string of four adjoint
functors:
sets
cohesive spaces
p∗ p!p∗p! ⊣⊣⊣
in which p∗ (hence also p!) is fully faithful. The idea is that p∗ finds the underlying
set of a space, p∗ equips a set with the discrete topology, and p! equips it with the
indiscrete topology. (We will return to the meaning of p! below.) It follows that
p∗p∗ is a coreflection into the subcategory of discrete spaces while p
!p∗ is a reflection
into the subcategory of indiscrete spaces; thus they coincide with the modalities
♭ and ♯ mentioned above. We can ∞-ize this whole setup by simply replacing
categories with (∞, 1)-categories, “sets” with “∞-groupoids”, and adjoint functors
with adjoint ∞-functors; this has been studied extensively by Schreiber (2013).
Finally, there is a topos-theoretic side to Lawvere’s work which informs our
answer to question (1). If the category of cohesive spaces is to be a topos, then the
existence of this adjoint string says that it must be a local and locally connected
topos. And we know how to construct local and locally connected toposes, by
taking categories of sheaves on Grothendieck sites with special properties (see e.g
Johnstone 2002, C3.3.10 and C3.6.3(d)). Thus, it stands to reason that by taking
∞-sheaves on similar sorts of sites, we should be able to construct cohesive (∞, 1)-
toposes, and this is in fact the case, as shown by Schreiber (2013). The objects of
the particular cohesive (∞, 1)-topos we are interested in are known as topological
∞-groupoids or topological stacks.
Real-cohesive homotopy type theory. At this point we may appear to have
wandered rather far from our original motivating problem, namely that we need
an “internal” way to construct the fundamental ∞-groupoid. In fact, however,
we have snuck up behind it and are about ready to pounce. The secret lies with
Lawvere’s fourth functor p!. In his 1-categorical context, it constructs the set
of connected components of a space, since a map from any space to a discrete
one must be constant on every component. However, when we generalize to the
(∞, 1)-categorical context, the analogous p! is the fundamental∞-groupoid functor !
Unfortunately, to explain how this comes about would take too much space here.
Some insight may be gained from the proof of Theorem 9.5 below; for more details
see Schreiber (2013, Proposition 4.3.32) or Carchedi (2015, §3).
Just as p∗p∗ and p
!p∗ induce the operations ♭ and ♯ on the type theory of cohesive
spaces, the composite p∗p! induces a third modality, a reflection into discrete spaces
that we call the shape and denote s. (See Remark 9.7 for discussion of the name
“shape”.) With s in our type theory, we can at least state the desired relation
between the circles: we should have sS1 = S1. The existence of s alone does not
suffice to prove this, however; what we need is an additional axiom guaranteeing
that s is in fact constructed out of continuous paths indexed by intervals in R, as
we expect. To be precise, we assert that s is the “internal localization” at R, as
in Schreiber (2013, Proposition 3.9.4) and Dugger (2001, Proposition 8.3).
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At last, we have a type theory in which we can reproduce the classical proof of
Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem, using synthetic homotopy theory in the appropriate
place. We perform the topological part of the proof in type theory, using classical
axioms such as our modified form of excluded middle where appropriate. Then
at the end we apply s, use our calculation that sS1 = S1, and then appeal to the
synthetic proof of π1(S
1) = Z to reach a contradiction.
The type theory formed by the addition of s to ♭ and ♯ is called cohesive homotopy
type theory, and was already sketched by Schreiber and Shulman (2012). Our theory
is a further enhancement of this which I call real-cohesive homotopy type theory, due
to the special role played by the real numbers in defining s using continuous paths.
As we will see, the simple axiom of real-cohesion has many striking consequences,
especially combined with our modified classical axioms. In addition to Brouwer’s
fixed-point theorem, it implies versions of the Intermediate Value Theorem, and
characterizes the internal functions R → R as being precisely those that are ε-δ
continuous in the usual sense. The present paper is a formal development of just
enough real-cohesive homotopy type theory to enable the proof of the Brouwer
fixed-point theorem, which we give in §12.
The problem of comonadic modalities. It should be noted before proceeding
that there are in fact many subtly different ways to represent the modalities s, ♭,
and ♯ in type theory. The problems in trying to do this arise from the fact that
everything in ordinary type theory happens in an arbitrary context, which means
that all type-theoretic operations must correspond to category-theoretic operations
that apply in each slice category and are stable under pullback. For instance, the
na¨ıve type-theoretic notion of “reflective subuniverse” (UFP 2013, Definition 7.7.1)
corresponds categorically not to a mere reflective subcategory, but to a “reflective
subfibration” of the self-indexing.
For ♯ this is not a problem, since it is a left exact reflector (being a composite
of two right adjoints), and any left-exact-reflective subcategory admits a canonical
extension to a reflective subfibration. For s, which is a reflector but not left exact,
it is more of an issue; however, as long as s can be defined by an internal localiza-
tion — which categorically means that our topos is not just locally connected but
stably locally connected (see Johnstone 2011) — it can be extended to a reflective
subfibration. (The category-theoretic side of such modalities will be studied else-
where; presently we are concerned with their type-theoretic manifestation, with the
category theory providing only motivation. Internally in type theory, modalities of
this sort were sketched briefly by UFP (2013, §7.7) and will be studied in detail by
Rijke, Shulman, and Spitters (2016).)
The real problem arises with the modality ♭, which is a coreflector, and cannot
be extended to a “coreflective subfibration”. In fact, one can prove a “no-go theo-
rem” (Theorem 4.1) that the only coreflective subfibrations are those of the form
U (A) = A × U for a subterminal object U , and ♭ is certainly not of this form.
Thus, we must find some way to represent ♭ that prevents it from being applied in
arbitrary contexts.
Schreiber and Shulman (2012) did this by using ♯Type. We cannot have ♭ as an
operation Type → Type on the universe itself, but we can have it as an operation
♯Type→ ♯Type, i.e. a “discontinuous” self-map of the universe. This choice had the
advantage of being formalizable in existing proof assistants, but the disadvantage
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that it required developing large amounts of theory of ♯Type as “the external cate-
gory of types” (which was mostly omitted by Schreiber and Shulman 2012). Even
worse, there is no way to “escape” from ♯Type, but it should be the case that if we
have a particular type defined in the empty context, such as N, we can define ♭N
as an actual type, rather than just an element of ♯Type. Finally, in Schreiber and
Shulman (2012) all the modalities were obtained by asserting axioms, but for good
formal behavior of a type theory it is preferable to use rules rather than axioms,
since axioms interfere with canonicity.
For these reasons, in this paper we take a different approach, based on the
“judgmental reconstruction” of modal logic by Pfenning and Davies (2001). We
modify our base type theory by introducing a new sort of hypothesis x :: A, which
we call crisp, intended to mark whether dependence on a variable is continuous or
discontinuous. Based on this, we can then introduce ♭ and ♯ using the usual sort of
rules for type constructors: formation, introduction, elimination, and computation.
Our rules for ♭ are almost exactly those of Pfenning and Davies (2001) for .
If B is a type depending only on crisp hypotheses we can form ♭B, and similarly
if a term M : B depends only on crisp hypotheses we can form M ♭ : ♭B, while
an element of ♭B can always be assumed to be of this form. However, although
our ♯ on its own behaves like the © of Pfenning and Davies (2001), its rules are
quite different (in particular, we have no judgment “M ∼: A” like in Pfenning and
Davies (2001)) and make it automatically right adjoint to ♭. The resulting type
theory, which requires no axioms yet, we call spatial type theory; we expect that
it corresponds semantically to local toposes, which have p∗ ⊣ p∗ ⊣ p! but no p!. It
includes as a fragment the “modal logic of local toposes” of Awodey and Birkedal
(2003) and Awodey, Birkedal, and Scott (1999).
In particular, the rules of ♭ stipulate that it can only be applied in a context
of purely discontinuous dependence, circumventing the no-go theorem. In addition
to resolving all the above problems with ♯Type, this has the additional advantage
that we can apply ♭ not only in a totally empty context, but in a context of other
discrete spaces. Categorically speaking, this means we treat the topos of cohesive
spaces as indexed over the base topos via p∗, which is exactly the right thing to
do for any geometric morphism (see Johnstone 2002, B3.1.2; and Schreiber 2013,
Theorem 3.4.20).
Remark 1.3. One might argue that it would be better to include a separate kind
of type representing objects in the base category, and type constructors represent-
ing the functors p∗, p∗, etc. rather than the monads and comonads they induce.
This would be in line with the “judgmental deconstruction” of Reed (2009) that
decomposes  and © into pairs of adjoint functors. It could be that this is indeed
better; in fact, the current rules for ♭ and ♯ were deduced from a generalization of
Reed (2009) developed by Licata and Shulman (2016).
However, for now I have chosen to go with a simpler type theory in which there is
only one kind of type. Learning to keep track of the two kinds of variables in spatial
type theory is hard enough. Moreover, the theory of Licata and Shulman (2016)
is general enough to include this case as well: unlike  and ©, our modalities
♭ and ♯ are type-theoretically sensible in their own right without needing to be
deconstructed. There is also a philosophical attractiveness to the position that all
types have topological structure, even if that structure happens to be discrete or
codiscrete.
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Remark 1.4. It is natural to wonder why we introduce crisp hypotheses x :: A,
when semantically they are essentially just ordinary hypotheses u : ♭A. Why not
simply restrict the formation of ♭B and M ♭ to contexts containing only variables
of the form u : ♭A?
This might be simpler in some respects, but it would be bizarre in others. The
official type-theoretic reason is that, as noted by Pfenning and Davies (2001, §4.2),
“substitution would no longer be an admissible rule”. In less fancy language, that
means that we would not be able to determine the validity of an expression by
plain syntactic analysis, or else we would have to introduce a complicated calculus
of explicit substitutions.
For instance, if M ♭ could be formed in a context of variables u : ♭A, then we
could define a function f :≡ (λx. x♭) : ♭B → ♭♭B, since a variable x : ♭B has the
correct form to allow us to write x♭ : ♭♭B. Now suppose we also had a function
g : A → ♭B. Then the composite f ◦ g would reduce to λa. g(a)♭; but g(a) does
not have the correct form to allow us to apply (–)♭ to it! So if we allowed g(a)♭
as a valid expression, we would be unable to determine its validity by inspection,
but would have to “guess” that it was obtained by substituting g(a) into the valid
x♭. Otherwise, we would have to write instead x♭[g(a)/x], where the substitution
[g(a)/x] is not, as usual, a defined operation on expressions, but a basic part of the
grammar of expressions (an “explicit substitution”).
The formalism of crisp variables avoids both horns of this dilemma. In this
setup, f : ♭B → ♭♭B must be defined as λx. let u♭ := x in u♭♭ (see §4), and when we
compose it with g we get λa. let u♭ := g(a) in u♭♭. Now we are no longer applying
(–)♭ directly to g(a), but to a crisp variable that it has been destructed into; thus
the syntactic invariant that indicates a correct application of (–)♭ is preserved.
With all that said, once the basic lemmas about ♭ are proven using crisp variables,
in most cases we will be able to blur the distinction between crisp elements of A
and elements of ♭A, at least when working informally.
Now we have to choose how to represent s. One possibility would be to add
further new judgment forms so that it could be characterized similarly to ♭ and ♯.
The general theory of Licata and Shulman (2016) immediately suggests how to do
this, but the judgmental structure of the resulting theory would be substantially
more complicated. Moreover, semantically it seems likely to correspond to indexing
the base topos over the cohesive topos by means of p!, which is at least an odd thing
to do. We would also need to take special care that the rules didn’t force s to be
left exact (whereas our rules for ♭ and ♯ do automatically make both of them left
exact), since in our desired models it is not.
For these reasons, I have chosen to introduce s axiomatically. However, rather
than asserting the modality itself as an axiom, we assert a set of “generators” for
it, enabling the modality itself to be constructed by a higher inductive localization.
This has some technical advantages, and it also leads naturally into the stronger
axiom of real-cohesion, where we can simply assert that R alone is a sufficient
generator for s. It seems highly unlikely that the special position of R in real-
cohesion could be obtained by rules rather than an axiom, so we lose nothing in
that regard by making s axiomatic already.
It should be clear from this discussion, however, that there is nothing sacred
about the particular choices made in this paper. Most of the length of this paper
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is devoted to proving from our rules and axioms that s, ♭, and ♯ satisfy the cor-
rect relationships (which Schreiber and Shulman (2012) just assumed to be true).
Specifically, we need to know that ♯ and s are reflectors (Theorem 3.6 and Theo-
rem 9.14) and ♭ is a coreflector (Corollary 6.15), that ♯ is left exact (Theorem 3.9),
that s ⊣ ♭ ⊣ ♯ (Corollary 6.26 and Theorem 9.15), that s preserves finite products
and reflects into the same subcategory that ♭ coreflects into, that the images of
♭ and ♯ are equivalent (Corollary 6.23) by an equivalence that identifies ♭ with ♯
(Theorem 6.22), and that s is generated by R (Axiom R♭). Once these facts are
established somehow, the contentful theorems (such as sS1 = S1 and the Brouwer
fixed-point theorem) are essentially independent of the underlying type-theoretic
machinery. I had to fix some particular choice of that machinery in order to write
the paper, but this choice made may very well turn out not to be the optimal one.
Moreover, the behavior of “spatial type theory” as a type theory has not yet
been studied. It looks somewhat reasonable, in that ♯ and ♭ have introduction
and elimination rules of roughly the usual sort. But for it to be really respectable
as a type theory one should prove various standard theorems about it, such as
normalization and canonicity, and this has not been done. (Licata and Shulman
(2016) did this for a more general class of “adjoint logic” type theories, but only
under the fairly severe simplifying assumptions of no dependent types and only one
variable in the context. Licata, Shulman, and Riley (2017) allows multi-variable
contexts, but still no dependent types, and has a rather fiddlier adequacy theorem.)
Eventually, one might hope to implement such a type theory in a proof assistant.
Outline of the paper. This paper has three parts; but rather than coming in
sequential order, one of the parts is interleaved through the other two. The first
part, consisting of §§2–7, develops spatial type theory. It begins with the judgmental
structure (§2), then moves on to ♯ (§3) and then ♭ (§§4–6). In §7 we sketch briefly
the intended categorical models of this theory, and use them to motivate the axioms
to be introduced in the third part.
The second, interleaved, part, consisting of §§2.1, 3.1, 3.2, 6.4 and 8.3, studies
classical axioms that can be added to spatial type theory without destroying its
topological content, such as the modified law of excluded middle mentioned above.
It is interleaved because the formulation and proof of various classical principles
requires more and more of the base type theory, but at the same time provides useful
motivation for the same. In §2.1 we state the restricted law of excluded middle,
and decide that in order to state a similarly restricted axiom of choice we need ♯.
After introducing ♯, in §3.1 we revisit excluded middle in some other guises made
possible by ♯, and in §3.2 we formulate the axiom of choice, but note that there
ought to be simpler versions available if we had ♭. Thus, after introducing ♭, in §6.4
we discuss these versions and their applications. Finally, after stating the axioms of
real-cohesion, in §8.3 we show that these axioms strengthen our classicality axioms,
and state one further such axiom.
The third part, consisting of §§8–12, adds additional axioms to spatial type the-
ory that make it cohesive and real-cohesive, and applies them to prove the Brouwer
fixed-point theorem. In §8 we state the cohesion and real-cohesion axioms in gen-
erator form and deduce some consequences, and in §9 we construct s as a higher
inductive type. Section 10 relates our axioms back to the motivating topos-theoretic
notions. In §11 we note some implications of real-cohesion for synthetic topology
REAL-COHESIVE HOTT 11
that don’t require any higher homotopy, including some versions of the Intermedi-
ate Value Theorem and a version of “Brouwer’s theorem” that all functions R→ R
are continuous. Finally, in §12 we bring everything together to prove the Brouwer
fixed-point theorem by mimicking the classical proof, invoking synthetic homotopy
theory and our modified classicality axioms in the appropriate places. We also sim-
ilarly prove a constructive variant asserting only the existence of approximate fixed
points, but not requiring any classicality axioms.
On axioms and notation. Because we are developing a hierarchy of type theories
(spatial < cohesive < real-cohesive), and using classical axioms in some places, we
keep careful track of which axioms are necessary for which theorems. In addition
to our classicality axioms (LEM, AC, and T) and (real-)cohesion axioms (C0, C1, C2,
and R♭), we track uses of the full univalence axiom (UA). We do need UA for our
proof of the Brouwer fixed-point theorem, but most of the theory does not require
it, and hence should be valid in a 1-topos model in addition to an (∞, 1)-topos
model. We will, however, use without comment the axioms of function extensional-
ity, propositional resizing, and univalence restricted to propositions (“propositional
extensionality”), since these are all valid in a 1-topos.
We will generally adhere to the notation of UFP (2013). For example, we write
x = y for the identity type, M ≡ N for a judgmental equality, and a :≡ P if a is
currently being defined to equal P . However, as remarked above, we will call ele-
ments of x = y “identifications” or “equalities” rather than “paths”, and we write
S1 for the higher inductive circle to reserve S1 for the topological one. We will also
call (−1)-truncated types simply propositions rather than “mere propositions”, as is
common outside of UFP (2013). Similarly, we pronounce the (−1)-truncated exis-
tential (as in UFP (2013), ∃x:AP (x) means
∥∥∥∑(x:A) P (x)∥∥∥) simply as “there exists”,
rather than the “there merely exists” of UFP (2013). This also requires avoiding
other terminology such as “propositional equality” and “propositional uniqueness
rule” since the notions in question are not (−1)-truncated; for this purpose we
introduce the new adjective typal (to contrast with judgmental).
Vistas. The Brouwer fixed-point theorem is not itself of central importance; it
serves mainly as a convenient test case. The real point is the development of spatial,
cohesive, and real-cohesive type theory. Some possibilities for further applications
include the following.
• Real-cohesion should also imply other applications of homotopy theory to
topology, such as the Lefschetz fixed-point theorem and the hairy ball the-
orem.
• In cohesive homotopy type theory, a topological group appears as an or-
dinary internal (0-truncated) group, which can be delooped as in Licata
and Finster (2014). These deloopings are classifying spaces for topologi-
cal principal bundles up to isomorphism (rather than the up-to-homotopy-
equivalence classifying spaces of classical algebraic topology); the classifying
maps live in “continuous cohomology theories”.
• Matrix groups and their deloopings are important in classical algebraic
topology, but as∞-groupoids they are hard to define in ordinary homotopy
type theory. In real-cohesive homotopy type theory, we can obtain them as
shapes of ordinary set-level definitions. The same is true for other classical
objects such as higher Hopf fibrations.
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• There are other local toposes than cohesive and real-cohesive ones, such as
Sierpinski cones, the topological topos of Johnstone (1979), and the relative
realizability topos of Awodey, Birkedal, and Scott (1999). Each of these
should motivate different axioms.
• Similarly, there are cohesive toposes other than real-cohesive ones. Some,
which play an important role in Schreiber (2013), encode smoothness rather
than continuity; these satisfy a version of Axiom R♭ with R replaced by
a type of “smooth reals”. Other interesting examples include the global
homotopy theory of Rezk (2014), the ∞-topos of simplicial ∞-groupoids,
and the tangent ∞-toposes of Lurie (2014).
On theft and honest toil. One of the advantages of type theory is that it enables
us to “add structure by failing to rule it out”. For instance, because type theory
admits topological models, if we define (say) a group in type theory, as long as
we didn’t use any principles that are invalid topologically, we have automatically
defined a topological group as well. Homotopy type theory applies the same effect
to ∞-groupoids: as long as we don’t use any principles like UIP, everything we do
in type theory is automatically homotopical.1 This is especially valuable because
working directly with∞-groupoids can be combinatorially complicated and require
a lot of background in algebraic topology and category theory.
Spatial and cohesive type theory extend this advantage even further: not only
does type theory apply automatically to spaces and to ∞-groupoids, it also ap-
plies to spatial ∞-groupoids, which have both structures at once. Moreover, even
if we didn’t have any categorical models in mind to specify what a “spatial ∞-
groupoid” might mean, we could still undertake to study them in type theory by
simply combining the axioms and principles that pertain to spatial models (such
as continuity principles and/or modalities) and homotopical models (such as uni-
valence and HITs). Except for §§7 and 10, the present paper can be read from such
a perspective.
It is true that mathematical honesty may demand that such models eventually
be produced, to ensure relative consistency and allow our “synthetic” results to be
translated into classical theorems. However, once someone has undertaken that toil
(in our case, the toil includes Gepner and Kock 2012; Kapulkin and Lumsdaine 2012;
Lumsdaine and Shulman 2016; Lumsdaine and Warren 2015; Lurie 2009; Schreiber
2013; Shulman 2011a,b, as well as future work that remains to be done), we can
continue to work in the type theory without needing to think about or understand
the model. This principle should also apply to other possible enhancements of
spatial type theory.
Acknowledgments. This paper owes a lot to many people. My understanding
of cohesive (∞, 1)-toposes developed over the course of many discussions with Urs
Schreiber, who also helped greatly with understanding the categorical semantics of
modalities (this joint work is represented in Schreiber and Shulman (2012), which
this paper draws heavily on). Other participants at the nForum and n-Category
Cafe´ have also been very helpful, particularly Zhen Lin. Andrej Bauer and Mart´ın
Escardo´ patiently explained to me the relationship between different classicality ax-
ioms and some existing theories of synthetic topology, and Bas Spitters contributed
1We do have to be careful that this happens in the right way. For instance, the na¨ıve definition
of “group” doesn’t give the correct ∞-groupoidal notion, but there is a different one that does.
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the proof of Example 8.34. Urs Schreiber, Bas Spitters, Egbert Rijke, and Mart´ın
Escardo´ also gave useful feedback on drafts. Finally, Dan Licata explained Pfen-
ning and Davies (2001) to me, did most of the work on our joint paper (2016)
generalizing Reed (2009) that led to the spatial type theory presented here, and
has been generally indispensable in teaching me to sound at least vaguely like a
type theorist.
2. Judgments of spatial type theory
As explained in the introduction, we take the point of view that all types have
spatial structure, independently of their ∞-groupoid structure, and concomitantly
all ordinary type-theoretic constructions are continuous. Now, it does happen some-
times in mathematics that we want to talk about things that are not continuous.
Our main target in this paper — the Brouwer fixed-point theorem — is a prime
example: fixed points of functions cannot be selected continuously with respect to
the space of functions. For this reason, we augment our type theory with technol-
ogy that enables us to talk about possibly-discontinuous constructions as well as
continuous ones.
Recall that the basic judgment of type theory is a : A for some specific type A,
expressing that a is a point of the type A. This judgment is used in two ways: for
some specific expression a we can judge it to be true, or for some variable x we
can suppose it to be true. For instance, in a statement like “whenever x : A then
f(x) : B” we see both uses: x is a variable hypothesized to be of type A, and under
this hypothesis, f(x) is an expression judged to have type B. It is a distinguishing
feature of type theory that whenever x : A is a hypothesis, x must be a variable; it
makes no sense to say “suppose that f(x) : B” (in contrast to the behavior of the
membership predicate ∈ of set theory).
In a world where types are spaces, all ordinary type-theoretic constructions are
continuous; thus a statement like “whenever x : A then f(x) : B” means that
f(x) depends continuously on x. We now augment our type theory with new
features to express the possibility that this dependence may not be continuous. In
general, we might imagine doing this either by modifying the hypothesis x : A or
the conclusion f(x) : B. Since continuous functions are also discontinuous,1 the
variance of implication means that if we modify x : A, we would have to replace
it by a stronger judgment (i.e. one that implies x : A), whereas if we modify the
conclusion f(x) : B, we would have to replace it by a weaker judgment (i.e. one
that is implied by f(x) : B).
We take the first route. Following Pfenning and Davies (2001), we denote the
stronger judgment by
x :: A
When we hypothesize x :: A, this means that we allow ourselves to perform con-
structions and proofs using x that may not respect the topology of A (but they still
must respect the topology of any other ordinary hypotheses y : C). In other words,
having x :: A is more powerful than having x : A; and thus, oppositely, proving
something with a hypothesis of x :: A says less than proving it with a hypothesis
x : A.
1We will use “discontinuous” to mean “not necessarily continuous”, by analogy with other
phrases such as “noncommutative ring”.
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∆ | Γ ⊢ A : Type ∆ | Γ, x : A ⊢ B : Type
∆ | Γ ⊢∏(x:A)B : Type
∆ | Γ, x : A ⊢ b : B
∆ | Γ ⊢ λx. b :∏(x:A)B
∆ | Γ ⊢ f :∏(x:A)B ∆ | Γ ⊢ a : A
∆ | Γ ⊢ f(a) : B[a/x]
∆ | Γ, x : A ⊢ b : B ∆ | Γ ⊢ a : A
∆ | Γ ⊢ (λx. b)(a) ≡ b[a/x]
∆ | Γ ⊢ f :∏(x:A)B
∆ | Γ ⊢ f ≡ (λx. f(x))
Figure 2.
∏
-types in spatial type theory
We refer to x :: A as a crisp hypothesis, and x as a crisp variable.1 (Pfenning
and Davies (2001), whose focus is on logic, use the word valid.) A crisp variable
can always be used as an ordinary one, but also (potentially) in other ways. If we
don’t want to give a name to the variable, we may say that A holds crisply. If
necessary, for contrast we will refer to an ordinary hypothesis or variable x : A as
cohesive.
For consistency, we require that all variables appearing in the type of a crisp
hypothesis are themselves crisp. Moreover, a crisp variable can only be substituted
by expressions involving only other crisp variables. If M : A is an expression other
than a variable, we will say that M is crisp, and sometimes write M :: A, if the
only variables it contains are crisp. Thus, as for Pfenning and Davies (2001) the
notion of crisp conclusion is not a basic part of the theory, but rather is defined to
mean an ordinary conclusion that depends only upon crisp hypotheses.
All the ordinary rules of type theory (
∏
-types,
∑
-types, =-types, W -types,
HITs) are imported into our theory only in the world of cohesive variables. Appli-
cations of these rules can involve dependence on “unaffected” crisp variables; but
the variables that are manipulated in the rules, as well as their conclusions, are
always cohesive. (We will eventually prove, however, that in some cases this can
be worked around.)
At a formal level, what we are doing is separating our context into two pieces:
first a crisp one, then a cohesive one, maintaining the restriction that the type of
each variable can only contain variables occurring to its left. We would therefore
write our judgments as ∆ | Γ ⊢ J . The previous paragraphmeans that the ordinary
rules of type theory leave the crisp context ∆ untouched; for example, the rules for∏
-types are shown in Figure 2. In what follows, we will attempt to describe all the
rules of spatial type theory in words, but we will also include some formal syntax of
this sort for precision. After introducing the rules, however, we will reason almost
entirely informally in the style of UFP (2013).
We will have occasion to use various axioms (including axioms from UFP (2013)
such as function extensionality and univalence), so it is worth noting how these
1The word “crisp” is chosen as having a connotation somewhat similar to “discrete” (i.e. not
flabby or deformable) and being relatively free of other mathematical meanings. Its one existing
mathematical usage that I am aware of is in fuzzy-set theory, where it refers to ordinary (non-
fuzzy) sets; this is actually closely related to our usage, since many categories of fuzzy sets are
quasitoposes (Wyler 1991, Chapter 8) in which the crisp sets are what we would call the codiscrete
objects, so that they also “forget about the cohesion”.
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interact with our split contexts. Ordinarily in type theory an axiom means an
assumed element of some type. There are two ways of thinking about such axioms
in type theory: they can be premise-free rules added to the theory, or they can be
simply additional assumptions in the context that are never discharged. According
to the first approach, an axiomatic a : A in our theory would be given by the rule
∆ | Γ ⊢ a : A
Note that because this rule is valid even if Γ is empty, it implies unavoidably
that the term a : A is crisp. The second approach is more flexible: we can add
assumptions to either the crisp context ∆ or the cohesive one Γ. However, in this
paper, whenever we speak of an axiom, it is to be understood that it is crisp.
We will also consider some “axioms” that are not stated as assumed elements of
a fixed type, e.g. because they quantify over crisp variables. These can, however,
always be formulated as “unjustified rules”; an example will occur momentarily.
Moreover, once we introduce ♭, all such axioms can be reformulated in the usual
way (modulo potential issues with universes, which we ignore).
2.1. The law of excluded middle. With the tool of crisp hypotheses in hand,
we can express a version of the law of excluded middle that does not contradict
topological models.
Axiom LEM. (Crisp excluded middle) For any crisp P :: Prop, we have P ∨ ¬P .
Remark 2.1. In ordinary mathematics, we blur the distinction between a hypo-
thetical conclusion (or entailment) and an implication (or function). That is, when
we write “if x : A then f(x) : B(x)”, we might mean that we have constructed
f(x) : B(x) under the hypothesis of x : A, or we might mean that we have an
element f :
∏
(x:A)B(x). These two statements are intimately connected by the
introduction and elimination rules for
∏
, so no confusion results from failing to
distinguish between them.
However, when the hypothesis is crisp, we have as yet no type-former corre-
sponding to
∏
: we cannot abstract over a crisp variable. Thus, statements such as
crisp excluded middle must be read as hypothetical conclusions. In type-theoretic
language, we have to read Axiom LEM as an “unjustified rule”:
∆ | · ⊢ P : Prop
∆ | · ⊢ lemP : P ∨ ¬P
rather than an assumed element of some fixed type. (We write “∆ | ·” to indicate
that the cohesive context is empty.)
Fortunately, in §§3 and 4 we will introduce new type formers that will allow us
to mostly go back to ignoring this distinction. See Remark 1.4 for an explanation
of why we do this in two steps.
To understand why this law of excluded middle is sensible, we need to think a
bit about what a predicate P : A → Prop looks like topologically. In the classical
category of topological spaces, the monomorphisms are the continuous injections;
they need not necessarily be subspace inclusions. Therefore, given a subobject (i.e.
a mono) m : [P ] →֒ A, there is a difference between saying that every point of A
is in [P ] (which is to say that the injection m is actually a bijection) and saying
that m is a homeomorphism. We regard the judgments “P (x) for all x :: A” and
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“P (x) for all x : A” as expressing this same dichotomy in our type theory. The
latter says that P (x) holds for all x continuously as a function of x, so that our
monomorphism m must have a section, and hence be a homeomorphism.
Now if P : A → Prop, its pointwise negation ¬P : A → Prop is, essentially by
definition, the largest subobject of A disjoint from P . Topologically, this means the
corresponding mono [¬P ] →֒ A should contain exactly those points of A that are
not in [P ], but also that [¬P ] →֒ A must be a subspace inclusion — for the inclusion
of the subspace determined by those points is certainly disjoint from [P ] and hence
must be contained in [¬P ] as a subobject of A.
It should be clear now that the ordinary LEM cannot hold, for it would assert
that for any mono m : [P ] →֒ A, the space A is the disjoint union of the space [P ]
and the subspace determined by its complement. This is not true in general even
if [P ] is a subspace inclusion. However, since [P ] and [¬P ] together do contain all
the points of A, it is sensible to assert that for any x : A we have P (x) ∨ ¬P (x)
crisply, and this is what the crisp law of excluded middle gives us.
Remark 2.2. It is natural to wonder how we can express internally in type the-
ory the property that a subobject is a subspace inclusion. The above analysis
suggests that the double negation ¬¬P : A → Prop should be the subspace con-
taining the same points as P , so that P would itself be a subspace if and only
if
∏
(x:A) ¬¬P (x) → P (x). In §3 we will introduce another way to express this
property, and in §3.1 we will prove (using our axioms) that they are equivalent.
Remark 2.3. The assertion that every subspace has a complementary subspace
(such that their disjoint union is the whole space) translates to
∏
(P :Prop) ¬P ∨¬¬P .
Thus, the latter assertion, which is sometimes called de Morgan’s law (since it is
equivalent to the one direction of de Morgan’s laws that is not constructively valid,
¬(P ∧Q)→ (¬P ∨ ¬Q)), is not acceptable for us either.
We can try to perform a similar analysis of the axiom of choice. There is one
subtlety: we must realize that the “surjections” of type theory correspond topo-
logically to regular epimorphisms — which is to say, quotient maps — rather than
arbitrary epimorphisms. One way to see that this must be so is to recall that any
surjection between sets in type theory can be proven to be a quotient of its do-
main by some equivalence relation, which is true of regular epis of spaces but not
ordinary ones. Another way is to recall that in type theory we have a (surjection,
embedding) factorization system, and topologically the left class corresponding to
the monomorphisms is the quotient maps.
Now supposing that Y → X is a quotient map, of course there may not be any
continuous section of it. However, if the only source of non-classicality is topology,
it should have a discontinuous section. Thus we may hope to be able to formulate
this principle in our type theory. However, if we inspect the usual formulation of
the axiom of choice from UFP (2013, Theorem 3.2.2):(∏
x:X
‖Y (x)‖
)
→
∥∥∥∥∥
∏
x:X
Y (x)
∥∥∥∥∥
it is not clear how to do this with our current tools. What we want is for the
section f :
∏
(x:X) Y (x) on the right to be discontinuous. But at present we can
only indicate discontinuity by a conclusion f(x) : Y (x) with a crisp hypothesis
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x :: X , and we cannot apply a ‖–‖ outside such a judgment. (The outer ‖–‖ is, of
course, necessary for consistency with univalence.)
In the next section, therefore, we introduce a new type former ♯ that “internal-
izes” such judgments, allowing us to solve this problem (and many others).
3. The ♯ modality and codiscreteness
Topologically, the function-type
∏
(x:X) Y (x) represents the space of continuous
functions; but as we saw in the last section, we sometimes want to internalize the
notion of a discontinuous function. Since every function out of a discrete topological
space is continuous, and every function into a codiscrete space is continuous, to
make a discontinuous function continuous all we have to do is retopologize its
domain discretely or its codomain codiscretely. We represent these “retopologizing”
constructions by modalities called ♭ and ♯, which “reify” judgments involving crisp
hypotheses.
In this section we study ♯ first, as it is somewhat simpler and stands on its own
better. Described in English, the rules are as follows; a type-theoretic presentation
is shown in Figure 3.
• For any A : Type there is a type ♯A.
• If a : A, then a♯ : ♯A.
• All crisp variables appearing in a can become cohesive ones in a♯. In other
words, when we write (–)♯, inside the (–) we are free to use all variables
introduced outside of it as if they were crisp. In yet other words, when
we “hit a (–)♯” while parsing an expression, all variables currently in the
context become crisp. This expresses the fact that all functions into a
codiscrete space are continuous.
• In the same way, all crisp variables appearing in a type A can become
cohesive ones in ♯A. This expresses the fact that the space of codiscrete
types is itself codiscrete (which may not be obvious, but is true; we will
explain it topologically in Remark 3.14).
• From any crisp element x :: ♯A, we can extract an element x♯ : A. Of
course, since x is crisp, x♯ is also crisp.
• A computation rule, which says (a♯)♯ ≡ a. This requires (a♯)♯ to be well-
typed, which means that only crisp variables in the ambient context can
occur in a. (The above rule says that when writing a♯, cohesive variables in
the ambient context can be used as crisp inside a; but such variables remain
cohesive in the term a♯, potentially preventing us from writing (a♯)♯.)
• A uniqueness rule, which says (a♯)♯ ≡ a. This likewise requires both sides
to be well-typed, but now the potential problem lies with the right-hand
side.1 In writing (a♯)
♯ the cohesive variables in the context might be treated
as crisp inside a♯ and hence inside a, so that a itself might not be well-typed
outside of (–)♯.
Remark 3.1. ♯ is a negative type former. This means, roughly, that its intro-
duction rule(s) are chosen to match its elimination rule(s) rather than vice versa.
For instance, function types are negative because to introduce a function we use
1Note that if we view this rule as an “expansion” a →η (a♯)
♯ rather than a reduction, as is
common for uniqueness rules, then it shares with the computation rule the property that it can
be applied to any well-typed input a : ♯A.
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∆,Γ | · ⊢ A : Type
∆ | Γ ⊢ ♯A : Type
∆,Γ | · ⊢M : A
∆ | Γ ⊢M ♯ : ♯A
∆ | · ⊢M : ♯A
∆ | Γ ⊢M♯ : A
∆ | · ⊢M : A
∆ | Γ ⊢ (M ♯)♯ ≡M : A
∆ | Γ ⊢M : ♯A
∆ | Γ ⊢ (M♯)♯ ≡M : ♯A
Figure 3. Rules for ♯
λ-abstraction, which essentially means we have to say what will happen when we
apply the eliminator (application) on any input. In the case of ♯, the elimination
rule says that we can get to A if we have a crisp element of ♯A; thus to introduce
an element of ♯A, it suffices to give an element of A under the assumption that
everything is crisp.
Negative type formers tend to require (judgmental) uniqueness rules (whereas
for positive ones, a typal uniqueness rule1 is usually provable). This holds true for
♯.
As our first application, we can make ♯ into a functor: given f : A → B, we
define ♯f : ♯A→ ♯B by
♯f(u) :≡ f(u♯)♯.
Note how the type-checking works: inside the (–)♯, the variable u :: ♯A is crisp, so
we can write u♯ : A and apply f to it. We can check functoriality: if also g : B → C,
then
♯g(♯f(u)) ≡ g((f(u♯)♯)♯)♯
≡ g(f(u♯))♯
≡ ♯(gf)(u).
In addition, for any A : Type, we have a map (–)♯ : A→ ♯A, and we can check that
this is natural:
♯f(x♯) ≡ f((x♯)♯)♯
≡ f(x)♯.
We will often omit parentheses around iterated sub- and superscripted ♯s (and,
later, ♭s), maintaining only their order. Thus, for instance, g((f(u♯)
♯)♯)
♯ becomes
instead g(f(u♯)
♯
♯)
♯, and f((x♯)♯)
♯ becomes f(x♯♯)
♯. This avoids proliferation of
parentheses.
Now, recall that our intent was that ♯A would be A retopologized codiscretely.
Thus, a type should be called codiscrete just when this operation does nothing to
it.
Definition 3.2. A type A : Type is codiscrete if (–)♯ : A→ ♯A is an equivalence.
The rules for ♯ transfer over to theorems about codiscrete types. For instance,
we have:
1Recall that we say “typal” to mean that a rule is witnessed by an inhabitant of the identity
type rather than being a judgmental equality, avoiding the older term “propositional” since it may
not be a “proposition” in the (−1)-truncated sense.
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Theorem 3.3. If P is codiscrete, then when constructing an element of P we may
assume that all variables in the context are crisp.
Proof. Since P is codiscrete, we have an inverse r : ♯P → P . Thus, it suffices to
construct an element of ♯P . But now we can apply (–)♯, which allows us to assume
all variables are crisp. 
Theorem 3.4. If P : ♯A→ Type is such that each P (v) is codiscrete, and we have
f :
∏
(x:A) P (x
♯), then we have g :
∏
(v:♯A) P (v) such that g(x
♯) = f(x) for all x : A.
We refer to this principle as ♯-induction.
Proof. Since each P (v) is codiscrete, we have inverses rv : ♯P (v) → P (v). Thus,
to construct g it will suffice to construct for each v : ♯A an element of ♯P (v), and
for this it suffices to construct an element of P (v) assuming a crisp v :: ♯A. Now of
course we have v♯ : A, and hence f(v♯) : P (v♯
♯) ≡ P (v), as desired. In symbols,
g(v) :≡ rv(f(v♯)♯).
Finally, we have
g(x♯) ≡ rv(f(x♯♯)♯) ≡ rv(f(x)♯) = f(x)
using the computation rule for ♯ and the fact that rv is an inverse of (–)
♯. 
We now show that the codiscrete types form a reflective subuniverse in the sense
of UFP (2013, §7.7).
Theorem 3.5. For any A : Type, the type ♯A is codiscrete.
Proof. Given z : ♯♯A, to define an element of ♯A it suffices to define an element of
A assuming z is crisp. But then we have z♯♯ : A. In other words,
(λz. z♯♯
♯) : ♯♯A→ ♯A.
Note that we cannot reduce z♯♯
♯ to z♯ using the uniqueness rule, since z♯ is not
well-typed for an arbitrary (cohesive) z.
We now show that this map is inverse to (–)♯ : ♯A→ ♯♯A. In one direction, if z
is y♯ for y : ♯A, we have
y♯♯♯
♯ ≡ y♯♯ ≡ y
using the computation rule followed by the uniqueness rule. Note that we could not
do this computation in the other order, because y♯♯ is not well-typed on its own: y
is not crisp, so neither is y♯. In the other direction, for any z : ♯♯A we have
z♯♯
♯♯ ≡ z♯♯ ≡ z
using the uniqueness rule twice; the first use is valid because z♯ is well-typed inside
the outer (–)♯. 
Theorem 3.6. If B : Type is codiscrete, then for any A : Type, precomposition
with (–)♯ : A→ ♯A is an equivalence
(♯A→ B) ≃ (A→ B).
More generally, if B : ♯A → Type has each B(v) codiscrete, then precomposition
with (–)♯ is an equivalence(∏
(v:♯A)B(v)
)
≃
(∏
(x:A)B(x
♯)
)
.
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Proof. We prove the more general statement. Since each B(v) is codiscrete, post-
composition with (–)♯ : B(v) → ♯B(v) is an equivalence. Thus, by the 2-out-of-3
property of equivalences, it will suffice to show that the precomposition map(∏
(v:♯A)♯B(v)
)
→
(∏
(x:A)♯B(x
♯)
)
is an equivalence. Now in the opposite direction, given f :
∏
(x:A) ♯B(x
♯), we can
construct g :
∏
(v:♯A) ♯B(v) by
g(v) :≡ f(v♯)♯♯.
Note that this has the form of the left-hand-side of the uniqueness rule, but that
rule doesn’t apply: “f(v♯)” would not be well-typed since v is not a crisp variable.
On the other hand, it has the correct type ♯B(v) because the uniqueness rule says
v♯
♯ ≡ v since v is crisp inside the (–)♯, hence f(v♯) : ♯B(v♯♯) ≡ ♯B(v).
If we precompose g with (–)♯ : A→ ♯A, we get
g(y♯) ≡ f(y♯♯)♯♯ ≡ f(y)♯♯ ≡ f(y)
where now we have been able to apply the uniqueness rule since f(y) is well-typed
on its own. On the other hand, if we start with h : ♯A → ♯B, precompose it with
(–)♯, and then extend the result back to ♯A as above, we get the function sending
v : ♯A to
h(v♯
♯)♯
♯ ≡ h(v)♯♯ ≡ h(v)
using the uniqueness rule twice. Applying function extensionality on both sides
completes the proof. 
Combining this with Theorem 3.4, by UFP (2013, Theorem 7.7.4) we see that the
codiscrete types are actually a modality in the sense of UFP (2013, §7.7). However,
in the present paper we are using the word “modality” more generally to include
coreflectors such as ♭ in addition to reflectors such as ♯, so we will refer to modalities
in the sense of UFP (2013, §7.7) as monadic modalities.
The fact that ♯ is a monadic modality formally implies many useful consequences.
In particular, essentially all properties of the n-truncation from UFP (2013, Chapter
7) that don’t refer to more than one value of n are true for all monadic modalities,
and hence in particular for ♯. Monadic modalities will be studied further by Rijke,
Shulman, and Spitters (2016); here we list some of the main results, specialized to
♯.
(1) A type A is codiscrete if and only if (–)♯ : A→ ♯A admits a retraction.
(2) If A,B,C are codiscrete, and we have x, y : A and functions f : B → A
and g : C → A, then the following types are also codiscrete:
1 A×B x =A y fibf (x) B ×A C A ≃ B is-n-type(A)
(3) If A is any type and P : A→ Type is such that each P (x) is codiscrete, then∏
(x:A) P (x) is codiscrete. If in addition A is codiscrete, then
∑
(x:A) P (x)
is also codiscrete.
(4) For any A,B, the canonical map ♯(A×B)→ ♯A× ♯B is an equivalence.
(5) If A is a proposition, so is ♯A.
In fact, ♯ is even a left exact monadic modality, i.e. it preserves pullbacks. To
show this, we begin with an “encode-decode” characterization of the identity types
of ♯A.
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Theorem 3.7. For any x, y : A, we have an equivalence (x♯ = y♯) ≃ ♯(x = y) such
that the following triangle commutes:
(3.1)
(x♯ = y♯)
≃

(x = y)
ap
( – )♯ 66♠♠♠♠♠♠♠
(– )♯ ((
◗◗
◗◗
◗◗
◗
♯(x = y)
Proof. We define code : ♯A→ ♯A→ Type by
code(u, v) :≡ ♯(u♯ = v♯).
Here we use the fact that variables may be assumed crisp inside ♯(–) as well as
inside (–)♯. Note that for x, y : A we have code(x♯, y♯) ≡ ♯(x = y).
We also have r :
∏
(u:♯A) code(u, u). For by Theorem 3.5 code(u, u) is codiscrete;
thus by ♯-induction the goal reduces to
∏
(x:A) ♯(x = x), which is inhabited by
λx. reflx
♯.
Now we define
encode :
∏
u,v:♯A
(u = v)→ code(u, v)
in the usual way, encode(u, v, p) :≡ p∗(r(u)). To define
decode :
∏
u,v:♯A
code(u, v)→ (u = v)
we proceed as follows. Since ♯A is codiscrete, so is u = v, and hence so are
code(u, v) → (u = v) and ∏(v:♯A) code(u, v) → (u = v). Thus we can apply
♯-induction twice, reducing the goal to
∏
(x,y:A) code(x
♯, y♯) → (x♯ = y♯). But
code(x♯, y♯) ≡ ♯(x = y), so we can use ♯-induction again followed by ap(–)♯ .
It now suffices to show that encode ◦ decode is the identity, since for each u that
will exhibit
∑
(v:♯A) code(u, v) as a retract of the contractible
∑
(v:♯A)(u = v), hence
itself contractible. Now the goal encode(u, v, decode(u, v, c)) = c is an equality in
code(u, v), which is codiscrete by Theorem 3.5. Thus, the goal is also codiscrete, so
we can do ♯-induction again, replacing u and v by x♯ and y♯ respectively, and then
c : ♯(x = y) by p♯ for p : x = y, so that the goal becomes (ap(–)♯(p))∗((reflx)
♯) = p♯.
Finally, an Id-induction on p completes the proof of equivalence.
To see that (3.1) commutes, we do Id-induction on p again, then compute
encode(x♯, x♯, ap♯(reflx)) ≡ encode(x♯, x♯, reflx♯) ≡ (reflx♯)∗(r(x♯)) ≡ r(x♯) = reflx♯.

We remark in passing that this implies that ♯ is “functorial on homotopies” as
well. Given f, g : A → B and H : f ∼ g, i.e. H : ∏(x:A) f(x) = g(x), for any
u : ♯A we have H(u♯)
♯ : ♯(f(u♯) = g(u♯)), which by Theorem 3.7 can be decoded
to give f(u♯)
♯ = g(u♯)
♯, i.e. ♯f(u) = ♯g(u). We could also go on to construct
higher-dimensional aspects of a “coherent ∞-functor” structure on ♯.
Returning to left-exactness of ♯, this is actually implied formally by the conclu-
sion of Theorem 3.7 (see HoTT Project 2015; Rijke, Shulman, and Spitters 2016).
However, using the special properties of ♯ we can give a more direct proof, beginning
with a sense in which ♯ “preserves
∑
s”.
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Lemma 3.8. For any A : Type and B : A→ Type, we have
♯
(∑
x:A
B(x)
)
≃
∑
u:♯A
♯B(u♯).
(The right-hand side makes sense because inside ♯(–) we may use u as crisp.)
Proof. The right-hand side is codiscrete, so we can construct a map from left to right
by ♯-induction, sending (a, b) to (a♯, b♯). (Note that if u is a♯, then ♯B(a♯♯) ≡ ♯B(a),
so this is well-typed.) In the other direction it suffices to construct an element of∑
(x:A)B(x) supposing crisp hypotheses u :: ♯A and v :: ♯B(u♯); but then we have
(u♯, v♯) :
∑
(x:A)B(x). Finally, since both sides are codiscrete, both round-trip
composites can be compared to identities with further ♯-inductions. 
Theorem 3.9. ♯ preserves pullbacks.
Proof. Given f : A → C and g : B → C, recall that the pullback A ×C B is∑
(x:A)
∑
(y:B)(f(x) = g(y)). By Lemma 3.8, we have
♯(A×C B) ≃
∑
(u:♯A)
∑
(v:♯B)
♯(f(u♯) = g(v♯)).
while
♯A×♯C ♯B ≃
∑
(u:♯A)
∑
(v:♯B)
(♯f(u) = ♯g(v))
Thus, it will suffice to prove that for all u : ♯A and v : ♯B we have
♯(f(u♯) = g(v♯)) ≃ (♯f(u) = ♯g(v)).
But by definition of the functoriality of ♯, the right-hand side is f(u♯)
♯ = g(v♯)
♯.
Thus the result follows from Theorem 3.7. 
Left exact monadic modalities also have many nice features, for most of which
we refer to Rijke, Shulman, and Spitters (2016) (and which are formalized in HoTT
Project (2015)). One particularly important one is the following:
Corollary 3.10. ♯ preserves n-types for all n.
Proof. We induct on n. The base case n = −2 (i.e. ♯1 ≃ 1) is true for any monadic
modality. Thus, suppose ♯ preserves n-types for some n, let A be an (n+ 1)-type,
and let u, v : ♯A. Then (u = v) is codiscrete, hence so is the proposition “(u = v) is
an n-type”, so we can use ♯-induction on u and v. But by Theorem 3.7, for x, y : A
we have (x♯ = y♯) ≃ ♯(x = y), which is an n-type by the inductive hypothesis. 
Rijke, Shulman, and Spitters (2016) and HoTT Project (2015) show that if a
left-exact monadic modality is also accessible in a technical sense (defined there;
see also §9), then the universe of modal types is modal. We can prove this for ♯
without accessibility, because of our formation rule for ♯A. The marker {UA}means
that we need the full univalence axiom (although of course for the subuniverse of
propositions we would need only propositional extensionality).
Theorem {UA} 3.11. The universe Codisc :≡ ∑(A:Type) iscodiscrete(A) of codis-
crete types is codiscrete.
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Proof. Suppose X : ♯Codisc; we want to construct an element of Codisc (to define
a retraction). The first component of it will be ♯ of some type, and for the purpose
of constructing that type we may assume X is crisp. Thus, we have X♯ : Codisc,
which we can destruct further as (A, c) for A : Type and c : iscodiscrete(A). Now
we use A to be the type required. Explicitly, from X : ♯Codisc we have constructed
♯(pr1(X♯)) : Type
By Theorem 3.5, this type is codiscrete, so gives an element of Codisc.
To show that this is a retraction, if X is of the form Y ♯, then we have
♯(pr1(Y
♯
♯)) ≡ ♯(pr1(Y ))
which is equivalent to pr1(Y ), since by pr2(Y ) the latter is codiscrete. This com-
pletes the proof since codiscreteness is a proposition. 
It follows that we can interpret the formal syntax of ordinary type theory (with
only one kind of context) entirely into the codiscrete types, with Codisc playing the
role of the universe, obtaining a model with
∏
-types,
∑
-types, a unit type, and
identity types. We can also obtain some (higher) inductive types in this model,
at least up to homotopy (in the sense of UFP 2013, §5.5), simply by applying ♯
to their ordinary versions; this includes binary sums, the empty type, the natural
numbers, n-truncations, suspensions, and more general colimits.
This doesn’t appear to work for general W-types, however; if W is generated
by a constructor sup :
∏
(a:A)(B(a) → W ) → W , there isn’t even any obvious way
to define a function
∏
(a:A)(B(a) → ♯W ) → ♯W . It may be tempting to write
“λa. λb. sup(a, λy. b(y)♯)
♯”, but this is ill-typed: although the outer (–)♯ makes all
variables in the current context crisp, the inner λy binds a new, cohesive variable
y, so that b(y) is not crisp and we cannot apply (–)♯ to it.
We could work around this if ♯ were accessible, by adding the appropriate lo-
calization constructors to any HIT. Accessibility is a perfectly reasonable axiom,
since it holds in all known examples. But in this paper we have no need for it,
and moreover we want the base spatial type theory of this part (as opposed to the
real-cohesive extension of it in the next part) to be free of axioms.
As an example of translating type theory into the codiscrete universe, let us
define the Dedekind real numbers codiscretely. Since the types Z and Q are ab-
stractly equivalent to N, and ♯N is the natural numbers in the codiscrete world,
it follows that the codiscrete versions of Z and Q will be equivalent to ♯Z and ♯Q
respectively. Now if we expand out the usual definition of the Dedekind reals R into
the basic type constructors, we obtain the type shown first in Figure 4. Thus, their
codiscrete version should be the type R′ shown second in Figure 4. In contrast
to Z and Q, it is not at all obvious that R′ has anything to do with ♯R; in the
former all intermediate constructions are discontinuous, whereas in the latter we
do everything continuously and then at the very end forget the resulting topology.
We will see later on that they are in fact equivalent (Theorem 6.34), but this
is a very special property of R. In most cases, the “codiscrete version” of a type
A is very different from ♯A. For instance, ♯(R → R) should be the set of con-
tinuous functions R → R topologized codiscretely, whereas R′ → R′ is the set of
discontinuous functions.
Remark 3.12. The overall conclusion of this section so far can be summarized as
“♯ is a left-exact monadic modality” (plus Theorem 3.11, which could be obtained
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R :≡∑(L,U :Q→Prop)∥∥∥∑(q:Q)L(q)∥∥∥ × ∥∥∥∑(r:Q)U(r)∥∥∥
∧
(∏
(q:Q)L(q)↔
∥∥∥∑(r:Q)(q < r) × L(r)∥∥∥)
∧
(∏
(r:Q)U(r)↔
∥∥∥∑(q:Q)U(q)× (q < r)∥∥∥)
∧
(∏
(q:Q)(L(q)× U(q))→ ∅
)
∧
(∏
(q,r:Q)(q < r)→ ‖L(q) + U(r)‖
)
R′ :≡∑(L,U :♯Q→CodiscProp)♯∥∥∥∑(q:♯Q)L(q)∥∥∥ × ♯∥∥∥∑(r:♯Q)U(r)∥∥∥
∧
(∏
(q:♯Q)L(q)↔ ♯
∥∥∥∑(r:♯Q)(q <′ r)× L(r)∥∥∥)
∧
(∏
(r:♯Q)U(r)↔ ♯
∥∥∥∑(q:♯Q)U(q)× (q <′ r)∥∥∥)
∧
(∏
(q:♯Q)(L(q)× U(q))→ ♯∅
)
∧
(∏
(q,r:♯Q)(q <
′ r)→ ♯‖♯(L(q) + U(r))‖
)
Figure 4. The Dedekind reals and their codiscrete version
from accessibility). This is a purely cohesive statement, i.e. it can be stated without
any need for crisp variables. In Schreiber and Shulman (2012), using ordinary type
theory without crispness, we took this statement as the axiomatic definition of ♯.
The benefit of instead deriving it from rules involving crisp variables is that, as we
will see in §4, ♯ then automatically has the correct relationship to ♭.
3.1. Excluded middle revisited. With ♯ in hand, we can reformulate the crisp
law of excluded middle (Axiom LEM) as a single term (modulo universe polymor-
phism).
Lemma {LEM} 3.13 (The sharp law of excluded middle).
∏
(P :Prop) ♯(P ∨ ¬P ).
Proof. Assume P : Prop. By the introduction rule for ♯, it suffices to prove P ∨¬P
assuming a crisp P :: Prop. But this is exactly Axiom LEM. 
Let us now return to the topological viewpoint, where codiscrete types have the
codiscrete topology. More generally, if P : A → Type and each P (x) is codiscrete,
then
∑
(x:A) P (x) must have the “final topology” induced by the first projection,
i.e. the coarsest possible topology such that the first projection is continuous. To
see this, note that sections
∏
(x:A) P (x) are equivalent to sections
∏
(x:A) ♯P (x),
and hence to conclusions f(x) : P (x) under crisp hypothesis x :: A; but by our
topological gloss, these are supposed to be simply discontinuous sections. Thus,
the sections
∏
(x:A) P (x) take no account of any topology on P , so it must be that
P has the final topology.
Remark 3.14. This topological gloss explains why the universe of codiscrete types
must itself be codiscrete. A map into A whose domain has the final topology is
uniquely specified by a map into the underlying set (or ∞-groupoid) of A, i.e. it
takes no account of the topology of A. Thus, a family of codiscrete types over
A should be the same as such a family over ♯A, which is to say that any map
P : A→ Codisc must factor through ♯A; thus Codisc must be codiscrete.
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In particular, to say that a predicate P : A→ Prop is pointwise codiscrete must
mean that it is a subspace, with the induced topology. We have already seen in §2.1 a
different type-theoretic property that ought also to characterize subspaces, namely
that P is ¬¬-closed. It turns out that one simple assumption beyond Axiom LEM
guarantees that these two properties coincide. (See also Lawvere and Menni 2015,
Corollary 4.5.)
Axiom ♯∅. ∅ is codiscrete.
Theorem {LEM,♯∅} 3.15.
(1) A proposition P is codiscrete if and only if ¬¬P → P .
(2) For any proposition P we have ♯P ≃ ¬¬P .
(3) For any type A we have ♯‖A‖ ≃ ¬¬A.
Proof. We prove (1) first. Since P → ¬¬P always, we have ¬¬P → P if and only
if ¬¬P = P . Now since ∅ is codiscrete, so is ¬¬P for any P . Thus if ¬¬P = P ,
then P is also codiscrete.
Conversely, suppose P is codiscrete, and suppose that ¬¬P ; we must show P .
By crisp excluded middle, we have ♯(P ∨ ¬P ). Since our goal P is codiscrete, by
♯-induction we have P ∨ ¬P . But since ¬¬P , it must be that P . (Note that each
of the two assumptions Axiom LEM and Axiom ♯∅ is used in exactly one direction
of this equivalence.)
Now (2) follows because ♯ and ¬¬ both reflect a proposition into the sub-poset
of codiscrete propositions. Likewise, (3) follows because ♯‖–‖ and ¬¬ both reflect
an arbitrary type into that same poset (since ¬¬A is always a proposition). 
In particular, in this case the statement of Lemma 3.13 is equivalent to∏
P :Prop
¬¬(P ∨ ¬P )
which is a provable statement in type theory. Of course, we used Axiom LEM in
proving Theorem 3.15, so this doesn’t in any way absolve us from having to assume
Axiom LEM. But it is nice to see that the cohesive version of excluded middle
implied by our Axiom LEM is just the one that is already provable in constructive
type theory.
3.2. The axiom of choice. We can now revisit the axiom of choice. First, how-
ever, let us consider all the ways of saying that a family P : A→ Type is “inhabited”,
of which we now have four. Here is a list of them with their intended topological
meanings.
(1)
∏
(x:A) P (x) says that pr1 : (
∑
(x:A) P (x))→ A has a continuous section.
(2)
∏
(x:A) ♯P (x) says that this projection has a discontinuous section.
(3)
∏
(x:A)‖P (x)‖ says that this projection is a quotient map.
(4)
∏
(x:A) ♯‖P (x)‖ says that this projection is surjective on points.
(Assuming Axiom LEM, this is equivalent to
∏
(x:A) ¬¬P (x).)
These topological glosses are mainly for our intuition, but in some cases we can
prove precise versions of them in type theory. For instance, statement (1) makes
sense internally and is obviously true. Regarding (2), we can prove:
Lemma 3.16.
∏
(x:A) ♯P (x) if and only if ♯pr1 : ♯(
∑
(x:A) P (x))→ ♯A has a section.
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Proof. By ♯-induction
∏
(x:A) ♯P (x) is equivalent to
∏
(x:♯A) ♯P (x♯). This, in turn,
is equivalent to saying that pr1 : (
∑
(x:♯A) ♯P (x♯)) → ♯A has a section. But by
Lemma 3.8, ♯(
∑
(x:A) P (x)) ≃
∑
(x:♯A) ♯P (x♯), and it is easy to see that the projec-
tions match up. 
As for (3), if A and P are sets we can consider it justified by UFP 2013, Theorem
10.1.5 (surjections of sets are regular epimorphisms). The general case requires a
more refined notion of “quotient map”, but is also true when suitably formulated
(see Kraus 2016; Rijke 2017; van Doorn 2016).
Finally, regarding (4) we can say the following.
Lemma 3.17.
∏
(x:A) ♯‖P (x)‖ if and only if ♯pr1 : ♯(
∑
(x:A) P (x))→ ♯A is “codis-
cretely surjective”, i.e. for all x : ♯A we have ♯
∥∥fib♯pr1(x)∥∥.
Note that “codiscretely surjective” is what we get by interpreting “surjective”
in the universe of codiscrete types, as discussed at the end of §3. Thus, it is
the appropriate way to say that a map of codiscrete types “is surjective” in the
untopologized world.
Proof. By ♯-induction
∏
(x:A) ♯‖P (x)‖ is equivalent to
∏
(x:♯A) ♯‖P (x♯)‖. Thus, it
will suffice to show that for any x : ♯A we have ♯‖P (x♯)‖ ↔ ♯
∥∥fib♯pr1(x)∥∥.
Suppose first that q : ♯‖P (x♯)‖; we will show ♯
∥∥fib♯pr1(x)∥∥. We apply (–)♯,
making our goal
∥∥fib♯pr1(x)∥∥ and our hypotheses crisp, allowing us to form q♯ :
‖P (x♯)‖. Now by functoriality of ‖–‖, it suffices to assume p : P (x♯) and prove
fib♯pr1(x). But then (x♯, p)
♯ : ♯(
∑
(x:A) P (x)), and
♯pr1((x♯, p)
♯) ≡ pr1(x♯, p)♯ ≡ x♯♯ ≡ x.
Next suppose that z : ♯
∥∥fib♯pr1(x)∥∥; we will show ♯‖P (x♯)‖. Since ♯ takes values
in codiscrete types, it suffices to show ♯♯‖P (x♯)‖. Thus, we can apply (–)♯ to
make our hypotheses crisp while keeping the goal ♯‖P (x♯)‖. Now we can form
z♯ :
∥∥fib♯pr1(x)∥∥, and since ♯‖P (x♯)‖ is a proposition we can destruct z♯ to obtain
q : ♯(
∑
(x:A) P (x)) and ♯pr1(q) = x. Next, by ♯-induction we can assume q is (y, p)
♯
for some y : A and p : P (y). But ♯pr1((y, p)
♯) ≡ pr1(y, p)♯ ≡ y♯, so we have y♯ = x.
And since x is crisp we have x ≡ x♯♯, so y♯ = x♯♯. But by Theorem 3.7 this type
is equivalent to ♯(y = x♯). Thus, with another ♯-induction we obtain s : y = x♯,
so we can transport p along s to get an element of P (x♯), and finally map it into
♯‖P (x♯)‖. 
Corollary 3.18. If f : A→ B is an embedding and ∏(x:B) ♯fibf (x), then ♯f is an
equivalence.
Proof. Since f is an embedding, so is ♯f . Moreover, ♯f has codiscrete fibers. Thus,
Lemma 3.17 is sufficient to ensure that it is an equivalence. 
Now, since we cannot expect every surjection to have a continuous section, the
conclusion of our axiom of choice should be
∏
(x:A) ♯P (x). Therefore, it ought to
suffice as a hypothesis that it be surjective on points, i.e.
∏
(x:A) ♯‖P (x)‖. Of course,
the conclusion must be further (−1)-truncated outside the ∏, to be consistent with
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univalence. This might lead us to state the axiom of choice as
(3.2)
(∏
x:A
♯‖P (x)‖
)
→
∥∥∥∥∥
∏
x:A
♯P (x)
∥∥∥∥∥.
However, I believe this is not yet quite right either. Remember that the entire state-
ment is also parametrized by A and P . Thus, (3.2) is actually asserting that one
subobject of
∑
(A:Type)(A→ Type) is contained in another. But the first subobject
is codiscrete — i.e. has the subspace topology — whereas the second is not, at least
not by definition: ‖–‖ doesn’t preserve codiscreteness. Moreover, the reverse impli-
cation always holds; thus (3.2) is actually asserting that these two subobjects agree,
and hence that the one on the right is a subspace even though we haven’t forced
it to be. This seems unreasonable (although I do not currently have a concrete
counterexample). Thus, instead we take the following:
Axiom AC. (Sharp axiom of choice) For any set A and type family P : A→ Type,
we have
(3.3)
(∏
x:A
♯‖P (x)‖
)
→ ♯
∥∥∥∥∥
∏
x:A
♯P (x)
∥∥∥∥∥.
This is admittedly quite a mouthful, and one is left wondering whether it is
good for anything. Are there simpler special cases? What about, for instance, the
countable axiom of choice, where A = N; surely there shouldn’t be any topology on
N to get in the way. Thus, we now turn to making sense of what it means to have
a discrete topology.
4. The ♭ modality
4.1. A no-go theorem. Discreteness is encoded by the modality ♭ that is dual to
♯. Whereas ♯ is a reflector into the subcategory of codiscrete types, ♭ is a coreflector
into the subcategory of discrete types. However, unlike ♯, the behavior of ♭ cannot
be stated as ordinary type-theoretic rules or axioms, because the resulting pullback-
stability would cause it to degenerate. This is the conclusion of the following “no-go
theorem”.
Theorem 4.1. Suppose we have the following data:
(1) A predicate in : Type → Prop that is invariant under equivalence, i.e.
(A ≃ B) → in(A) → in(B). (This condition is, of course, automatic
with univalence.)
(2) An operation  : Type→ Type, such that in((A)) for all A.
(3) For each A : Type, a function εA : A→ A.
(4) If in(B), then postcomposition with εA is an equivalence (B → A) ≃
(B → A).
Then there exists U : Prop such that for all A we have
(a) in(A)↔ (A→ U) and
(b) A ≃ (A× U)
Proof. Firstly, we observe that if A is a proposition, so is A. For if x, y : A,
then we have two functions constx, consty : A → A whose composites with εA
are equal. Hence constx = consty and thus (evaluating them at x, say) x = y.
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Secondly, we observe that if εA : A → A has a section s : A → A, then
in(A). It suffices to show that s ◦ εA = idA; but these are again two maps
A→ A having the same composite with εA.
Thirdly, we can extend  to a functor such that ε is a natural transformation
from  to the identity. (This is also the dual of facts we observed in §3 for ♯.)
Now let U :≡ 1. First we prove (a). On one hand, if in(A), then A→ 1 factors
through U . On the other hand, suppose f : A → U ; we will construct a section
s : A → A. For any x : A we have constx : 1 → A, and hence by functoriality
constx : 1 → A. But f : A → 1, so we have constx(f(x)) : A; we define
this to be s(x). Now by naturality of ε, we have
εA(s(x)) = εA(constx(f(x))) = constx(ε1(f(x))) = x.
Thus, in(A); this completes the proof of (a).
Now we prove (b). By (a), we have in(A×U); thus the projection pr1 : A×U →
A factors through εA by some g : A×U → A. On the other hand, since in(A)
we have f : A → U , and thus (εA, f) : A → A × U . The composite in one
direction is
(εA, f) ◦ g = (εA ◦ g, f ◦ g) = (pr1, pr2) = idA×U
where εA ◦ g = idA by definition of g, while f ◦ g = idU since U is a proposition.
The composite in the other direction is a map A→ A whose composite with εA
is εA, hence it must be the identity. This shows (b). 
We certainly don’t expect ♭ to be of the form (– × U), so this means that we
cannot describe ♭ as ordinary type-theoretic rules or axioms. The central point
of Theorem 4.1 is that the universal property (4) can be applied in an arbitrary
context; this is what enables us to construct a section A→ A from a map A→ 1.
Thus, in order to describe a more general coreflection, we need to restrict the
context in which it and its universal property can be applied. In our current setup,
an obvious restriction to try is that the context should include only crisp variables.
This is what we will do.
4.2. The rules for ♭. We now describe our rules for ♭ in English; a type-theoretic
presentation is shown in Figure 5.
• For any crisp type A :: Type, there is a type ♭A.
• For any crisp a :: A, we have a♭ : ♭A.
• An element of ♭A may always be assumed to be of the form u♭ for some
crisp variable u :: A. This is called ♭-induction. Syntactically, if C is a
type depending on x : ♭A, and N : C[u♭/x] is an expression depending on a
crisp variable u :: A, while we have an element M : ♭A, we have an induced
element
(let u♭ :=M in N) : C[M/x].
Here the notation C[M/x] indicates that the expressionM is substituted
for the variable x in C. UFP (2013) used function notation when discussing
induction principles, but for ♭ we cannot since we do not have a basic
notion of “function of a crisp variable” (indeed, one of the purposes of ♭
is to provide such a notion); thus we have to talk about substituting into
expressions rather than evaluating functions.
• The expected computation rule: (let u♭ := M ♭ in N) ≡ N [M/u] if M :: A
is crisp.
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∆ | · ⊢ A : Type
∆ | Γ ⊢ ♭A : Type
∆ | · ⊢M : A
∆ | Γ ⊢M ♭ : ♭A
∆ | Γ, x : ♭A ⊢ C : Type ∆ | Γ ⊢M : ♭A ∆, u :: A | Γ ⊢ N : C[u♭/x]
∆ | Γ ⊢ (let u♭ :=M in N) : C[M/x]
∆ | Γ, x : ♭A ⊢ C : Type ∆ | · ⊢M : A ∆, u :: A | Γ ⊢ N : C[u♭/x]
∆ | Γ ⊢ (let u♭ :=M ♭ in N) ≡ N [M/u] : C[M ♭/x]
Figure 5. Rules for ♭
It is crucial that we cannot apply ♭ to types containing cohesive variables. This
reflects the fact that, by Theorem 4.1, “retopologizing discretely” is not a continuous
operation on the space of spaces. (It is possible to do this for “retopologizing
codiscretely”, so that ♯ requires no such restriction. Indeed, by Theorem 3.11
the type of codiscrete types is codiscrete, so any function into it is automatically
continuous.)
Remark 4.2. Strictly speaking, the syntax “let u♭ :=M in N” should also notate
the type family C, since that is not generally uniquely inferrable. However, when
working informally this will not matter much.
Remark 4.3. Dually to ♯ (see Remark 3.1), ♭ is a positive type former.1 This
means, roughly, that its elimination rule is chosen to match its introduction rule(s).
For instance, the coproduct A + B is positive because to define a (dependent)
function out of it, we use case analysis, which essentially means we have to specify
the values of that function on all the ways to construct an element of A+B (namely
via inl or inr). In the case of ♭, the introduction rule says that the way to get an
element of ♭A is to have a crisp element of A; thus the elimination rule says that
to define a function out of ♭A it suffices to assume we have a crisp element of A.
In contrast to negative type formers, whose uniqueness principles tend to be
judgmental rules, positive type formers tend to have uniqueness principles that are
only typal, but can be proven from their elimination and computation rules. As we
will now see, this is also the case for ♭.
Lemma 4.4 (Uniqueness principle for ♭). Let A :: Type, C : ♭A → Type, and
f :
∏
(x:♭A)C(x). For any x : ♭A we have
(let u♭ := x in f(u♭)) = f(x).
Proof. Let P (x) :≡ ((let u♭ := x in f(u♭)) = f(x)); then P : ♭A → Type. Thus, in
proving
∏
(x:♭A) P (x) we can use ♭-induction. But when x is v
♭, we have P (v♭) ≡
(f(v♭) = f(v♭)), using the computation rule for ♭ on the left-hand side, and this is
trivial by reflexivity. In symbols, we have
(let v♭ := x in reflf(v♭)) : (let u
♭ := x in f(u♭)) = f(x). 
1Well, at least in the usual sense that this adjective is used for dependent type theories. In the
sequent calculus of Licata and Shulman (2016), ♭ is (conjecturally) positive in the precise sense of
“focusing”, but our presentation of ♭ breaks some of this positivity. However, this often happens
to positive types when translating from sequent calculus into dependent type theory.
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As with ♯, we can make ♭ into a functor, at least on crisp functions: given
A,B :: Type and f :: A→ B, we define ♭f : ♭A→ ♭B by
(4.1) ♭f(x) :≡ (let u♭ := x in f(u)♭).
We might be tempted to write instead (let u♭ := x in f(u))♭, but this is invalid
because the inside of (–)♭ cannot contain cohesive variables such as x. For the
same reason, we require not only A and B, but also f , to be crisp. In particular,
we cannot deduce from this a map (A→ B)→ (♭A→ ♭B). The best we can do is
a map ♭(A→ B)→ ♭(♭A→ ♭B), defined by ♭-induction followed by (4.1).
When we try to verify the functoriality of this operation, we see that we need
some additional lemmas. Given A,B,C :: Type and f :: A→ B and g :: B → C, in
addition to (4.1) we have
(4.2) ♭g(y) :≡ (let v♭ := y in g(v)♭)
and thus for any x : ♭A, we have
♭g(♭f(x)) ≡ (let v♭ := (let u♭ := x in f(u)♭) in g(v)♭)
but on the right-hand side, what are we to do with this “nested let”? We have to
apply the following lemma, called a (typal) commuting conversion.
Lemma 4.5 (Commuting let with itself). Whenever both sides typecheck, we have(
let v♭ := (let u♭ :=M in N) in P
)
=
(
let u♭ :=M in (let v♭ := N in P )
)
.
Moreover, if the left-hand side typechecks, so does the right-hand side, while if
the right-hand side typechecks and u does not occur in P , then the left-hand side
typechecks.
Proof. One proof is to do ♭-induction on M : when M is w♭ for w :: A, both sides
of the goal reduce to (let v♭ := N [w/u] in P ), so we can apply reflexivity. Another
is to apply the uniqueness principle in reverse, followed by the computation rule:
let v♭ := (let u♭ :=M in N) in P
= let w♭ :=M in (let v♭ := (let u♭ := w♭ in N) in P )
≡ let w♭ :=M in (let v♭ := N [w/u] in P )
≡ let u♭ :=M in (let v♭ := N in P )
The second proof makes the typechecking conditions clearer, as these rewriting
steps can always be performed forwards, whereas to perform them backwards we
need to know that u does not occur in P . 
Remark 4.6. In Remark 2.1 we mentioned the difference between implication and
entailment, whose type-theoretic syntaxes are Γ ⊢ f : A→ B and Γ, x : A ⊢ f(x) :
B respectively. Both of these, however, are single “hypothetical judgments”, whose
hypotheses consist of a context of variables (either “Γ” or “Γ, x : A”). By contrast,
Lemma 4.5 cannot be expressed as a single hypothetical judgment, because M , N ,
and P must be “metavariables” denoting expressions rather than ordinary variables.
This should be clear from the condition “u does not occur in P”, which would
be nonsensical if P were a variable. In type-theoretic language, Lemma 4.5 is
a derivable rule rather than a single judgment, because among its hypotheses are
other hypothetical judgments ; Figure 6 shows it written out in type-theoretic syntax.
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∆ | · ⊢ A : Type ∆ | · ⊢ B : Type ∆ | Γ, y : ♭B ⊢ C : Type
∆ | Γ ⊢M : ♭A ∆, u :: A | Γ ⊢ N : ♭B ∆, v :: B | Γ ⊢ P : C[v♭/y]
∆ | Γ ⊢ (let v♭ := (let u♭ :=M in N) in P ) = (let u♭ :=M in (let v♭ := N in P )) (4.5)
∆ | · ⊢ A : Type
∆ | Γ, x : ♭A ⊢ B : Type ∆ | Γ, x : ♭A, y : B ⊢ C : Type ∆ | · ⊢M : ♭A
∆, u :: A | Γ ⊢ N : B[u♭/x] ∆ | Γ ⊢ f :∏(x:♭A)∏(y:B)C
∆ | Γ ⊢ f(M, (let u♭ :=M in N)) = (let u♭ :=M in f(u♭, N)) (4.7)
Figure 6. Commuting conversions
We will try to avoid such “meta-statements” as much as possible, but in this section
and the next we will need a few more of them.
With Lemma 4.5, we can now verify the functoriality of ♭:
♭g(♭f(x)) ≡ let v♭ := (let u♭ := x in f(u)♭) in g(v)♭
= let u♭ := x in (let v♭ := f(u)♭ in g(v)♭)
≡ let u♭ := x in g(f(u))♭
≡ ♭(g ◦ f)(x).
Functoriality on identities is easier, using the uniqueness principle:
♭(idA)(x) ≡ (let u♭ := x in u♭) = x
Note that unlike the functoriality of ♯, these are typal rather than judgmental
equalities. Thus, they should actually be viewed as the first level of a “coherent
∞-functor”; later on we will construct the next level by showing that ♭ is also
“functorial on homotopies”.
Continuing with the analogy to ♯, in place of the “unit” (–)♯ : A→ ♯A we have
a “counit” (–)♭ : ♭A→ A, which is defined for any (crisp!) A :: Type by
x♭ :≡ (let u♭ := x in u).
The computation rule tells us that for v :: A we have
(4.3) v♭♭ ≡ (let u♭ := v♭ in u) ≡ v.
We expect (–)♭ to be a natural transformation (and eventually a “coherent ∞-
natural transformation”) from ♭ to the identity functor. To verify this, let A,B ::
Type and f :: A→ B and fix any x : ♭A; then we would like to compute
(♭f(x))♭ ≡ (let u♭ := x in f(u)♭)♭
= let u♭ := x in f(u)♭♭ (Lemma 4.5)
≡ let u♭ := x in f(u)
= f(let u♭ := x in u) (?)
≡ f(x♭).
To fill in the step marked ?, we need another commuting conversion.
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Lemma 4.7 (Commuting let with function application). Suppose given types A,
B, and C, where A is crisp, B may depend on x : ♭A, and C may depend on
x : ♭A and y : B. Also suppose we have expressions M : ♭A and N : B[u♭/x] and
f :
∏
(x:♭A)
∏
(y:B) C, where N may depend on u :: A. Then we may conclude
f
(
M, (let u♭ :=M in N)
)
=
(
let u♭ :=M in f(u♭, N)
)
.
Like Lemma 4.5, this is formally a “derivable rule”; in Figure 6 we have written
it out in type-theoretic syntax.
Proof. As before, ♭-induction on M reduces both sides to f(w♭, N [w/u]); or we can
expand and contract:
f
(
M, (let u♭ :=M in N)
)
= let v♭ :=M in f
(
v♭, (let u♭ := v♭ in N)
)
≡ let v♭ :=M in f(v♭, N [v/u])
≡ let u♭ :=M in f(u♭, N). 
Analogous commuting conversions can be proven for the constructors and elim-
inators of all other ordinary types; we leave them to the reader. However, there
is one conversion we need that is more subtle, relating to ♭ itself. To see how this
arises, consider the obvious dual claim to (4.3), that x♭
♭ = x. Note that x♭
♭ only
makes sense when x is a crisp element of ♭A, since we can only apply (–)♭ to crisp
elements. In this case we would like to write
(4.4) x♭
♭ ≡ (let u♭ := x in u)♭ = (let u♭ := x in u♭) = x,
using the uniqueness principle (Lemma 4.4) at the end; but in the middle we need to
be able to commute (–)♭ past let. However, if we try to prove this as we did for the
other commuting conversions, we run into the problem that (as remarked above)
x :: ♭A must be crisp, whereas ♭-induction is only stated for types C depending on
a cohesive variable x : ♭A. Thus, we now take a brief digression to investigate crisp
induction principles.
5. Crisp induction principles
Here is the lemma we need about ♭. Note that its proof involves ♯ as well!
Lemma 5.1 (Crisp ♭-induction). Let C be a crisp type depending on a crisp variable
x :: ♭A, and N :: C[u♭/x] a crisp expression depending on a crisp variable u :: A.
If we have a crisp element M :: ♭A, then we have an element of C[M/x], which we
denote
(let u♭ ::=M in N) : C[M/x].
Moreover, if M :: A then
(let u♭ ::=M ♭ in N) ≡ N [M/u].
Proof. If we have only a cohesive variable x : ♭A, we can still write ♯C : Type,
since cohesive variables can become crisp inside ♯(–). Similarly, if u :: A we have
N ♯ : ♯C[u♭/x]. Thus, since M : ♭A, we have (let u♭ := M in N ♯) : ♯C[M/x]. And
since this expression is crisp, we have (let u♭ := M in N ♯)♯ : C[M/x], which we
define to be “let u♭ ::=M in N”. Finally, if M :: A then
(let u♭ :=M ♭ in N ♯)♯ ≡ N [M/u]♯♯ ≡ N [M/u]. 
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∆, x :: ♭A | · ⊢ C : Type
∆ | x : ♭A ⊢ ♯C : Type ∆ | · ⊢M : ♭A
∆, u :: A | · ⊢ N : C[u♭/x]
∆, u :: A | · ⊢ N ♯ : ♯C[u♭/x]
∆ | · ⊢ (let u♭ :=M in N ♯) : ♯C[M/x]
∆ | Γ ⊢ (let u♭ :=M in N ♯)♯ : C[M/x]
Figure 7. A derivation tree for Lemma 5.1
∆, x :: ♭A | · ⊢ C : Type ∆ | · ⊢M : ♭A ∆, u :: A | · ⊢ N : C[u♭/x]
∆ | Γ ⊢ (let u♭ ::=M in N) : C[M/x] (5.1)
(let u♭ ::=M ♭ in N) ≡ N [M/u]
∆ | · ⊢ A : Type ∆, x :: ♭A | · ⊢ B : Type
∆ | · ⊢M : ♭A ∆, u :: A | · ⊢ N : B[u♭/x]
∆ | Γ ⊢ (let u♭ :=M in N)♭ = (let u♭ :=M in N ♭) (5.2)
∆ | · ⊢ A : Type ∆ | · ⊢M : ♭A ∆, u :: A | · ⊢ N : Type
∆ | Γ ⊢ ♭(let u♭ :=M in N) = (let u♭ :=M in ♭N) (5.2)
Figure 8. Crisp ♭-induction and commuting let with ♭
This proof is somewhat tricky, so we include a derivation tree for it; see Figure 7.
The crispness restriction on C andN can be worked around in the usual “Frobenius”
way: if C and N depend on some cohesive variable y : B, we can form C′ :≡∏
(y:B)C andN
′ :≡ λy.N and apply Lemma 5.1 to them instead. By induction over
metatheoretic natural numbers, we can incorporate an arbitrary cohesive context.
Now we can prove the needed commuting conversion.
Lemma 5.2 (Commuting let with (–)♭). Given crisp expressions M :: ♭A and
N :: B[u♭/x], where B depends on a crisp variable x :: ♭A and N depends on u :: A,
we have
(let u♭ :=M in N)♭ = (let u♭ :=M in N ♭)
Proof. By Lemma 5.1, we can replace M by w♭ for some w :: A. Now both sides
reduce to N ♭[w/u]. 
At last, the computation (4.4) makes sense. Later on we will also have use for
the corresponding type-level commuting conversion:
Lemma 5.3 (Commuting let with ♭). Given crisp expressions M :: ♭A and N ::
Type, where N may depend on u :: A, we have
♭(let u♭ :=M in N) = (let u♭ :=M in ♭N).
The idea used to prove Lemma 5.1 can be applied to other positive types as well.
For instance, since we assert the rules of ordinary type theory only for cohesive
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∆, z : A+B | · ⊢ C : Type ∆, u :: A | · ⊢ N : C[inl(u)/z]
∆, v :: B | · ⊢ P : C[inr(v)/z] ∆ | · ⊢M : A+B
∆ | Γ ⊢ case♭(z.C, u.N, v.P,M) : C[M/z] (5.4)
case♭(z.C, u.N, v.P, inl(u)) ≡ N case♭(z.C, u.N, v.P, inr(v)) ≡ P
∆, u :: B, v :: B, p :: u = v | · ⊢ C : Type ∆, u :: B | · ⊢ d : C[u/v, reflu/p]
∆ | · ⊢ b1 : B ∆ | · ⊢ b2 : B ∆ | · ⊢ q : b1 = b2
∆ | Γ ⊢ J♭u,v,p.C(u.d; b1, b2, q) : C[b1/u, b2/v, q/p]
(5.6)
J♭u,v,p.C(u.d;u, u, reflu) ≡ d
Figure 9. Some crisp induction principles
variables, the eliminator for the coproduct type is
∆ | Γ, z : A+B ⊢ C : Type ∆ | Γ ⊢M : A+B
∆ | Γ, x : A ⊢ cA : C[inl(x)/z] ∆ | Γ, y : B ⊢ cB : C[inr(y)/z]
∆ | Γ ⊢ case(z.C, x.cA, y.cB,M) : C[M/z]
Thus, the element M being case-analyzed is cohesive, the variables x and y that it
is destructed into are cohesive, and the goal C depends on a cohesive z : A+B. The
first restriction is not significant since we can always use a crisp M as a cohesive
one, but the others are nontrivial. The method of Lemma 5.1 allows us to remove
them.
Theorem 5.4 (Crisp case analysis). Let A and B be crisp types, let C be a crisp
type depending on a crisp variable z :: A + B, and let N :: C[inl(u)/z] and P ::
C[inr(v)/z] be crisp expressions depending on crisp variables u :: A and v :: B. If we
have a crisp M :: A+B, then we have an element case♭(z.C, u.N, v.P,M) : C[M/z],
which computes to N and P on inl and inr.
Figure 9 shows Theorem 5.4 in type-theoretic syntax.
Proof. If we have only a cohesive variable z : A + B, we can still write ♯C : Type.
Similarly, if u : A we have N ♯ : ♯C[inl(u)/z], and if v : B we have P ♯ : ♯C[inr(v)/z].
Thus, treating the crisp M :: A + B as cohesive, we can do ordinary case analysis
to yield case(z.♯C, u.N ♯, v.P ♯,M) : ♯C[M/z]. But since C, M , N , and P are crisp,
so is this expression, so we can write
case(z.♯C, u.N ♯, v.P ♯,M)♯ : C[M/z].
The computation rule follows from those for case and ♯ combined. 
A more or less equivalent way to state Theorem 5.4 is that ♭ preserves coproducts.
This is sensible from a category-theoretic point of view, since we will soon see that
♭ is left adjoint to ♯.
Corollary 5.5. ♭A+ ♭B ≃ ♭(A+B) for any crisp types A and B.
Proof. To map from left to right, we do ordinary case analysis and then use the
functoriality of ♭. From right to left, we do ♭-induction, then crisp case analysis,
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then apply (–)♭ in both cases. We leave the details to the reader, along with the
proof that these are inverses. 
We can apply the same method to other positive types such as ∅ and N, con-
cluding in particular that ♭∅ ≃ ∅ and ♭N ≃ N. It also applies to identity types:
Theorem 5.6 (Crisp Id-induction). Suppose C :: Type depends on u, v :: B and
p :: u = v, and that we have d :: C[u/v, reflu/p] depending on u :: B. Then
for any u, v :: B and p :: u = v we have J♭u,v,p.C(u.d;u, v, p) : C, such that
J♭u,v,p.C(u.d;u, u, reflu) ≡ d.
Proof. As before, if we have cohesive variables x, y : B and q : x = y we can write
♯C[x/u, y/v, q/p]. Now we apply ordinary Id-induction: to inhabit ♯C[x/u, y/v, q/p]
for all x, y : A and q : x = y, it suffices to inhabit ♯C[x/u, x/v, reflx/p] for all x : A.
But such an inhabitant is supplied by d[x/u]♯ (note that u is crisp in d, but inside
(–)♯ we can assume x to be crisp).
We have shown that for all x, y : A and q : x = y, we have
Jx,y,q.♯C[x/u,y/v,q/p](x.d[x/u]
♯;x, y, q) : ♯C[x/u, y/v, q/p].
Now if we in fact have crisp assumptions u, v :: A and p :: u = v, then this becomes
a crisp conclusion
Jx,y,q.♯C[x/u,y/v,q/p](x.d[x/u]
♯;u, v, p) :: ♯C
(since C and d are also crisp). Thus, we can apply (–)♯ to obtain an element of C.
Finally, if we substitute (u, u, reflu) for (u, v, p), we have
Jx,y,q.♯C(x,y,q)(x.d[x/u]
♯;u, u, reflu)♯ ≡ d♯♯ ≡ d. 
In particular, we can transport in a crisp type along a crisp identification: if
C :: Type depends on z :: A and we have a, b :: A and p :: a = b and c :: C[a/z],
then we have p∗∗(c) :: C[b/z]. We repeat that the important novelty here is that
the definition of C might use the crispness of z. Note that since crisp Id-induction
is defined using an ordinary Id-induction followed by (–)♯, the uniqueness rule for
♯ implies p∗∗(c)
♯ = p∗(c
♯).
With “crisp transport”, we can state and prove crisp induction principles for
some higher inductive types as well, and particularly for homotopy colimits.
Theorem 5.7 (Crisp coeq-induction). Let A,B :: Type and f, g :: A → B with
homotopy coequalizer q :: B → coeq(f, g) and p :: ∏(u:A) q(f(u)) = q(g(u)). Let
C :: Type depend on z :: coeq(f, g), let N :: C[q(v)/z] depend on v :: B, and
let P :: p(u)∗∗(N [q(f(u))/z]) = N [q(g(u))/z] depend on u :: A. Then for any
M :: coeq(f, g) we have an element of C[M/z], which computes to N on q and to
P on f, g.
Proof. For a cohesive variable z : coeq(f, g) we can write ♯C : Type, and apply
ordinary coeq-induction. We also have N ♯ : ♯C[q(v)/z] depending on a cohesive
v : B. As remarked above, we have p(u)∗(N [q(f(u))/z]
♯) = p(u)∗∗(N [q(f(u))/z])
♯.
Now both p(u)∗∗(N [q(f(u))/z])
♯ and N [q(g(u))/z]♯ belong to ♯C[q(g(u))/z], so by
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the proof of Theorem 3.7 we have(
p(u)∗∗(N [q(f(u))/z])
♯ = N [q(g(u))/z]♯
)
≃ ♯
(
p(u)∗∗(N [q(f(u))/z])
♯
♯ = N [q(g(u))/z]
♯
♯
)
≡ ♯
(
p(u)∗∗(N [q(f(u))/z]) = N [q(g(u))/z]
)
which is the type of P ♯. Thus we have the inputs to ordinary coeq-induction, after
which we can apply (–)♯ as usual. 
Similarly, we have crisp induction for S1, for pushouts, and so on. The case of
truncations requires a little more thought.
Theorem 5.8 (Crisp truncation-induction). Let n :: N and A :: Type, let C be a
crisp n-type depending on z :: ‖A‖n, and let N :: C[|x|n/z] depend on x :: A. For
any M :: ‖A‖n, we have an element of C[M/z], which computes to N on |– |n.
Proof. For a cohesive variable z : ‖A‖n, we have ♯C : Type, to which we apply
ordinary truncation-induction. We have N ♯ : ♯C[|x|n/z] for a cohesive x : A;
so it remains to show that ♯C is an n-type. But in Corollary 3.10 we showed
that ♯ preserves n-types, and it is straightforward to generalize this (using crisp N-
induction) to a derivable rule in which n is crisp and the input n-type C depends on
crisp variables (that become cohesive in ♯C). Thus ordinary truncation-induction
applies, after which we use (–)♯ as usual. 
In the sequent calculus of Licata and Shulman (2016), these crisp induction
principles are taken as given, rather than derived from ♯. This produces a better-
behaved calculus in a proof-theoretic sense. However, not all (higher) inductive
types can consistently admit a crisp induction principle; we will see a counterex-
ample in Remark 9.13. For this reason, I prefer to derive all such principles from
♯.
6. Discreteness and ♭ revisited
6.1. Identifications in ♭. Just as we showed in Theorem 3.7 that ♯ is left exact
using an encode-decode argument, we can do the same for ♭.
Theorem 6.1. For any x, y :: A we have (x♭ = y♭) ≃ ♭(x = y).
Proof. We define code : ♭A→ ♭A→ Type by
code(u, v) :≡ (let x♭ := u in (let y♭ := v in ♭(x = y))).
Then for any x, y :: A, code(x♭, y♭) ≡ ♭(x = y). Thus, it will suffice to prove that
for any u, v : ♭A we have code(u, v) ≃ (u = v).
First note that for any u : ♭A, we have
r(u) :≡ (let x♭ := u in (reflx)♭) : code(u, u).
As usual, we then define encode :
∏
(u,v:♭A)(u = v) → code(u, v) by encode(p) :≡
p∗r(u).
Second, to construct decode :
∏
(u,v:♭A) code(u, v) → (u = v), if we destruct u
and v as x♭ and y♭ respectively with x, y :: A, we obtain c : ♭(x = y) with a goal
of (x♭ = y♭). Then we can further destruct c as a crisp p :: x = y. Now our
assumptions of x, y, and p suffice to apply crisp Id-induction, Theorem 5.6; this
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reduces our goal to (x♭ = x♭) for a given x :: A. But now of course we can use
reflx♭ . In symbols, we have
decodeu,v(c) :≡
(let x♭ := u in (let y♭ := v in (let p♭ := c in J♭x,y,p.(x♭=y♭)(x.reflx♭ ;x, y, p)))).
Now as remarked in Theorem 3.7, it suffices to show that for any u, v : ♭A and
c : code(u, v) we have encode(decode(c)) = c. Of course, we destruct u, v, c as
x, y :: A and p :: x = y, and then apply crisp Id-induction; the goal then becomes
(reflx♭)∗(reflx
♭) = reflx
♭, which is true. 
Corollary 6.2. For any u, v :: ♭A, we have (u = v) ≃ ♭(u♭ = v♭).
Proof. We showed above that any crisp element u :: ♭A is equal to u♭
♭, so this
follows from Theorem 6.1. 
Note that u and v in the statement of Corollary 6.2 must be crisp for the right-
hand side to make sense. However, inspecting the proof of Theorem 6.1 we extract
a more general statement that applies even to cohesive variables x, y : ♭A, namely
(x = y) ≃ (let x♭ := u in (let y♭ := v in ♭(x = y))).
Theorem 6.1 has many useful consequences. For instance, it implies the func-
toriality of ♭ on homotopies. That is, suppose that f, g :: A → B and H :: f ∼ g
is a crisp homotopy, i.e. H ::
∏
(x:A) f(x) = g(x); we would like to conclude
♭f ∼ ♭g. Introducing x : ♭A and using ♭-induction, this reduces to saying that
for any u :: A we have f(u)♭ = g(u)♭. This looks like it should be immedi-
ate from H(u) :: f(u) = g(u), but since (–)♭ is not a function, we cannot write
“ap(– )♭(H(u))”. Instead we use the following.
Corollary 6.3. For any u, v :: B and p :: u = v, we have p=♭ : u♭ = v♭ such that
(reflu)
=♭ = reflu♭ and ap(– )♭(p
=♭) = p.
Proof. We apply the decode from Theorem 6.1 to p♭ : ♭(u = v). The first equality
(reflu)
=♭ = reflu♭ follows from the definition of decode. For the second, we use crisp
Id-induction on p, and observe that
ap(–)♭((reflu)
=♭) = ap(– )♭(reflu♭) = reflu
using the first equality. 
Now we can define the action of ♭ on a homotopy H by
♭H(x) :≡ (let u♭ := x in H(u)=♭).
Functoriality on homotopies also implies that the functor ♭ preserves (crisp) equiv-
alences: if e :: A ≃ B, then we have ♭e : ♭A ≃ ♭B.
We can also regard Theorem 6.1 as the corollary of Theorem 5.6 saying anal-
ogously to Corollary 5.5 that “♭ preserves identity types”. It implies analogous
corollaries of Theorems 5.7 and 5.8.
Corollary 6.4. For any A,B :: Type and f, g :: A → B, we have ♭(coeq(f, g)) ≃
coeq(♭f, ♭g).
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Proof. From left to right, we apply ♭-induction, crisp coeq-induction, and then (–)♭
and the structure maps of coeq(♭f, ♭g). From right to left, we apply ordinary coeq-
induction first, and then ♭q : ♭B → ♭(coeq(f, g)); finally we need to show that for
x : ♭A we have ♭q(♭f(x)) = ♭q(♭g(x)); but this follows from the above functoriality
of ♭ on homotopies. That the composites are identities is proven similarly. 
Corollary 6.5. ♭S1 ≃ S1. 
Theorem 6.6. For any n :: N and A :: Type, if A is crisply an n-type, so is ♭A.
Proof. We do crisp induction (as in §5) over n :: N, beginning with n = −2. If A
is crisply contractible, we have some c :: A, hence also c♭ : ♭A. Now any x : ♭A can
be destructed as u♭ for u :: A, and by Theorem 6.1 (u♭ = a♭) ≃ ♭(u = a). But A is
crisply contractible, so we have p :: u = a, hence p♭ : ♭(u = a).
For the induction step, suppose A is crisply an (n+ 1)-type. Then x, y : ♭A can
be destructed as u♭ and v♭ for u, v :: A, and we have (u♭ = v♭) ≃ ♭(u = v). But
u = v is crisply an n-type; hence by the inductive hypothesis so is ♭(u = v). 
Corollary 6.7. For n :: N and A :: Type, we have ♭‖A‖n ≃ ‖♭A‖n.
Proof. From left to right, we apply ♭-induction and crisp truncation-induction, fol-
lowed by (–)♭. From right to left, we apply ordinary truncation-induction (using
Theorem 6.6) and then functoriality of ♭ on |– |n. The composites on either side
are proven to be identities similarly. 
Thirdly, Theorem 6.1 implies ♭ is left exact, using an analogue of Lemma 3.8:
Lemma 6.8. For any A :: Type and B :: A→ Type, we have
♭
(∑
x:A
B(x)
)
≃
∑
x:♭A
(
let u♭ := x in ♭B(u)
)
.
Proof. From left to right, we first apply ♭-induction, then destruct to get a crisp
u :: A and v :: B(u). Then we can form u♭ and v♭ : ♭B(u), and (u♭, v♭) belongs
to the right-hand side by the computation rule for ♭. From right to left, we first
destruct into x : ♭A and y : (let u♭ := x in ♭B(u)). Then we apply ♭-induction to x
to get u :: A, reducing the type of y to ♭B(u). Next we apply ♭-induction to y to
get v :: B(u), so we can form (u, v)♭ : ♭
(∑
(x:A)B(x)
)
. We leave it to the reader
to check that these are inverses. 
Theorem 6.9. For any A,B :: Type we have ♭(A ×B) ≃ ♭A× ♭B.
Proof. If B is independent of u : A, then (let u♭ := x in ♭B) = ♭B (this can be
regarded as an instance of the uniqueness principle for ♭). 
Theorem 6.10. For any A,B,C :: Type with f :: A→ C and g :: B → C, we have
♭(A×C B) ≃ ♭A×♭C ♭B.
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Proof. We compute
♭(A×C B) ≡ ♭
(∑
(x:A)
∑
(y:B)(f(x) = g(y))
)
≃∑(x:♭A)let u♭ := x in∑(y:♭B)let v♭ := y in ♭(f(u) = g(v))
≃∑(x:♭A)∑(y:♭B)♭(f(x♭) = g(y♭))
≃∑(x:♭A)∑(y:♭B)♭(♭f(x)♭ = ♭g(y)♭)
≃∑(x:♭A)∑(y:♭B)(♭f(x) = ♭g(y))
≡ ♭A×♭C ♭B.
The first step is the definition of pullbacks and the second is Lemma 6.8. The third
step combines several commuting conversions and the fourth is naturality of (–)♭.
The fifth step is Corollary 6.2 and the last is the definition of pullbacks. 
For completeness, we should also record:
Theorem 6.11. ♭1 ≃ 1.
Proof. It suffices to show that ♭1 is contractible. Since we have tt♭ : ♭1, it suffices
to show that ♭1 is a proposition. Now if u, v : ♭1, we can destruct them as x♭ and
y♭ for x :: 1 and y :: 1. Since 1 is (crisply) contractible we have p :: x = y, whence
p♭ : ♭(x = y). Thus, by Theorem 6.1, we have x♭ = y♭. 
6.2. Discrete types. We now move on to study discrete types, the duals of the
codiscrete types from §3. The definition should come as no surprise.
Definition 6.12. A crisp type A :: Type is discrete if (–)♭ : ♭A → A is an
equivalence.
Remark 6.13. To say that a type is discrete is very different from saying that
it is crisp. A discrete type is one whose points are “completely unconnected”
topologically, whereas a crisp type is one for which we can ignore the topology
relating it to other types. Discreteness is an “intrinsic” aspect of a type, whereas
crispness is a more “syntactic” one indicating what we are doing with that type at
the moment. Roughly speaking, a type is discrete if we are free to assume that its
elements are crisp.
At this point in our development, a type must be crisp before we can even ask
whether it is discrete. However, in §8 we will introduce a more general notion of
discreteness that removes this restriction.
Note that a (crisp and) discrete type A :: Type might also be crisply discrete,
i.e. we might have a crisp witness d :: isdiscrete(A). This distinction is admittedly
somewhat confusing. In practice, pretty much every discrete type is crisply discrete,
and whenever we assume a type to be discrete it must be crisply discrete. Moreover,
in §8 we will introduce a further axiom ensuring that every discrete type is crisply
discrete.
Our first goal is to show that the discrete types form a coreflective subuniverse
in an appropriate sense, with ♭ as the coreflector. The core of that result is that
maps ♭B → A are equivalent to maps ♭B → ♭A; this should appear sensible since
any function out of a discrete space is continuous. We do, however, have to apply
a further ♭ on both sides, since the type ♭B → A may inherit a nontrivial topology
from A.
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Theorem 6.14. For any A,B :: Type, postcomposition with (–)♭ : ♭A→ A induces
an equivalence
(6.1) ♭(♭B → ♭A) ≃ ♭(♭B → A).
Proof. To be precise, the left-to-right map in (6.1) is defined as follows: given
h : ♭(♭B → ♭A), we first destruct it into k :: ♭B → ♭A. Now since we have only
crisp variables, it suffices to construct a function ♭B → A, for which we have
λ(x : ♭B). k(x)♭. In symbols, from h : ♭(♭B → ♭A) we construct
let k♭ := h in (λ(x : ♭B). k(x)♭)
♭ : ♭(♭B → A).
To define the right-to-left map in (6.1), suppose given an element of ♭(♭B → A),
which we immediately destruct into f :: ♭B → A. To construct an element of
♭(♭B → ♭A), since we have only crisp variables it suffices to construct a function
♭B → ♭A. Thus, let x : ♭B, which we immediately destruct into u :: B. But now
again it suffices to construct an element of A itself, for which we can take f(u♭). In
symbols, from g : ♭(♭B → A) we construct
let f ♭ := g in (λ(x : ♭B). let u♭ := x in f(u♭)♭)♭ : ♭(♭B → ♭A).
It is tempting to think that the uniqueness principle for ♭ (Lemma 4.4) should
simplify “let u♭ := x in f(u♭)♭” to f(x)♭. However, this rule does not apply because
we cannot write f(x)♭, since x is not a crisp variable.
In Figure 10 we verify that both round-trip composites are the identity. We use
the fact that since (–)♭ is defined with let, the commuting conversions allow us to
push it inside another let, along with function extensionality to allow this (and the
uniqueness principle) to happen inside a λ-abstraction. 
Corollary 6.15. If B :: Type is crisply discrete, then for any A :: Type, postcom-
position with (–)♭ : ♭A→ A induces an equivalence
(6.2) ♭(B → ♭A) ≃ ♭(B → A).
Proof. As remarked after Corollary 6.3, the functor ♭ preserves equivalences, and
precomposition with the equivalence (–)♭ : ♭B ≃ B is an equivalence on function
types. Thus, this follows immediately from Theorem 6.14. 
More generally, we have a dependent universal property:
Theorem 6.16. For B :: Type and A :: ♭B → Type, fiberwise postcomposition with
(–)♭ : ♭A(x)→ A(x) induces an equivalence
(6.3) ♭
(∏
x:♭B
(let u♭ := x in ♭(A(u♭)))
)
≃ ♭
(∏
x:♭B
A(x)
)
Therefore, if B :: Type is crisply discrete and A :: B → Type, fiberwise postcompo-
sition with (–)♭ : ♭A(x)→ A(x) induces an equivalence
(6.4) ♭
(∏
x:B
(let u♭ := s(x) in ♭(A(u)))
)
≃ ♭
(∏
x:B
A(x)
)
where s : B → ♭B is the inverse of (–)♭ : ♭B → B.
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let k♭ := (let f ♭ := g in (λx. let u♭ := x in f(u♭)♭)♭) in (λx. k(x)♭)
♭
= let f ♭ := g in (let k♭ := (λx. let u♭ := x in f(u♭)♭)♭ in (λx. k(x)♭)
♭)
≡ let f ♭ := g in (λx. (let u♭ := x in f(u♭)♭)♭)♭
= let f ♭ := g in (λx. let u♭ := x in f(u♭)♭♭)
♭
≡ let f ♭ := g in (λx. let u♭ := x in f(u♭))♭
= let f ♭ := g in (λx. f(x))♭
≡ let f ♭ := g in f ♭
= g.
let f ♭ := (let k♭ := h in (λx. k(x)♭)
♭) in (λx. let u♭ := x in f(u♭)♭)♭
= let k♭ := h in (let f ♭ := (λx. k(x)♭)
♭ in (λx. let u♭ := x in f(u♭)♭)♭)
≡ let k♭ := h in (λx. let u♭ := x in k(u♭)♭♭)♭
= let k♭ := h in (λx. let u♭ := x in k(u♭))♭
= let k♭ := h in (λx. k(x))♭
≡ let k♭ := h in k♭
= h.
Figure 10. The round-trip composites in Theorem 6.14
Proof. The left-to-right map in (6.3) is defined like that in (6.1), taking h to
let k♭ := h in (λ(x : ♭B). let u♭ := x in k(u♭)♭)
♭ : ♭
(∏
x:♭B
A(x)
)
.
Its inverse looks exactly the same as the inverse of (6.1), though now all the func-
tions are dependent:
let f ♭ := g in (λ(x : ♭B). let u♭ := x in f(u♭)♭)♭ : ♭(♭B → ♭A).
The calculations in Figure 10 generalize immediately, and (6.4) is again obtained
by transporting along the equivalence ♭B ≃ B. 
Lemma 6.17. For A :: Type to be crisply discrete, it suffices that (–)♭ : ♭A → A
have a crisp section.
Proof. First we should clarify what is meant by a “crisp section”. The type of
sections of (–)♭ is
∑
(s:A→♭A)
∏
(a:A) s(a)♭ = a. Having a crisp element of this type
means having a crisp s :: A→ ♭A and also a crisp homotopy H ::∏(a:A) s(a)♭ = a.
It remains to show that s(x♭) = x for all x : ♭A. By ♭-induction, it suffices to
show that for any u :: A we have s(u♭♭) = u
♭. But u♭♭ ≡ u, so what we must
show is s(u) = u♭. Now s(u) : ♭A is crisp, so we also have s(u) = s(u)♭
♭; thus it
suffices to show s(u)♭
♭ = u♭. But now Corollary 6.3 tells us that this follows from
H(u) :: s(u)♭ = u. 
Theorem 6.18. For any A :: Type, the type ♭A is crisply discrete.
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Proof. We define s : ♭A → ♭♭A by s(x) :≡ (let u♭ := x in u♭♭). Applying (–)♭ to
s(x), we get
(let u♭ := x in u♭♭)♭ = (let u
♭ := x in u♭♭♭) ≡ (let u♭ := x in u♭) = x
using a commuting conversion and the uniqueness rule. 
Thus ♭ coreflects into the discrete types, dually to how ♯ reflects into the codis-
crete types. However, there are several ways in which the duality breaks down.
Firstly there is the outer ♭ on the equivalence in Corollary 6.15.
Secondly, we have seen that ♯ and ♭ are both left exact, whereas a strict duality
would interchange left exactness with right exactness. Note that exactness of re-
flectors and coreflectors can be a bit subtle and confusing. For instance, a reflector
is a left adjoint, so it always preserves colimits, i.e. takes colimits in the ambient
category to colimits in the reflective subcategory — but these latter colimits will
only coincide with those in the ambient category if the subcategory is closed under
them. This is not generally the case for ♯: the coproduct of codiscrete spaces is not
generally codiscrete.
Dually, a coreflector is a right adjoint, so it always takes limits in the ambient
category to limits in the coreflective subcategory. The content of Theorems 6.9
to 6.11 is thus that the discrete types are closed under finite limits. We record
these facts:
Theorem 6.19. If A,B,C :: Type are crisply discrete and f :: A → C and g ::
B → C and x, y :: A, then the following types are crisply discrete:
A×B A×C B 1 (x = y)
Proof. For A × B, we have A × B ≃ ♭A × ♭B ≃ ♭(A × B). The case of A ×c B is
similar, and 1 is exactly Theorem 6.11. For x = y, since equivalences lift to identity
types, it suffices to show that if x, y :: ♭A then (x = y) is discrete; but this follows
from Theorem 6.18 and Corollary 6.2. 
More generally, we have:
Theorem 6.20. Suppose A :: Type is crisply discrete, and that B :: A → Type
is such that for every x : ♭A, we have (let u♭ := x in isdiscrete(B(u))). Then∑
(x:A)B(x) is crisply discrete.
The hypothesis is morally “B(u) is discrete for every u :: A”, but stating it that
way would require this theorem to be only a “derivable rule” (see Remark 4.6),
since we cannot say “for every u :: A” in an ordinary hypothesis.
Proof. Using Lemma 6.8, we have
♭
(∑
(x:A)B(x)
)
≃
(∑
(x:♭A)
(
let u♭ := x in ♭B(u)
))
≃
(∑
(x:♭A)
(
let u♭ := x in B(u)
))
≃∑(x:♭A)B(x♭)
≃∑(u:A)B(u). 
On the other hand, the dual of left-exactness of ♯ would be right-exactness of ♭,
which is true. In fact, as remarked in §5, this is essentially the content of the crisp
induction principles. We record these facts:
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Theorem 6.21. If A,B :: Type are crisply discrete and f, g :: A → B and n :: N,
then the following types are crisply discrete:
A+ B ∅ N S1 coeq(f, g) ‖A‖n
Combining the last two, set-coequalizers also preserve crisp discreteness. 
6.3. Adjointness of ♭ and ♯. To complete our study of ♭, we consider how it
interacts with ♯. Our first observation is that ♭ and ♯ “eat each other”.
Theorem 6.22. For any A :: Type, there are natural equivalences
♯♭A ≃ ♯A and ♭A ≃ ♭♯A.
This is sensible according to our topological intuition: ♭ and ♯ are supposed to re-
equip a space with the discrete or codiscrete topology, respectively, so it shouldn’t
matter whether we have already modified its topology in the other way.
Proof. The first equivalence is defined by
λ(y : ♯♭A). y♯♭
♯ and λ(x : ♯A). x♯
♭♯.
The round-trip composite starting with x : ♯A yields
x♯
♭♯
♯♭
♯ ≡ x♯♭♭♯ ≡ x♯♯ ≡ x
while that starting with y : ♯♭A yields
y♯♭
♯
♯
♭♯ ≡ y♯♭♭♯ = y♯♯ ≡ y.
The second equivalence is defined by
λ(x : ♭A). let u♭ := x in u♯♭ and λ(y : ♭♯A). let v♭ := y in v♯
♭.
The round-trip composite starting with x : ♭A yields
let v♭ := (let u♭ := x in u♯♭) in v♯
♭
= let u♭ := x in (let v♭ := u♯♭ in v♯
♭)
≡ let u♭ := x in u♯♯♭
≡ let u♭ := x in u♭
= u.
And the round-trip composite starting with y : ♭♯A yields
let u♭ := (let v♭ := y in v♯
♭) in u♯♭
= let v♭ := y in (let u♭ := v♯
♭ in u♯♭)
≡ let v♭ := y in v♯♯♭
≡ let v♭ := y in v♭
= v. 
Corollary 6.23. For any crisply discrete A :: Type, the map A → ♭♯A is an
equivalence. Dually, for any crisply codiscrete A :: Type, the map ♯♭A → A is an
equivalence. 
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We can express this more internally using the type Codisc :≡∑(A:Type) iscodiscrete(A)
from Theorem 3.11 and an analogous universe of discrete types, defined as:
Disc :≡
∑
A:♭Type
(let B♭ := A in isdiscrete(B)).
Corollary {UA} 6.24. Disc ≃ ♭Codisc; hence also ♯Disc ≃ Codisc.
Proof. By Lemma 6.8, we have
♭Codisc ≃
∑
A:♭Type
(let B♭ := A in iscodiscrete(B)).
The equivalence Disc ≃ ♭Codisc now comes from the endomaps of ♭Type induced
by ♭ and ♯. These are mutually inverse by Corollary 6.23 and Theorem 6.1 and
univalence. 
Since ♯ and ♭ preserve n-types, this equivalence relativizes to the universes of n-
types. In particular, we have DiscProp ≃ ♭CodiscProp, which uses only propositional
univalence.
Furthermore, this equivalence respects all type formers, suitably reflected or
coreflected. For instance, since discrete and codiscrete types are closed under carte-
sian products, we have product operations Disc → Disc → Disc and Codisc →
Codisc → Codisc, and these commute with the equivalence of Corollary 6.24. Dis-
crete objects need not be closed under function types, but we have an operation
Disc→ Disc→ Disc defined by
λA. λB. let C♭ := A in let D♭ := B in ♭(C → D)
which agrees with λA. λB. (A → B) : Codisc→ Codisc→ Codisc under the equiva-
lence of Corollary 6.24; and so on.
Topological intuition also suggests that since all functions between discrete or
codiscrete spaces are continuous, both ♭A→ ♭B and ♯A→ ♯B ought to be the set
of all (discontinuous) functions from A to B. These two spaces may themselves
have different topologies, of course (and in fact they do), but if we make them both
discrete or codiscrete we should be able to identify them.
Theorem 6.25. For any A,B :: Type, there is an equivalence
(6.5) ♭(♭A→ ♭B) ≃ ♭(♯A→ ♯B).
Proof. On one hand, we have the functorial action of ♯:
♯ : (♭A→ ♭B)→ (♯♭A→ ♯♭B).
We can compose the result with the equivalences ♯♭A ≃ ♯A and ♯♭B ≃ ♯B on either
side, and apply then the functor ♭, to obtain a map from left to right in (6.5). On
the other hand, as remarked above, the functorial action of ♭ can be expressed (in
this case) as
♭ : ♭(♯A→ ♯B)→ ♭(♭♯A→ ♭♯B)
and we can again compose on either side with the equivalences ♭♯A ≃ ♭A and
♭♯B ≃ ♭B.
More explicitly, given f : ♭(♭A→ ♭B) we can write
let h♭ := f in (λ(x : ♯A). h(x♯
♭)♭
♯)♭ : ♭(♯A→ ♯B)
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and given g : ♭(♯A→ ♯B) we can write
let k♭ := g in (λ(x : ♭A). let u♭ := x in k(u♯)♯
♭)♭ : ♭(♭A→ ♭B).
Omitting the commuting conversions and reductions that eliminate the variables h
and k, as in the proof of Theorem 6.14, the computations that show these to be
inverses are
(let u♭ := x♯
♭ in k(u♯)♯
♭)♭
♯ ≡ k(x♯♯)♯♭♭♯ ≡ k(x♯♯)♯♯ ≡ k(x)♯♯ ≡ k(x)
(let u♭ := x in h(u♯♯
♭)♭
♯
♯
♭) ≡ (let u♭ := x in h(u♭)♭♭) = (let u♭ := x in h(u♭)) = h(x).

Corollary 6.26. For any A,B :: Type, there is a natural equivalence
♭(♭A→ B) ≃ ♭(A→ ♯B).
In other words, ♭ is “crisply left adjoint” to ♯.
Proof. We have the following chain of equivalences:
♭(♭A→ B) ≃ ♭(♭A→ ♭B) ≃ ♭(♯A→ ♯B) ≃ ♭(A→ ♯B). 
In fact, more generally we can say:
Theorem 6.27. For any A :: Type and B :: A → Type, there is a natural equiva-
lence
♭
(∏
(u:♭A)B(u♭)
)
≃ ♭
(∏
(x:A)♯B(x)
)
.
Proof. Given f : ♭
(∏
(u:♭A)B(u♭)
)
, we define g : ♭
(∏
(x:A) ♯B(x)
)
by
let h♭ := f in (λ(x :A). h(x♭)♯)♭
and given g, we define f by
let k♭ := g in (λ(u : ♭A). let x♭ := u in k(x)♯)
♭.
Omitting the outer commuting conversions and reductions again, the computations
that show these to be inverses are
(let x♭ := u in h(x♭)♯♯) ≡ (let x♭ := u in h(x♭)) ≡ h(u)
and
(let x♭ := x♭ in k(x)♯)
♯ ≡ k(x)♯♯ ≡ k(x). 
Hence we have both a reflective subcategory (the codiscrete types) and a co-
reflective subcategory (the discrete types), which by Corollary 6.23 are abstractly
equivalent via the reflection and coreflection. Moreover, Theorem 6.22 tells us that
modulo this equivalence, the reflector ♯ agrees with the coreflector ♭, which is sen-
sible if we consider that both take the same underlying set (or ∞-groupoid) and
equip it with a new topology.
Remark 6.28. We now have another formulation of the law of excluded middle.
When assumed as an axiom, Lemma 3.13 is a crisp element of
∏
(P :Prop) ♯(P ∨¬P ),
and hence yields an element of ♭
(∏
(P :Prop) ♯(P ∨ ¬P )
)
. Thus, by Theorem 6.27 we
can obtain a (crisp) element of
(6.6)
∏
P :♭Prop
(P♭ ∨ ¬P♭),
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a statement which we might call the flat law of excluded middle.
Remark 6.29. The overall conclusion of §§4–6 can be summarized as “♭ is a
coreflector, and the images of ♭ and ♯ are equivalent by an equivalence that identifies
♭ with ♯.” But in contrast to the analogous statement about ♯ in Remark 3.12, this
cannot be stated purely cohesively, because of the no-go Theorem 4.1. In Schreiber
and Shulman (2012), using ordinary type theory without crispness, we stated this
axiomatically with ♭ as an operation on ♯Type; here we instead derive it from the
rules governing ♭ and ♯ in relation to crisp hypotheses.
6.4. The axiom of choice revisited. Let us now return to the sharp axiom of
choice, Axiom AC. Restated, this says that for any set A and type family P : A→
Type, we have (∏
x:A
♯‖P (x)‖
)
→ ♯
∥∥∥∥∥
∏
x:A
♯P (x)
∥∥∥∥∥.
Using discreteness, we can derive from this a statement less encumbered by ♯s.
Theorem {AC} 6.30 (The discrete axiom of choice). Suppose A :: Type is a crisply
discrete set, that P :: A→ Type is also crisp, and that ∏(x:A)‖P (x)‖ crisply. Then∥∥∥∏(x:A) P (x)∥∥∥.
Proof. The hypothesis
∏
(x:A)‖P (x)‖ is stronger than that of the sharp axiom of
choice, so we can apply the latter, obtaining ♯
∥∥∥∏(x:A) ♯P (x)∥∥∥. Since all the param-
eters are crisp, we can apply (–)♯ to get
∥∥∥∏(x:A) ♯P (x)∥∥∥; whereas what we want
is
∥∥∥∏(x:A) P (x)∥∥∥. By functoriality, we can remove the ‖–‖ from both. Now by
Theorem 6.27, we get
∏
(u:♭A) P (u♭); but A is discrete, so this gives
∏
(x:A) P (x) as
desired. 
Corollary {AC} 6.31 (The crisp countable axiom of choice). Suppose P :: N →
Type is crisp and that
∏
(n:N)‖P (n)‖ crisply. Then
∥∥∥∏(n:N) P (n)∥∥∥. 
We will refer to this statement as Axiom ACN. As mentioned previously, later
on we will assume an axiom ensuring that all propositions are discrete; thus the
crispness of
∏
(n:N)‖P (n)‖ will become automatic. However, the crispness of P is
a real restriction that makes this significantly weaker than the ordinary countable
axiom of choice.
For example, let RC denote the Cauchy real numbers and R the Dedekind real
numbers.1 There is an injection i : RC → R which is not constructively an iso-
morphism. It is well-known that ordinary countable choice implies that it is an
isomorphism, i.e. that every Dedekind real is a Cauchy real. But with our restricted
Axiom ACN (or Axiom LEM), all we can get is the following.
Theorem {ACN or LEM} 6.32. Any crisp Dedekind real x :: R is a Cauchy real.
1For constructive definitions of RC and R, see e.g. UFP (2013, Chapter 11) or Johnstone
(2002, §D4.7). At the moment, by the “Cauchy reals” we mean a simple quotient of the set of
Cauchy sequences or approximations; in Corollary 8.27 we will show that under suitable axioms,
these coincide with the fancier Cauchy reals of UFP (2013, §11.3).
REAL-COHESIVE HOTT 47
Proof. By UFP (2013, Lemma 11.4.1), a Dedekind real x : R is a Cauchy real iff
there exists c :
∏
(q,r:Q)(q < r)→ (q < x) + (x < r).
First suppose Axiom LEM. Then since x is crisp, and Q and (q < r) are discrete,
for any q, r with q < r we have (q < x) + ¬(q < x). This implies (q < x) + (x < r)
as in UFP (2013, Corollary 11.4.3).
Now suppose Axiom ACN. Then since x is crisp, so is the family P :: S → Type
defined in UFP (2013, Corollary 11.4.3) as
P (q, r) :≡
∑
b:2
(b = 02 → q < x) ∧ (b = 12 → x < r),
where S :≡ {(q, r) : Q × Q | q < r} is equivalent to N. Thus, we can get a choice
function and extract c in the same way. 
Corollary {ACN or LEM} 6.33. The induced maps ♭RC → ♭R and ♯RC → ♯R are
equivalences.
Proof. By Theorem 6.22, the two statements are equivalent, so it suffices to prove
the second. By Corollary 3.18, it will suffice to show
∏
(x:R) ♯fibi(x). But by Theo-
rem 6.27, this follows from Theorem 6.32. 
In other words, RC and R have the same points, but perhaps different topologies.
It is natural to wonder what those topologies are! We will return to this in §§8
and 11.
Another important question to ask is what their points are. From the perspective
of the cohesive part of the type theory, this is a meaningless question: their points
are, by definition, the real numbers (Cauchy or Dedekind, respectively). However,
recall from §3 that we can also construct “the set of real numbers” entirely in
the codiscrete world, yielding the type R′ shown in Figure 4 and reproduced in
Figure 11. Thus, we can ask whether the set of points of the space of real numbers
R is the same as this “codiscrete set of real numbers”, i.e. is “the space of real
numbers” R really a “topology” on the set of real numbers? The answer is yes; this
internalizes Johnstone (2002, C3.6.11).
Theorem 6.34. ♭R′ ≃ ♭R, and hence R′ ≃ ♯R.
Proof. First of all, notice that since CodiscProp is codiscrete, we have
(♯Q→ CodiscProp) ≃ (Q→ CodiscProp).
Thus, in R′ we can sum over L,U : Q → CodiscProp instead; we write L′, U ′ for
their unique extensions to ♯Q.
Next, by the dependent version of Theorem 3.6, the
∏
(q:♯Q)’s in R
′ can be re-
placed by
∏
(q:Q), with q replaced by q
♯ inside. Now we can use the facts that
L′(q♯) = L(q), U ′(q♯) = U(q), and (q♯ <′ r♯) = ♯(q < r) (since the inequalities on
♯Q extend those of Q), and since ♯(q < r) is the domain of a function with codis-
crete codomain, we can replace it by (q < r). Thus we obtain the second version
shown in Figure 11.
Now note that for q : ♯Q we have
L′(q) = ♯L′(q) = ♯L′(q♯
♯) = ♯L(q♯)
and similarly for R′. Likewise, for q : ♯Q and r : Q we have
(q <′ r♯) = ♯(q <′ r♯) = ♯(q♯
♯ <′ r♯) = ♯(q♯ < r).
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R′ :≡∑(L,U :♯Q→CodiscProp)
♯
∥∥∥∑(q:♯Q)L(q)∥∥∥ × ♯∥∥∥∑(r:♯Q)U(r)∥∥∥
×
(∏
(q:♯Q)L(q)↔ ♯
∥∥∥∑(r:♯Q)(q <′ r) × L(r)∥∥∥)
×
(∏
(r:♯Q)U(r)↔ ♯
∥∥∥∑(q:♯Q)U(q)× (q <′ r)∥∥∥)
×
(∏
(q:♯Q)(L(q)× U(q))→ ♯∅
)
×
(∏
(q,r:♯Q)(q <
′ r)→ ♯‖♯(L(q) + U(r))‖
)
≃∑(L,U :Q→CodiscProp)
♯
∥∥∥∑(q:♯Q)L′(q)∥∥∥ × ♯∥∥∥∑(r:♯Q)U ′(r)∥∥∥
×
(∏
(q:Q)L(q)↔ ♯
∥∥∥∑(r:♯Q)(q♯ <′ r) × L′(r)∥∥∥)
×
(∏
(r:Q)U(r)↔ ♯
∥∥∥∑(q:♯Q)U ′(q)× (q <′ r♯)∥∥∥)
×
(∏
(q:Q)(L(q)× U(q))→ ♯∅
)
×
(∏
(q,r:Q)(q < r)→ ♯‖♯(L(q) + U(r))‖
)
≃∑(L,U :Q→CodiscProp)
♯
(∥∥∥∑(q:Q)L(q)∥∥∥ × ∥∥∥∑(r:Q)U(r)∥∥∥)
×
(∏
(q:Q)L(q)↔ ♯
∥∥∥∑(r:Q)♯(q < r) × L(r)∥∥∥)
×
(∏
(r:Q)U(r)↔ ♯
∥∥∥∑(q:Q)U(q)× ♯(q < r)∥∥∥)
×
(∏
(q:Q)(L(q)× U(q))→ ♯∅
)
×
(∏
(q,r:Q)(q < r)→ ♯‖(L(q) + U(r))‖
)
♭R′ ≃∑(M,N :♭(Q→DiscProp))let L♭ :=M in let U ♭ := N in
♭♯
(∥∥∥∑(q:Q)♯L(q)∥∥∥ × ∥∥∥∑(r:Q)♯U(r)∥∥∥)
× ♭
(∏
(q:Q)♯L(q)↔ ♯
∥∥∥∑(r:Q)♯(q < r)× ♯L(r)∥∥∥)
× ♭
(∏
(r:Q)♯U(r)↔ ♯
∥∥∥∑(q:Q)♯U(q)× ♯(q < r)∥∥∥)
× ♭
(∏
(q:Q)(♯L(q)× ♯U(q))→ ♯∅
)
× ♭
(∏
(q,r:Q)(q < r)→ ♯‖(♯L(q) + ♯U(r))‖
)
≃∑(M,N :♭(Q→DiscProp))let L♭ :=M in let U ♭ := N in
♭
(∥∥∥∑(q:Q)L(q)∥∥∥ × ∥∥∥∑(r:Q)U(r)∥∥∥)
× ♭
(∏
(q:Q)♭
(
L(q)↔
∥∥∥∑(r:Q)(q < r)× L(r)∥∥∥))
× ♭
(∏
(r:Q)♭
(
U(r)↔
∥∥∥∑(q:Q)U(q)× (q < r)∥∥∥))
× ♭
(∏
(q:Q)♭
(
(L(q)× U(q))→ ∅))× ♭(∏(q,r:Q)♭((q < r)→ ‖(L(q) + U(r))‖))
Figure 11. The Dedekind reals and their codiscrete version
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Thus, using Lemma 3.8 (and, in the second and third lines, the fact that ♯ preserves
products), together with the fact that ♯‖♯A‖ ≃ ♯‖A‖ (since both are a reflection
into codiscrete propositions) we obtain the third version.
Now, since Q is crisply discrete, we have
♭(Q→ CodiscProp) ≃ ♭(Q → ♭CodiscProp) ≃ ♭(Q→ DiscProp)
using Corollary 6.24 in the second step. Thus, with Lemma 6.8 we can convert ♭R′
into a sum over M,N : ♭(Q → DiscProp), obtaining the first expression for ♭R′ in
Figure 11. (Since ♭ preserves products, we have also distributed it over the ×s.)
However, as remarked after Corollary 6.24, the equivalence Disc ≃ ♭Codisc re-
spects all suitably-(co)reflected type formers. Since discrete types are closed under
truncations and contain ∅, we deduce the second expression for ♭R′ in Figure 11.
Here we abuse notation somewhat in applying ♭ to types that depend on cohesive
variables q, r : Q; the meaning is that since Q is discrete, we can transfer q, r to
elements of ♭Q and then destruct them into crisp variables first, as in the left-hand
side of (6.4). Now applying Theorem 6.16 gets rid of all the ♭s inside the
∏
s. Fi-
nally, we can un-distribute the ♭s over the ×s, and apply Lemma 6.8 in reverse, to
obtain ♭R on the right. 
7. Topos models of spatial type theory
So far we have described a spatial type theory with crisp variables and two modal-
ities ♭ and ♯, and also (in §§2.1, 3.1, 3.2 and 6.4) some classical axioms that can
be added to this theory without (we expect) destroying the intended topological
content. However, nothing we have said excludes the possibility that all types are
both discrete and codiscrete, with ♭ and ♯ being the identity. (In this case our
classical axioms would of course apply to all types, trivializing the topology.)
Thus, in order to “do some real topology”, we need a new axiom that gives us a
way to “access the topology” internally in type theory. We could motivate such an
axiom purely on first principles, but it seems appropriate at this point to instead
discuss the various possible models of our theory.
So far, we have been referring mainly to classical topological spaces for intuition.
This is fine, but topological spaces do not actually model our theory for several
reasons. One reason is that they are not a topos, lacking universes and even a
subobject classifier. Indeed, they are not even locally cartesian closed, so do not
have
∏
-types.
Another reason is that a classical topology is “mere structure” on a set, whereas
our theory demands something more. Consider for instance the following definition.
Definition 7.1. A type A is concrete if (–)♯ : A → ♯A is a embedding (i.e. a
(−1)-truncated map).
In classical topological spaces, the map from a space to its codiscrete reflection
is always injective, so that all spaces would be concrete in this sense. However, for
us this is impossible.
Theorem 7.2. If Prop is concrete, then all propositions are codiscrete.
Proof. Suppose (–)♯ : Prop → ♯Prop is an embedding. Then for any P,Q : Prop,
we have (P = Q) ≃ (P ♯ = Q♯); but the latter is ♯(P = Q) by Theorem 3.7. Thus,
P = Q is codiscrete. But taking Q = 1, we have (P = 1) = P , so all propositions
are codiscrete. 
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From a topological point of view, “all propositions are codiscrete” would mean
that all continuous injections are subspace embeddings. This seems quite dubious,
and in fact it trivializes almost the entire theory:
Theorem 7.3. For any n : N, an n-type A is codiscrete if and only if the map
const : A→ (P → A) is an equivalence for all propositions P such that ♯P . In par-
ticular, therefore, if all propositions are codiscrete, then all n-types are codiscrete.
Proof. The “only if” direction follows immediately from the universal property of ♯
(Theorem 3.6), since if P : Prop and ♯P , then (♯P → A) ≃ A. For the “if” direction,
we induct on n. When n = −1, let A : Prop and suppose const : A → (P → A) is
an equivalence for all P : Prop such that ♯P . To show A is codiscrete, we assume
♯A and try to prove A. But then A is a valid choice of P , and of course A → A;
hence A.
Before embarking on the inductive step, we note that by Theorem 3.7, A→ ♯A
is an embedding (i.e. A is concrete) if and only if x = y is codiscrete for all x, y : A.
On the other hand, for x, y : A and P : Prop, we have
(constx = consty) ≃ (P → (x = y)).
Thus const : A→ (P → A) is an embedding if and only if
const : (x = y)→ (P → (x = y))
is an equivalence. Therefore, if A is an (n + 1)-type and const : A → (P → A) is
an equivalence for all P : Prop such that ♯P , then the inductive hypothesis ensures
that A→ ♯A is an embedding; thus it remains to show that it is surjective.
Let z : ♯A, and write η :≡ (–)♯ : A → ♯A. Then fibη(z) is a proposition.
Moreover, since ♯ is left exact, we have ♯fibη(z) ≃ fib♯η(z♯). But ♯η is an equivalence,
so the latter type is contractible. Thus, ♯fibη(z), so by assumption const : A →
(fibη(z)→ A) is an equivalence. But we have pr1 : fibη(z)→ A, so there is an x : A
such that pr1 = constx.
We claim η(x) = z. Since this is a codiscrete goal, and we have ♯fibη(z), by
♯-induction we may assume that fibη(z), i.e. there is a y : A and p : η(y) = z. But
pr1 = constx yields y = x, and hence η(x) = z as desired. 
Remark 7.4. Theorem 7.3 is a general fact about left exact monadic modalities,
which generalizes the fact that a subtopos of a 1-topos is determined by its action
on monomorphisms (see e.g. Johnstone 2002, A4.3.6). A subtopos of an (∞, 1)-
topos, however, is not completely determined by its action on n-types for finite n
(see Lurie 2009, §6.5).
Therefore, we are forced to think of our “topologies” as some more contentful
“stuff” rather than just structure. A good example to think about is the topological
topos of Johnstone (1979). Its objects are sets X equipped with, for every sequence
x : N → X and point y ∈ X , a collection of “witnesses that (xn) converges to y”,
equipped with natural operations (e.g. there is a specified “reflexivity” witness that
a constant sequence converges to the point at which it is constant, etc.) Such an
object is codiscrete just when every sequence converges uniquely to every point.
Thus, since monomorphisms must be injective on points and witnesses both, such
an object is concrete just when there is at most one witness that any sequence
converges to any point. But in general, a “space” in this topos can have a sequence
that converges to one point in many different ways.
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The topological topos is a 1-topos rather than a higher topos, so we can expect
it to model all of our type theory except for full univalence. Pending a solution to
the general problem of higher-topos-theoretic semantics, we may expect that there
should be a corresponding “topological (∞, 1)-topos” that models the whole theory
with univalence.
More generally, the spatial type theory of §§2–6 should admit models in any local
topos. A geometric morphism f : F → E is called local (see e.g. Johnstone 2002,
§C3.6) if its direct image f∗ admits a further E-indexed right adjoint f !, which is
then necessarily fully faithful (and so is f∗). In this case F inherits a comonad f∗f∗
and a monad f !f∗ which are adjoint, and ought to extend the internal type theory
of F to model our ♭ and ♯ (without univalence). The restricted classical axioms of
§§2.1, 3.1, 3.2 and 6.4 will hold if their ordinary versions hold in E . Moreover, if
we enhance f to a local morphism of (∞, 1)-toposes, then it should be possible to
model homotopy type theory with (at least weak) univalent universes.
Remark 7.5. At present, the previous paragraph is only conjectural. What needs
to be done to make it precise is (1) define an appropriate sort of “category with
families” or “contextual category” to handle our two-context type theory with crisp
variables and formulate ♯ and ♭ as algebraic structure on such a gadget, (2) prove
that syntax yields an initial one of these, and (3) construct such algebraic objects
from local geometric morphisms. Of these, (1) should be straightforward, (2) is still
only conjectural even for most ordinary type theories (the one complete theorem
along these lines is in Streicher 1991), while (3) should be straightforward in the
1-topos case and, I hope, possible in the ∞-case, at least if we only ask for weak
universes. However, none of this is technically necessary for our actual results,
which are simply theorems in our formal system; the categorical semantics is for
motivation, for relative consistency, and, eventually, for applications to classical
mathematics.
As shown by Johnstone (2002, C3.6.3(d)), local toposes are obtained as sheaves
on sites with terminal objects admitting no nontrivial covers (“local sites”), and
this was generalized to (∞, 1)-toposes by Schreiber (2013, Proposition 3.4.18). The
topological topos arises in this way: its site has two objects 1 and N∞. More
generally, we can consider sheaves on any small full subcategory of topological
spaces that contains the one-point space. Any such topos will model spatial type
theory with our classical axioms, and if we generalize to higher sheaves, it should
have at least weak univalent universes.
Remark 7.6. A number of further examples of local geometric morphisms of 1-
toposes can be found in Johnstone (2002, C3.6.3), all of which generalize appro-
priately to (∞, 1)-toposes. A “purely ∞-categorical” example is the (∞, 1)-topos
of parametrized spectra, whose objects are pairs (X,E) where X is a space and
E a spectrum parametrized over X ; this is equivalently the category of 1-excisive
functors from pointed spaces to unpointed spaces studied in Goodwille calculus
(Goodwillie 2003; Joyal 2008; Lurie 2014). Here the discrete and codiscrete objects
coincide, being those for which E = 0, and moreover we have ♯ = ♭. Finally, the
(co)discrete objects are also exactly the hypercomplete ones, and hence include all
n-types for finite n.
In particular, therefore, our “spatial type theory” is in fact significantly more
general than the name suggests. In the rest of this paper we will add axioms that
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bring it closer to our intended intuition that “types have topology”; studying other
classes of models would of course lead us to different axioms.
Remark 7.7. A different sort of internal logic for local geometric morphisms (along
with another class of examples arising from realizability) is considered by Awodey
and Birkedal (2003) and Awodey, Birkedal, and Scott (1999). It is a “logic over a
type theory” in which the types all belong to the base category but the propositions
to the local topos, and there are two propositional modalities. This theory can
be roughly identified with the fragment of spatial type theory in which we allow
arbitrary crisp contexts (of sets, i.e. 0-truncated types), but require all types in the
cohesive context to be propositions. (Since dependence on a proposition is always
trivial, we can then assume that our cohesive propositions depend only on the crisp
context, as is usual for logic-enriched type theories.) Unfortunately, the meaning
of ♭ and ♯ in ibid. is reversed from ours; but as we will see in Remark 9.21 there is
a good reason for our choice.
As remarked in ibid., when restricted to propositions, our ♭ (their ♯) satisfies the
formal properties of the operator  in S4 modal logic. Roughly speaking, this is
the eventual origin of our term modality for ♭ and ♯ (and, later on, s).
One further remark is that the operations relating types to propositions in the
logic of ibid. are not exactly those of spatial type theory. On one hand, since
∏
and
∑
cannot be applied to crisp dependence directly, we have to wrap them in a
♭ first to yield the quantifiers ∃ and ∀ of ibid. Specifically, if u :: A | · ⊢ P : Prop,
then by “∀u, P” we can only mean “∏(x:♭A) let u♭ := x in P”, and similarly for ∃.
On the other hand, if A is a set and u :: A and v :: A, we can form the
proposition u = v, but this is not what is meant by “u = v” in ibid.: since that is
discrete, it must instead be ♭(u = v) (or equivalently, by Theorem 6.1, (u♭ = v♭)).
That this has the correct universal property (i.e. satisfies “Lawvere’s law” from
Lawvere 1970) can be seen from crisp Id-induction (Theorem 5.6), which implies
that if x :: A, y :: A | · ⊢ Q : Prop and u :: A | · ⊢ Q[u/x, u/y] true, then
x :: A, y :: A, p :: x = y | · ⊢ Q true, and hence x :: A, y :: A | q : ♭(x = y) ⊢ Q true
by ♭-induction.
Returning to our goal of “accessing the topology” internally in type theory, one
natural approach would be to pick one local topos with a “topological” character,
or a class of them, and look for special features of that model that are visible
internally. For Johnstone’s topological topos, this approach has been pursued by
Escardo and Streicher (2016), in the following way. One can define internally the
generic convergent sequence N∞ to be the type of non-increasing functions N→ 2;
in the topological topos this does in fact yield the space N∞. Thus, one can define a
convergent sequence in an arbitrary type X to be a map N∞ → X . If we wanted to
combine this approach with spatial type theory, we could add axioms ensuring that
the discrete and/or codiscrete types, as defined using ♭ and ♯, can be characterized
in terms of N∞.
1
This is an interesting direction for future research, but in this paper we take a
different route, corresponding to a different choice of a small full subcategory of
1Note that the notion of “indiscrete” referred to in the title of Escardo and Streicher (2016) is
weaker than our “codiscrete”; the former asks only that every sequence converges to every point
in some way. Theorems 7.2 and 7.3 imply that the universe cannot be codiscrete in our stronger
sense without largely trivializing the theory.
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topological spaces. We are interested in applications to theorems about “manifold-
like” spaces locally modeled on the real numbers, both because of their intrinsic
interest, because homotopy types presented by such spaces play an important role in
classical algebraic topology, and because of their importance in applications (e.g. to
physics). While manifold-like spaces are generally well-enough behaved that their
topology is detected by convergent sequences, so that they embed fully faithfully
into the topological topos, the generating object N∞ of this topos is not at all
manifold-like. In particular, it is not even locally connected, a property that is
important for ensuring that a space has a well-behaved fundamental ∞-groupoid.
Thus, our motivating model will instead be the topos of sheaves (or the higher
topos of higher sheaves) on the full subcategory of topological spaces whose ob-
jects are the cartesian spaces Rn. This higher topos was studied by Schreiber
(2013, §4.3) under the name Euclidean-topological cohesion, its objects being called
Euclidean-topological ∞-groupoids or continuous ∞-groupoids ; in other places they
are called topological stacks or topological ∞-stacks. In the same way that the
topological topos defines “topology” to consist of convergent sequences, this topos
defines “topology” to consist of continuous paths (and, more generally, homotopies
and higher homotopies between such paths). In particular, just as the former al-
lows spaces in which a sequence converges to a limit in many ways, our topos allows
paths that “are continuous” in many ways; the “concrete objects” will be those in
which any path is continuous in at most one way.1
We emphasize again that these “paths” are totally different from the terms of
identity type (or “identifications”) that in homotopy type theory are sometimes
called “paths”. For instance, the topological circle S1 contains many continuous
paths, but no identifications other than reflexivity (inside type theory, it will be
a “set”), whereas the homotopical circle S1 contains Z-many identifications but
no nontrivial topology (in fact, we have seen already in Theorem 6.21 that it is
topologically discrete). A general object of our (higher) topos is a sort of stack,
with both topological paths and nontrivial identifications, and moreover it can have
“topology on its identifications”. A good example is the delooping of a topological
group such as O(n); this is homotopically a 1-type, but its loop type is O(n) with
its topological structure.
Just as N∞ plays a central role in the internal theory of the topological topos, we
should expect the space of real numbers R to play an analogously central role for us.
We would like to be able to define this space internally, just as N∞ can be defined
internally using decreasing binary sequences. As remarked in §6.4, there are at
least two obvious ways to define “the real numbers” internally, so we should inquire
whether either of these definitions automatically inherits the correct topology.
The answer is that the Dedekind real numbers do inherit the correct topology,
whereas the Cauchy real numbers do not. In fact, the Cauchy real numbers are
discrete; we will prove this internally in Theorem 8.26. The correctness of the
topology on the Dedekind reals requires a more involved semantic argument (see
Lin (2014) and Example 8.33), but in Theorem 11.5 we will prove a corresponding
internal approximation. Both of these proofs use the axiom of real-cohesion to
1In general, when interpreted in a local topos of sheaves on a local site, our definition of
“concrete” reduces to the notion of “concrete sheaf” studied by Baez and Hoffnung (2011), Dubuc
and Espan˜ol (2006), and Dubuc (1979). Its formulation using ♯ was pointed out by Carchedi and
appears in Schreiber (2013, Proposition 3.7.5).
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be introduced in the second part of the paper, which enhances our spatial type
theory by asserting that the “topology” of types is determined by maps out of the
Dedekind real numbers.
Remark 7.8. Before continuing, let us note that having moved away from the
idea of types as classical topological spaces, we also need to update our subsidiary
intuitions. For example, we noted before that monomorphisms of topological spaces
are continuous injections; but in topological toposes the monomorphisms must be
injective not only on points but on “topological structure” (e.g. witnesses to conver-
gence of a sequence or continuity of a path). Such a monomorphism is a subspace
inclusion when it is also “full” on topological structure (e.g. for any path lying in
the subspace, the witnesses of its continuity in the subspace map isomorphically to
the witnesses in the ambient space).
The case of (regular) epimorphisms (corresponding to type-theoretic surjections)
is somewhat more subtle and involves the Grothendieck topology with which we
equip our site. In Johnstone’s topological topos, a map f : A → B is epimorphic
if it is surjective on points and any (witness of a) convergent sequence (bn) → b∞
in B has a “subsequence” (bnk) → b∞ that is the image of some (witness of a)
convergent sequence in A. More importantly for us, in our topos of Euclidean-
topological spaces, f : A→ B is epimorphic if for any continuous “plot” Rn → B,
we can cover Rn by open balls such that the restriction of our plot to any such ball
is in the image of some plot in A. If we think of A and B as a sort of manifold
locally modeled on Rn, then the epimorphisms are the continuous maps that admit
local sections.
8. Cohesion and real-cohesion
Recall that R denotes the Dedekind real numbers (since it is much more im-
portant for us than any other kind of real numbers, we dignify it by omitting any
subscript). We may call a map R → A a (continuous) path in A. If topology is to
be determined by such paths, then a discrete type should be one in which every
such path is constant. This is what the following axiom expresses.
Axiom R♭. A crisp type A :: Type is discrete if and only if const : A → (R → A)
is an equivalence.
Remark 8.1. As stated, this “axiom” has to be formulated as an unjustified rule
rather than an element of some fixed type, like our original Axiom LEM. However,
as we did for Axiom LEM in Remark 6.28, by using ♭ we can reformulate it as an
assumed (crisp) element of∏
B:♭Type
let A♭ := B in (isdiscrete(A)↔ isequiv(constA,R)).
8.1. Cohesion. When Axiom R♭ is added to spatial type theory, we call it real-
cohesive type theory (or real-cohesive homotopy type theory, if homotopical features
such as univalence and HITs are included). We now explore the consequences of
Axiom R♭ in stages, by introducing a sequence of weaker axioms that use succes-
sively more properties of R. In addition to clarifying the exposition, this makes it
clear that many results are true much more generally. By cohesive (homotopy) type
theory we mean spatial type theory with one or more of these weaker axioms.
We begin with the following, the weakest of the axioms of cohesion.
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Axiom C0. There is a type family R :: I → Type such that a crisp type A :: Type
is discrete if and only if const : A→ (Ri → A) is an equivalence for all i : I.
Since this characterization of discreteness is purely internal, we finally have a
notion of “discrete” that applies also to non-crisp types.
Definition {C0} 8.2. An arbitrary type A : Type (not necessarily crisp) is said to
be discrete if const : A→ (Ri → A) is an equivalence for all i : I.
Lemma {C0} 8.3. Discrete types are an exponential ideal, and even a “depen-
dent exponential ideal”: if B : A → Type and each B(x) is discrete, then so is∏
(x:A)B(x).
Proof.
(
Ri →
∏
(x:A)B(x)
)
≃
(∏
(x:A)(Ri → B(x))
)
≃
(∏
(x:A)B(x)
)
. 
Technically we also need to verify that this equivalence is the map const, but
this is usually easy, so we omit it, both here and in the following lemmas.
Lemma {C0} 8.4. Discrete types are closed under
∑
: if A is discrete and B :
A→ Type has each B(x) discrete, then ∑(x:A)B(x) is discrete.
Proof. We have
(
Ri →
∑
(x:A)B(x)
)
≃
(∑
(f :Ri→A)
∏
(r:Ri)
B(f(r))
)
. But since
A → (Ri → A) is an equivalence, the latter is equivalent to
∑
(x:A)(Ri → B(x)),
which is equivalent to
∑
(x:A)B(x) since each B(x) is discrete. 
Lemma {C0} 8.5. If A is discrete and x, y : A, then (x = y) is discrete.
Proof. Since const : A→ (Ri → A) is an equivalence, it induces an equivalence on
identity types:
(x = y) ≃ (constx = consty).
However, (constx = consty) is equivalent to Ri → (x = y). 
Lemma {C0} 8.6. Discrete types are closed under pullbacks.
Proof. If A,B,C are discrete and f : A→ C, g : B → C, then
A×C B =
∑
(x:C)
∑
(y:B)
(f(x) = g(y)),
so this follows from Lemmas 8.4 and 8.5. 
8.2. Punctual cohesion. Our next batch of consequences uses the additional as-
sumption that each Ri is inhabited (which is clearly true for R).
Axiom C1. Axiom C0 holds, and moreover we have some r :
∏
(i:I)Ri.
This makes Definition 8.2 equivalent to a weaker-looking definition.
Lemma {C1} 8.7. A type A is discrete if and only if every function Ri → A is
constant, i.e. for all i : I and f : Ri → A there is an a : A such that f(x) = a for
all x : Ri.
Proof. The given condition says that each const : A → (Ri → A) has a section;
but it always has a retraction, namely evaluation at ri. Thus, having a section is
equivalent to being an equivalence. 
The primary application of Axiom C1 for us is the following fact.
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Lemma {C1} 8.8. All propositions are discrete.
Proof. Since each Ri is inhabited, if A is a proposition and Ri → A, then A is
contractible; hence the condition of Lemma 8.7 holds. 
From the ♭-♯ adjunction, we obtain a partial dual:
Lemma {C1} 8.9. All crisp propositions are codiscrete.
Proof. We are to show that for any P :: Prop, P is codiscrete, i.e. that ♯P → P
holds. Since P and ♯P are both discrete by Lemma 8.8, it will suffice to prove
♭♯P → ♭P . But by Theorem 6.22, ♭♯P ≃ ♭P . 
For instance, this implies that we can dispense with the distinction between
“crisp and discrete” and “crisply discrete”.
Lemma {C1} 8.10. If A :: Type is crisp and discrete, then we may assume it is
crisply discrete.
Proof. SupposeA :: Type and that we have some d : isdiscrete(A). Since isdiscrete(A)
is a proposition, it is discrete, and so we might as well have d : ♭(isdiscrete(A)).
Thus, by ♭-induction, no matter our goal we are free to assume d′ :: isdiscrete(A). 
Similarly, if a crisp function is an equivalence, it is automatically a crisp equiv-
alence; if a crisp type is an n-type, it is crisply an n-type; and so on.
As another particular case of Lemma 8.9, we have:
Theorem {C1} 8.11. ∅ is codiscrete, i.e. Axiom ♯∅ holds.
Proof. ∅ is a crisp proposition. 
Corollary {LEM,C1} 8.12. For any proposition P we have ♯P ≃ ¬¬P .
Proof. This is just Theorem 3.15, but with Axiom ♯∅ replaced by Axiom C1, which
implies it (by Theorem 8.11). 
In particular, even though Axiom C1 only characterizes discreteness explicitly,
in the presence of Axiom LEM it implies an even more explicit characterization of
codiscreteness, at least for n-types.
Corollary {LEM,C1} 8.13. An n-type A is codiscrete if and only if const : A →
(P → A) is an equivalence for all propositions P such that ¬¬P .
Proof. Combine Corollary 8.12 and Theorem 7.3. 
Remark 8.14. In topos-theoretic language, Axiom ♯∅ says that the subtopos de-
fined by ♯ is dense, while the stronger Lemma 8.9 says that ♯ is in fact fiberwise
dense in the sense of Johnstone (2002, C1.1.22).
We also obtain a characterization of discrete sets (i.e. 0-types) that makes no
reference to the family R, and coincides with that of Dubuc and Penon (1986) and
Penon (1985): they are the sets with decidable equality.
Lemma {LEM,C1} 8.15. A set A is discrete if and only if ∀x, y : A.(x = y∨x 6= y).
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Proof. If A is discrete, then given x, y : A we may assume they are crisp. Then
since A is a set, x = y is a crisp proposition, hence x = y ∨ x 6= y follows from
Axiom LEM.
Conversely, suppose ∀x, y : A.(x = y ∨ x 6= y). Since x = y and x 6= y are
incompatible propositions, we have ((x = y) ∨ (x 6= y)) ≃ ((x = y) + (x 6= y)), so
we can define functions by cases on equality in A. Now for any f : Ri → A, define
g : Ri → 2 by
g(r) =
{
12 if f(r) = f(ri)
02 if f(r) 6= f(ri).
Since 2 is discrete, g is constant. But g(ri) = 12, so g(r) = 12 for all r : Ri, i.e.
f(r) = f(ri) for all r. Hence f is constant. 
We record a few more useful consequences. Firstly, ♭ detects emptiness:
Corollary {C1} 8.16. If A :: Type and ¬♭A, then ¬A.
Proof. If ¬♭A, then it may as well hold crisply by Lemma 8.8, i.e. we have f :: ♭A→
∅. Then by Corollary 6.26, we also have A→ ♯∅, and hence ¬A since ♯∅ = ∅. 
Next, any injective continuous function with discrete codomain also has discrete
domain, as we would expect from classical topology.
Lemma {C1} 8.17. Any subobject of a discrete type is discrete.
Proof. If A is discrete and P : A→ Prop is a predicate, then each P (x) is discrete
by Lemma 8.8; hence the subobject
∑
(x:A) P (x) is discrete by Lemma 8.4. 
Corollary {C1} 8.18. If m :: A → B is a crisp embedding, then its naturality
square for ♭ is a pullback:
♭A //

A

♭B // B
Proof. Since ♭ preserves embeddings, ♭A→ ♭B is an embedding, as is the pullback
of A to ♭B. Thus, it will suffice to show that the latter pullback factors through ♭A
as a subobject of ♭B. But since it is a subobject of a discrete type, it is discrete,
so this follows from the universal property of ♭A. 
We can also characterize the concrete objects (Definition 7.1) more exactly.
Corollary {LEM,C1} 8.19. A set A is concrete if and only if it is ¬¬-separated,
i.e. ¬¬(x = y)→ (x = y) for all x, y : A.
Proof. By definition, A is concrete if (–)♯ : A → ♯A is an embedding. But by
Theorem 3.7, (x♯ = y♯) ≃ ♯(x = y), so this holds just when x = y is codiscrete for
all x, y : A. Now apply Corollary 8.12. 
For example, since R is always ¬¬-separated (see for example Johnstone 2002,
D4.7.6), it follows that R is concrete. But in fact, this is true even without LEM.
Theorem {C1} 8.20. R is concrete.
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Proof. It will suffice to prove that for any crisp A :: Type and f, g :: A→ R, if the
two composites A→ R→ ♯R are equal, then so are f and g. (Applying this when
A = R×♯R R will then show that R → ♯R is monic.) Moreover, by Corollary 6.26,
saying that the two composites A → R → ♯R are equal is the same as saying that
the two composites ♭A→ A→ R are equal.
Now a map f : A→ R is determined by two Q-indexed families of subobjects of
A, say Lf(q) and Uf (q) for q : Q, satisfying the usual axioms, and likewise for g.
Thus, our assumption says that Lf (q) and Uf(q) agree with Lg(q) and Ug(q) when
pulled back to ♭A, and we want to show that Lf(q) = Lg(q) and Uf(q) = Ug(q)
already over A. By Corollary 8.18, the pullback of Lf (q) to ♭A is ♭Lf(q), and
likewise for all the others. (Note that Q, being abstractly isomorphic to N, is
discrete, so we can assume any rational number to be crisp).
Now if q < r, we have Lf(q) ∩ Uf (r) = ∅, and thus ♭Lf(q) ∩ ♭Uf (r) = ∅. But
♭Uf (r) = ♭Ug(r) by assumption, so ♭Lf (q) ∩ ♭Ug(r) = ∅ as well. Since ♭ preserves
pullbacks, by Corollary 8.16 we have Lf (q) ∩ Ug(r) = ∅. If further r < s, then
since Ug(r) ∪ Lg(s) = A, we have Lf(q) ⊆ Lg(s). Finally, for any p : Q we have
Lf(p) =
⋃
q<p L
f(q) ⊆ ⋃q<p Lg(p) = Lg(p) (by taking s :≡ p, and r between q
and p). The same argument applies in the other direction and to all the other
subsets. 
We can also show the inclusion of the discrete retopologization is injective (in-
deed, bijective) on points — but with a truncation restriction.
Theorem {C1} 8.21. If B :: Type is a crisp set, then ♭B → B is injective.
Proof. Note that ♭B is a set by Theorem 6.6. In the proof of Corollary 6.2, we
showed that for any u, v : ♭B we have (u = v) ≃ code(u, v), where
code(u, v) :≡ let x♭ := u in (let y♭ := v in ♭(x = y)).
However, if B is a set, then x = y is a proposition, hence discrete by Lemma 8.8.
Thus, by ♭-induction we can prove that code(u, v) is equivalent to
let x♭ := u in (let y♭ := v in (x = y))
which by a couple of commuting conversions is equivalent to
(let x♭ := u in x) = (let y♭ := v in y)
i.e. to (u♭ = v♭). Thus, (–)♭ is injective. 
The proof also makes clear why we should not expect ♭B → B to be an embed-
ding if B is not a set: in that case we also have to discretify the identity types.
Corollary {C1} 8.22. If B :: Type is a crisp set, then the composite ♭B → B → ♯B
is injective.
Proof. It is equal to the composite ♭B ∼= ♭♯B → ♯B, and ♯B is also a crisp set. 
Corollary {C1} 8.23. Any crisp discrete set is concrete. 
We can also show that discrete sets are closed under surjective quotients (see
also Johnstone 2002, A4.6.6).
Lemma {C1} 8.24. If A,B :: Type are crisp, A is discrete, B is a set, and
f :: A→ B is surjective, then B is discrete.
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Proof. The kernel-pair of f is a subobject of A×A, and is therefore crisply discrete
by Lemma 8.17. But B is the set-coequalizer of that kernel pair, hence discrete by
Theorem 6.21. 
Corollary {C1} 8.25. If A is crisp and discrete, then so is ‖A‖0. 
Now we can prove the following, which was claimed in §7 to hold in our topos
model.
Theorem {C1} 8.26. The Cauchy real numbers RC are discrete.
Proof. Since Q and N are discrete, by Lemma 8.3, the type N → Q of sequences
of rational numbers is discrete. The type C of Cauchy sequences is a subobject
of N → Q, so by Lemma 8.17 it is also discrete. Finally, the Cauchy reals are a
surjective image of the set of Cauchy sequences, so by Lemma 8.24 they are also
discrete. 
Theorem 8.26 is about the usual sort of Cauchy real numbers defined as a quo-
tient of the set of Cauchy sequences. UFP (2013, §11.3) constructs a “better” set of
Cauchy real numbers that is constructively Cauchy complete. However, our classi-
cality axioms suffice to ensure that the usual RC is already Cauchy complete, hence
coincides with that of UFP (2013):
Corollary {AC,C1} 8.27. RC is Cauchy-complete.
Sketch of proof. Since RC is discrete by Theorem 8.26 and the quotient map C →
RC is surjective, by Theorem 6.30 there exists a section of it. Thus, for any Cauchy
sequence in RC there exists a sequence of sequences of rational numbers, and “di-
agonalizing” this in the usual way we obtain a limit in RC . 
Finally, we can also nail down the exact relationship between the topology on
the two types of real numbers.
Corollary {ACN or LEM, C1} 8.28. RC ≃ ♭R.
Proof. By Corollary 6.33, ♭RC ≃ ♭R. But RC is discrete, so ♭RC ≃ RC . 
We will return to the question of what the topology on R itself is in §11.
8.3. Omniscience principles. We have seen that the ordinary LEM and AC are
inconsistent with spatial interpretations, motivating the introduction of ♯ and ♭
in order to state our modified Axiom LEM and Axiom AC. However, there are
weaker “classicality” principles whose ordinary versions are true in our motivating
model, and some of them can even be proven from our current axioms, such as the
following.
Theorem {LEM,C1} 8.29. The limited principle of omniscience (LPO)
holds: for any f : N → 2, either there exists an n : N such that f(n) = 12, or
f(n) = 02 for all n.
Proof. Since N → 2 is discrete by Lemma 8.3, we may assume f :: N → 2 is
crisp. Then “∃n.f(n) = 12” is a crisp proposition, so by Axiom LEM we have
either ∃n.f(n) = 12 or ¬(∃n.f(n) = 12). But ¬(∃n.f(n) = 12) is the same as
(∀n.f(n) = 02), so we are done. 
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In particular, this implies that if we define N∞ as in Escardo and Streicher (2016)
to be the type of non-increasing binary sequences N → 2, then the canonical map
N+1→ N∞ is an equivalence. In particular, every type in our theory is “indiscrete”
in the sense of Escardo and Streicher (2016). Thus, the “topology” of the types in
cohesive type theory is very different from the “topology” studied by Escardo and
Streicher (2016).
It is well-known in constructive mathematics that LPO implies the following
weaker classicality principles.
Corollary {LEM,C1} 8.30. The lesser limited principle of omniscience
(LLPO) holds: for any f, g : N → 2, if it is not the case that both ∃n.f(n) = 12
and ∃n.g(n) = 12, then either ∀n.f(n) = 02 or ∀n.g(n) = 02. 
Corollary {LEM,C1} 8.31. Markov’s principle (MP) holds: if f : N→ 2 and
¬∀n.f(n) = 02, then ∃n.f(n) = 12. 
It is also well-known that LPO, LLPO, and MP are equivalent to statements
about the order and equality of Cauchy real numbers. Specifically:
(1) LPO is equivalent to saying that RC has decidable equality. (Thus, Theo-
rem 8.29 and Lemma 8.15 give an alternative proof of Theorem 8.26.)
(2) LLPO is equivalent to ∀x : RC .(x ≤ 0 ∨ x ≥ 0), hence that ≤ is a total
order on RC .
(3) MP is equivalent to ∀x : RC .(¬(x ≤ 0)→ x > 0).
Traditionally in constructive mathematics, two real numbers x, y are said to be
apart, written x# y, if |x − y| > 0. We have ¬(x# y)↔ (x = y), but in general,
x# y is stronger than ¬(x = y). However, since x = y is equivalent to |x− y| ≤ 0,
Markov’s Principle implies that x# y and ¬(x = y) coincide for Cauchy reals.
Of course, we are generally more interested in the Dedekind reals R than the
Cauchy ones RC . Toby Bartels has suggested the following terminology:
(1) The analytic LPO claims that R has decidable equality.
(2) The analytic LLPO claims that ∀x : R.(x ≤ 0 ∨ x ≥ 0).
(3) The analytic MP claims that ∀x : R.(¬(x ≤ 0)→ x > 0).
Since (assuming Axiom R♭) R is not discrete (its identity map is not constant),
the analytic LPO is false. Somewhat more surprisingly, we will prove in Theo-
rem 11.7 that the analytic LLPO is also false. The analytic Markov’s principle,
however, is actually true in our motivating model! I conjecture that it can even be
proven from Axiom LEM and Axiom R♭, but I have not managed to show this yet.
Thus, we assume it as an additional axiom. Actually, I prefer the following axiom,
which is equivalent in the presence of Axiom LEM.
Axiom T. For any x : R, the proposition x > 0 is codiscrete.
Theorem {LEM,C1,T} 8.32 (Analytic Markov’s Principle). If x, y : R satisfy
¬(x = y), then x# y. In particular, if ¬(x ≤ 0), then x > 0.
Proof. By Axiom T, x# y is codiscrete, so by Corollary 8.12 it is ¬¬-stable. Thus,
we can prove it by contradiction. However, ¬(x#y) means x = y, which contradicts
the assumption of ¬(x = y). 
Axiom T is arguably the most mysterious part of the theory. Topologically, it
says that the open subset (0,∞) of R is a subspace, i.e. has the induced topology.
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In other words, it relates the intrinsic “topology” of R, arising from its definition
as a type, to the internal ordering relation defined on it. Another way to look at it
is that it ensures that the intrinsic “topology” of R makes it into a topological field,
i.e. that the reciprocal is continuous on the subspace of invertible elements.
Some considerations of models may also help to understand Axiom T.
Example 8.33. Axiom T holds in our motivating model of sheaves on the category
C of cartesian spaces Rn.
Sketch of proof. This requires recalling a bit about the standard proof that R inher-
its the correct topology in this model, which goes as follows (see Mac Lane and Mo-
erdijk 1994, §VI.9; Lin 2014). For any space X ∈ C, we have Sh(C)/X ≃ Sh(C/X),
which admits a local geometric morphism to Sh(X). Since local geometric mor-
phisms are orthogonal to grouplike morphisms (Johnstone 2002, C3.6.10), and the
space of real numbers is a grouplike locale, to give a real number in Sh(C)/X is
equivalent to giving a real number in Sh(X), or equivalently a map X → R. Thus,
the sections of the Dedekind real number object over X are the continuous maps
X → R.
Repeating this argument with R replaced by the space of positive real numbers,
which is also grouplike, we find that the object of positive reals in Sh(C) is the
sheaf of positive real-valued functions. To say that this is a codiscrete subobject of
the Dedekind reals is to say that a continuous real-valued function factors through
the space of positive real numbers just when it is positive at every point, which is
obviously true. 
The preceding argument depends crucially on the classicality of the base topos,
and in particular the fact that the locale of formal real numbers (which classifies
internal Dedekind real numbers) is spatial. Indeed, we have:
Example 8.34. If we start from an arbitrary base topos, and construct a similar
topos of sheaves on the category of cartesian locales Rnf (where Rf denotes the
locale of formal reals), then Axiom T can fail.
Sketch of proof. I am indebted to Bas Spitters for this argument. There exist
toposes (particularly, recursive ones such as the effective topos) in which there
are uniformly continuous functions f : R → R such that f(x) > 0 for all x but f
does not have uniform lower bounds on all finite intervals. Now since the metric
space R is “locally compact” in the sense of Bishop, by Palmgren (2007a), f ex-
tends to a locale morphism f¯ : Rf → Rf , and since R is the space of points of Rf ,
we still have f¯(x) > 0 for all x. However, f¯ does not factor through the locale of
formal positive reals, since by Palmgren (2007b) if it did then it would have local
uniform lower bounds. Thus, we can repeat the proof of Example 8.33 until the
last sentence, at which point we find that the “obvious” fact is now false. 
Note that the topos of Example 8.34 is local over its base and satisfies Axiom R♭,
by the same argument as before. Thus, (modulo Remark 7.5) Axiom T does not
follow from Axiom R♭ alone; but I do not know a countermodel to it that satisfies
both Axiom R♭ and Axiom LEM.
9. Shape
Codiscrete types are defined by the fact that functions into them need not be
continuous; while discrete types are defined by the fact that functions out of them
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need not be continuous. In a sense, this means that all the non-tautological infor-
mation about codiscrete types is carried by the maps out of them, and likewise the
non-trivial information about discrete types is carried by the maps into them. Let
us leave the first for another day1 and concentrate on maps A → B, where B is
discrete.
In the world of classical topological spaces, if B is discrete, then (at least when
A is well-behaved, which at the moment means “locally connected”) continuous
maps A → B are the same as functions π0(A) → B, where π0(A) is the set of
connected components of A. In other words, π0 is a reflection into the subcategory
of discrete spaces. Since π0(A) is also the “first layer” of the homotopy type, or
fundamental∞-groupoid, of A, this suggests that mapping into discrete spaces can
carry information about the latter construction.
In fact, it turns out that the single generalization from sets to ∞-groupoids
ensures that mapping into discrete types carries all the information about the
fundamental ∞-groupoid. At least in good situations, such as our ∞-topos of
sheaves on the category of cartesian spaces Rn, the fundamental ∞-groupoid can
be defined as a left adjoint to the inclusion of discrete spaces (see Schreiber 2013,
Proposition 4.3.32; Carchedi 2015, §3). With Axiom R♭ in our theory, we can get
an inkling of how this works internally by considering the topological circle S1.
Definition 9.1. The topological circle S1 is the (homotopy) coequalizer of the
pair of maps
R
id //
+1
// R .
We might write this as S1 :≡ R/Z. In Theorem 9.19 we will compare this
definition to some other possible definitions of the topological circle. For now let
us simply observe that it is at least one reasonable definition — with one caveat,
namely that S1 ought to be a set (i.e. have no higher identifications), and with this
definition it is not obvious that this is so. We could, of course, 0-truncate it, but
that would defeat the purpose of what we are about to do, and fortunately it turns
out to be unnecessary:
Theorem {UA} 9.2. Suppose R is a set and f : R ≃ R an equivalence such that
for all r : R and m,n : Z, if fn(r) = fm(r), then m = n. (In other words, the
induced action of Z on R is free.) Then the homotopy coequalizer of R
id //
f
// R is
also a set.
Proof. Recall that S1 denotes the homotopical circle, a HIT with two constructors
base : S1 and loop : base = base. We define P : S1 → Type by P (base) :≡ R and
P (loop) = f (modulo univalence). Note that S1 is the homotopy coequalizer of
1 ⇒ 1. Thus, by the flattening lemma (UFP 2013, §6.12), the desired homotopy
coequalizer of idR and f is equivalent to
∑
(x:S1) P (x); so it will suffice to prove
that the latter is a set.
Let x, y : S1 and u : P (x), v : P (y); we must prove that (x, u) = (y, v) is a
proposition. Now (x, u) = (y, v) is equivalent to
∑
(p:x=y)(p∗u = v). Thus, suppose
p, q : x = y and r : p∗u = v and s : q∗u = v; we must show (p, r) = (q, s). Since r
1But see Theorem 10.2 and Corollary 10.3.
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and s are equalities in a set, it suffices to show p = q. But this is also an equality
in a set (since S1 is a 1-type), hence a proposition; thus, since S1 is connected, we
may assume x = base and y = base.
Now under the isomorphism (base = base) ≃ Z, our p and q get identified with
n,m : Z respectively. Moreover, by definition of P , transporting along p or q gets
identified with application of fn or fm respectively. Thus, from r and s we obtain
p∗u = q∗u and hence f
n(u) = fm(u), with u : R, and so the freeness assumption
gives n = m as needed. 
Remark 9.3. It should be possible to prove Theorem 9.2 using univalence only
for propositions (e.g. with UFP 2013, Theorem 7.2.2). But the preceding proof is
easier.
Corollary {UA} 9.4. The topological circle S1 is a set.
Proof. Since R is an abelian group, (+1) : R → R is an equivalence. The freeness
condition in Theorem 9.2 is equivalent to saying that the unique ring homomor-
phism Z→ R is injective, which just says that R has characteristic 0. 
The following proof contains the crucial idea involved in the adjoint characteri-
zation of fundamental ∞-groupoids.
Theorem {R♭} 9.5. For any discrete type X, we have (S1 → X) ≃ (S1 → X).
Proof. The universal property of S1 means that (S1 → X) is equivalent to
(9.1)
∑
x:X
(x = x).
But by the universal property of a coequalizer, (S1 → X) is equivalent to
(9.2)
∑
g:R→X
(g ◦ (+1) = g).
Now g ◦ (+1) = g is an equality in the type R→ X , which is equivalent to X since
X is discrete. The equivalence can be implemented by evaluating at any r : R, such
as 0; thus (9.2) is equivalent to
(9.3)
∑
g:R→X
(g(1) = g(0)).
But since (R→ X) ≃ X , we may assume g is constant at some x : X , giving (9.1).

In particular, the identity map of S1 corresponds to a nontrivial map S1 → S1,
which may be said informally to “wrap the topological circle around the homotopical
one”. Since Theorem 9.5 is easily shown to be natural, this map exhibits S1 as a
reflection of S1 into the discrete types. (Recall from Theorem 6.21 that S1 is
topologically discrete.)
Since S1 is, or should be, the fundamental ∞-groupoid of S1, this leads us to
ask: does every type have a reflection into the discrete types? The answer is yes,
and it requires only the much weaker Axiom C0.
Definition {C0} 9.6. For any type A, its shape sA is the higher inductive type
with the following five constructors.
(1) σA : A→ sA
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(2) κA :
∏
(i:I)(Ri → sA)→ sA
(3) For all i : I and g : Ri → sA and x : Ri, an equality g(x) = κA(i, g).
(4) κ′A :
∏
(i:I)(Ri → sA)→ sA
(5) For all i : I and x : sA, an equality x = κ′A(i, constx).
Remark 9.7. We use the word “shape” not only because it is nine syllables shorter
than “fundamental ∞-groupoid”, but because the latter has various connotations
that we want to be free of. In particular, the shape is a purely internal construction
in our “real-cohesive type theory”, although it generally behaves like the fundamen-
tal ∞-groupoid. Moreover, the fundamental ∞-groupoid is usually notated Π∞,
but since Π is rather overworked in type theory already, a different symbol is prefer-
able. The word “shape” comes from shape theory, which also studies generalizations
of the fundamental ∞-groupoid that make sense for less well-behaved spaces. The
symbol s is not an integral sign (
∫
) but an “esh”, the IPA sign for a voiceless
postalveolar fricative (English sh).
The definition of sA is cooked up precisely to admit a map from A and to be
discrete:
Lemma {C0} 9.8. sA is discrete.
Proof. The last four constructors say exactly that sA→ (Ri → sA) has both a left
and a right inverse. 
It is unsurprising, therefore, that sA has the desired universal property. We
express this first as a s-induction principle.
Theorem {C0} 9.9. If P : sA → Type is a family of discrete types, and we have
d :
∏
(x:A) P (σ(x)), then we have f :
∏
(y:sA)
P (y) such that f(σ(x)) = d(x) for all
x : A.
Proof. The “basic” induction principle of sA arising from its higher inductive defi-
nition says that given Q : sA→ Type together with
(1) dσ :
∏
(x:A)Q(σ(x))
(2) dκ :
∏
(i:I)
∏
(g:Ri→sA)
∏
(h:
∏
(x:Ri)
Q(g(x)))Q(κ(i, g))
(3) d= :
∏
(g:R→sA)
∏
(h:
∏
(x:R) Q(g(x)))
∏
(x:R)(h(x) =ξ dκ(i, g, h)), where ξ is the
third constructor of sA,
(4) dκ′ :
∏
(i:I)
∏
(g:Ri→sA)
∏
(h:
∏
(x:Ri)
Q(g(x)))Q(κ
′(i, g))
(5) d=′ :
∏
(i:I)
∏
(x:sA)
∏
(y:Q(x))(y =ζ dκ′(i, constx, consty)), where ζ is the last
constructor of sA,
we have f :
∏
(y:sA)
P (y) such that f(σ(x)) ≡ dσ(x) (plus four other equalities).
Thus, given our current hypotheses, it remains to construct dκ, d=, dκ′ , and d=′ .
First suppose g : Ri → sA and h :
∏
(x:Ri)
Q(g(x)), for some i. By the third
constructor of sA, we have g(x) = κ(i, g) for all x : Ri. Thus, transporting h(x)
along these equalities, we get h′ : Ri → Q(κ(i, g)). Thus, since Q(κ(i, g)) is discrete,
there is a dκ(i, g, h) : Q(κ(i, )) such that d=(i, g, h, x) : h
′(x) = dκ(i, g, h) for all
x : R, as desired.
Now suppose x : sA and y : Q(x). By the last constructor of sA, we have x =
κ(i, constx). Thus, transporting y along this equality, we obtain y
′ : Q(κ(i, constx)).
Since Q(κ(i, constx)) is discrete, we have d=′(i, x, y) : y
′ = dκ′(i, constx, consty) as
desired. 
REAL-COHESIVE HOTT 65
Corollary {C0} 9.10. sRi is contractible for any i : I.
Proof. It is inhabited by κRi(i, σRi), so it remains to show x = κRi(i, σRi) for all
x : sR. Since sRi is discrete, so is this equality type; so by s-induction, it suffices to
prove σRi(x) = κRi(i, σRi) for all x : Ri. But this follows from the third constructor
of sRi. 
Corollary {R♭} 9.11. sR is contractible. 
Corollary {C1} 9.12. For any A, the map σ : A→ sA is surjective. In particular,
if ‖sA‖ then ‖A‖.
Proof. Given y : sA, define P (y) :≡
∥∥∥∑(x:A) σ(x) = y∥∥∥. By Lemma 8.8, each P (y)
is discrete. Thus, by Theorem 9.9, to prove
∏
(y:sA)
P (y) (i.e. that σ is surjective),
it suffices to prove
∏
(x:A) P (σ(x)); but this is obvious. 
Remark 9.13. Recall from §4 that many positive type formers have a “crisp”
variant of their induction principle, so that we can do case analysis on a u :: A+B
or induction on a u :: N. This is not the case for s, however. If it were, then we
could do s-induction on u :: sA, so that if B were discrete then anyM : B depending
on u :: A would factor through sA. Specializing to A :≡ R and B :≡ 2, any M : 2
depending on u :: R would be constant. However, since u is crisp, by using the
crisp LEM we can define M : 2 to be 02 if u < 0 and 12 otherwise, which is not at
all constant.
Now we have the reflection property:
Theorem {C0} 9.14. For any A : Type and any discrete B : Type, composition
with σ : A→ sA induces an equivalence
(sA→ B) ≃ (A→ B).
Proof. s-induction into the constant family λx.B yields a section of (– ◦ σ). Thus,
it suffices to show that given h, k : sA → B, if h ◦ σ = k ◦ σ, then h = k. This
follows from another s-induction with P (x) :≡ (h(x) = k(x)), which is discrete by
Lemma 8.5. 
Moreover, analogously to how ♭ ⊣ ♯ crisply (Corollary 6.26), we have s ⊣ ♭ crisply.
Theorem {C0} 9.15. For any A,B :: Type, there is a natural equivalence
♭(sA→ B) ≃ ♭(A→ ♭B).
Proof. Since ♭B is discrete, by Theorem 9.14 we have a natural equivalence
(sA→ ♭B) ≃ (A→ ♭B)
and this equivalence is preserved by ♭. On the other hand, since sA is discrete, by
Corollary 6.15 we have a natural equivalence
♭(sA→ ♭B) ≃ ♭(sA→ B).
Composing these two equivalences yields the conclusion. 
Theorem 9.14 makes s into a monadic modality, like ♯, and its construction as
a localization makes it an accessible one (see Rijke, Shulman, and Spitters 2016).
Unlike ♯, however, s is not left exact. To show this, we introduce our final weakening
of Axiom R♭.
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Axiom C2. Axiom C1 holds, and moreover there exist i0 : I and r0, r1 : Ri0 such
that Ri0 is a set and r0 6= r1.
Note that Axiom R♭ implies Axiom C2, since 0 6= 1 in R.
Theorem {C2} 9.16. There exists a pullback that is not preserved by s.
Proof. The pullback of the inclusions r0, r1 : 1 → Ri0 is ∅. But s1 and sRi0 are
both contractible, whereas s∅ = ∅ since it is already discrete. 
(However, like any monadic modality, s does preserve products.)
Viewing s as a reflection gives another, more category-theoretic, way to phrase
and prove Theorem 9.5.
Theorem {R♭} 9.17. sS1 = S1.
Proof. By Theorem 9.14, s is a left adjoint to the inclusion of discrete types in
all types. Thus, it preserves all colimits, which is to say it takes colimits in the
category of all types to colimits in the category of discrete types. Thus, since S1 is
the (homotopy) coequalizer of R ⇒ R, it follows that sS1 is the coequalizer in the
category of discrete types of sR⇒ sR, and hence by Corollary 9.11 of 1⇒ 1. Now
S1 is the coequalizer of 1⇒ 1 in the category of all types; but by Theorem 6.21 it
lies in the subcategory of discrete types and hence is also the coequalizer there. 
Similar methods may be used in many other examples. That is, given a “cell
complex” presentation of a classical topological space, if we can convert it into
both a specification for a HIT and a colimit decomposition of that space that is
sufficiently “cofibrant”, then s will preserve that colimit and take the space to the
HIT. We do have to be careful to avoid the sort of cell complex used in classical
algebraic topology where discs are glued along their boundaries, because such gluing
in a constructive world tends to produce inhomogeneous “cusps”. For instance,
identifying the two endpoints of the topological interval [0, 1] = {x : R | 0 ≤ x ≤ 1}
would not1 produce a space equivalent to S1. This is also a known “defect” (if
one regards it so) of the topos model we have in mind; see also the remarks after
Theorem 11.7. (It is “fixed” in the topological topos of Johnstone (1979, §6), but
in that model no left adjoint s can exist due to a lack of local connectedness.)
However, in many cases it should be possible to remedy this by gluing along open
overlaps instead. What makes this work is the fact that although R fails to satisfy
the trichotomy principle constructively, we do have (x < z) → (x < y) ∨ (y < z)
for all x, y, z : R. Combined with the following observation, this tells us that gluing
along open overlaps produces no cusps.
Lemma 9.18. If f : A → C and g : B → C are embeddings, then their union as
sub-types of C is their pushout under their intersection: A ∪B ≃ A ⊔A∩B B.
Proof. By definition, f ∪ g : A ∪ B → C is the smallest embedding through which
both f and g factor, while A ∩ B is the pullback A ×C B. If h : D → C is an
embedding through which both f and g factor, then the square
A ∩B //

B

A // D
1Although, amusingly, its shape would still be S1: it would be the coequalizer of 1 ⇒ [0, 1],
while s[0, 1] is also contractible since [0, 1] is a retract of R.
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commutes since h is an embedding, so there is an induced map A ⊔A∩B B → D.
It remains to note that A ⊔A∩B B → C is an embedding by Rijke (2017, Lemma
2.4). 
As an example, we give two other definitions of S1.
Theorem 9.19. The following types are equivalent.
(1) S1 as defined in Definition 9.1, i.e. the coequalizer of the identity and +1 :
R→ R.
(2) The subset {(x, y) | x2 + y2 = 1} of R× R (the boundary of the topological
disc D2).
(3) The coequalizer of the inclusion of open intervals (0, ε) → (0, 1) and the
translated inclusion (λx. 1 − ε+ x) : (0, ε)→ (0, 1), for any 0 < ε < 12 .
Proof. We can define the functions sin and cos on the Dedekind reals constructively,
and prove that sin2 x + cos2 x = 1. Thus, λx. (cos(2πx), sin(2πx)) defines a map
from R to {(x, y) | x2 + y2 = 1}, which by the periodicity of sin and cos descends
to S1. It is then straightforward to verify that this map is both surjective and
injective, hence an equivalence since both types are sets. Thus (1) and (2) are
equivalent.
Now let 0 < ε < 12 . Every real number is either < ε or > −ε, so the set {(x, y) |
x2 + y2 = 1} in (2) is the union of its subsets U and V consisting of the points
where y < ε and where y > −ε. Thus, by Lemma 9.18 it is the pushout of U and
V , each of which is isomorphic to an open interval, under their intersection, which
is isomorphic to the disjoint union of two open intervals, included into U and V at
their ends. Since (again by Lemma 9.18) the pushout of two open intervals under
their intersection is their union, we can rearrange this pushout to become (3). 
Similarly, we can obtain the topological sphere S2 by gluing two topological discs
D2 (isomorphic to R2, hence with contractible shape) along a strip S1 × R (with
shape S1). Thus sS2 is the homotopical suspension of S1, i.e. the homotopical
sphere S2. We can proceed inductively for higher spheres, and so on. In this way it
may be possible to access homotopy types that would be quite difficult to present
as HITs (due, for example, to their having infinitely many constructors), by first
constructing their topological versions as sets using the Dedekind reals and then
applying s.
Remark 9.20. The overall conclusions drawn from Axiom C0 in this section and
§8 can be summarized as “s is a reflector into the same subcategory that ♭ core-
flects into, and it preserves finite products”. As with the analogous conclusions
about ♯ and ♭ noted in Remarks 3.12 and 6.29, in Schreiber and Shulman (2012) we
assumed this axiomatically, while here we have deduced it from Axiom C0 and a
higher inductive definition of s. This difference from Schreiber and Shulman (2012)
is roughly orthogonal to our introduction of ♭ and ♯ using crisp variables; it is not
necessitated by anything, but it is a convenient starting point for expressing the
stronger Axiom C1, Axiom C2, and Axiom R♭. These axioms were not considered
in Schreiber and Shulman (2012); but in §10 we will relate the first two to corre-
sponding categorical properties studied by Johnstone (2011), Lawvere (2007), and
Lawvere and Menni (2015).
Remark 9.21. The crisp adjointness s ⊣ ♭ from Theorem 9.15 finally allows us to
justify the choice of the notations ♭ and ♯ (the notation and justification are both
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due to Schreiber (2013)). Suppose G is a group, meaning a set (0-type) with a
group structure (but, like all types in spatial type theory, also possessing intrinsic
topology). We can construct a delooping BG (a.k.a. K(G, 1)) by the methods of
Licata and Finster (2014).
Now if X is any space, a principal G-bundle over X with a flat connection assigns
to every (topological) path inX an element ofG (“transport” along that path), such
that concatenating paths corresponds to multiplication in G, and so forth. Since
paths in X and elements of G are the 1-morphisms in the fundamental∞-groupoid
of X and in BG, respectively, such a bundle with flat connection can be described
categorically as a map sX → BG. But by Theorem 9.15, this is equivalent to a
map X → ♭BG. Thus, ♭BG is the moduli space of flat G-connections, justifying
the notation ♭. The notation ♯ is chosen simply as dual to flat; although one can
argue that if Z classifies bundles of some sort then ♯Z classifies analogous bundles
that are “sharp” in that their fibers can vary discontinuously. (Unfortunately, as
noted in Remark 7.7, in Awodey and Birkedal (2003) and Awodey, Birkedal, and
Scott (1999) the symbols ♭ and ♯ were used for the propositional restriction of the
same operations, but with reversed meanings.)
10. Axioms of cohesion
The axioms introduced in §§8 and 9 form a linear string of implications:
R♭ ⇒ C2 ⇒ C1 ⇒ C0.
Our main goal (the Brouwer fixed point theorem) requires Axiom R♭ (or at least its
consequence Corollary 9.11). However, the weaker versions are much more general
assumptions, which are not very specific to the “topological” situation and are
satisfied in many other models, so it is interesting that they suffice for most of the
general theory. In this somewhat digressive section, we investigate some of their
further consequences and their topos-theoretic meaning.
10.1. Axiom C0 means stable local connectedness. Combining Corollary 6.26
and Theorem 9.15, we see that Axiom C0 gives us a crisp “adjoint triple” s ⊣ ♭ ⊣ ♯,
in which s preserves finite products. In topos-theoretic language, the category of
types is “local and locally connected” over the category of discrete (or, equiva-
lently, codiscrete) types, and in addition the left adjoint preserves binary products.
Johnstone (2011) called this additional condition stable local connectedness.
Conversely, if a topos is local and stably locally connected, then by combining
Johnstone (2002, C3.6.3(d)) with Johnstone (2011, Proposition 1.3), it has a site
of definition that is local and locally connected and closed under finite products.
We should therefore be able to show that Axiom C0 holds in its internal spatial
type theory by taking I to be the discrete set of objects of the site and Ri the
corresponding representable. The condition that A→ (Ri → A) be an equivalence
then says, in terms of sheaves, that A(U) → A(Ri × U) is an isomorphism (or, in
the higher-topos case, an equivalence) for any object U of the site (here we use the
fact that the site has finite products). The special case U = 1 tells us that A is a
constant (pre)sheaf, and the rest of the conditions follow automatically. (We could
also take I to be a set of objects that generate the site under finite products, as R
does for our site of cartesian spaces Rn.)
Thus, Axiom C0 is exactly a type-theoretic incarnation of stable local connect-
edness (as an additional property added to a local topos). Schreiber (2013) calls a
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local and stably locally connected ∞-topos cohesive (although for Lawvere (2007)
the word “cohesive” also includes the categorical version of Axiom C1, below, and
an additional axiom called “continuity” that we do not consider here).
In addition to our motivating example (sheaves on cartesian spaces), several
other similar examples of local and stably locally connected toposes and∞-toposes
can be found in Schreiber (2013). Here are a few more:
• By Johnstone (2011, Lemma 1.1) and Johnstone (2002, C3.6.3(a) and
C3.6.17(a)), the topos Sh(X) of sheaves on a space (or locale) is local and
stably locally connected if and only if X has both a focal point and a dense
point. For example, in the Sierpinski space, the closed point is focal and
the open point is dense.
• The local ∞-topos of parametrized spectra mentioned in Remark 7.6 is
stably locally connected, with s = ♯. In fact, it is also punctually locally
connected (see below).
• Rezk (2014) shows that “global equivariant homotopy theory” forms a local
and stably locally connected ∞-topos.
10.2. Axiom C1 means punctual local connectedness. If we additionally as-
sume Axiom C1, then by Lemma 8.17 the discrete objects are closed under sub-
objects. Johnstone (2011) shows that this is equivalent to the following condition,
there called punctual local connectedness (Lawvere (2007) calls it the Nullstellen-
satz ; and Schreiber (2013) calls it pieces have points).
Theorem {C1} 10.1 (Johnstone 2011, Lemma 2.3). For any A :: Type, the com-
posite ♭A→ A→ sA is surjective.
Proof. As in UFP (2013, Theorem 8.8.1), it suffices to show that ‖♭A‖0 → ‖sA‖0
is surjective. Thus, since epimorphisms of sets are surjections (UFP 2013, Lemma
10.1.4), it suffices to show (invoking the universal property of ‖–‖0) that (sA →
C)→ (♭A→ C) is injective for any set C. Moreover, since in the proof of Lemma
10.1.4 from UFP (2013) we only need to instantiate this property with one particular
set C, in fact it suffices to show that
(10.1) ♭(sA→ C)→ ♭(♭A→ C)
is injective for any crisp set C. And by Corollary 6.15, we may as well assume C
is also discrete (otherwise we could apply ♭ to it).
Now we can essentially copy the proof of Lemma 2.3 from Johnstone (2011).
Firstly, note that (10.1) is equal to the composite
♭(sA→ C) ≃−→ ♭(A→ C) ♭−→ ♭(♭A→ ♭C) ≃−→ ♭(♭A→ C)
where the first equivalence is Theorem 9.14 and the last is because C is discrete.
Thus, it will suffice to show that the middle map is injective. But this map is equal
to the composite
♭(A→ C) −→ ♭(A→ ♯C) ≃−→ ♭(♭A→ C) ≃−→ ♭(♭A→ ♭C)
where the middle equivalence is Corollary 6.26 and the last is because C is discrete.
But C → ♯C is injective by Corollary 8.23. 
Thus, Axiom C1 implies punctual local connectedness. Conversely, by Johnstone
(2011, Proposition 1.4), any punctually locally connected topos has a site of defini-
tion that is local and locally connected and in which every object has a global point.
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Clearly in this case if we take I and Ri as described above, then Axiom C1 will
hold; thus it is exactly a type-theoretic incarnation of punctual local connectedness.
In the different terminology of Lawvere and Menni (2015), Theorem 10.1 (along
with our previous results) means that the category of types is “pre-cohesive” over
that of (co)discrete types. In fact, it is “stably pre-cohesive”, because all of our
theorems admit an arbitrary crisp context.
10.3. Axiom C2 means contractible codiscreteness. Following Lawvere and
Menni (2015) further, we investigate the shapes of codiscrete types, for which pur-
pose we bring back Axiom C2 (page 66).
Theorem {LEM,C2} 10.2. If A is codiscrete, then sA is a proposition.
Proof. Let x, y : sA; we must show x = y. By s-induction, we may assume that
x = η(u) and y = η(v) for u, v : A. Let i0 and r0, r1 : Ri0 be as in Axiom C2.
Since they are axioms, they are crisp, and so we have r0
♭ : ♭Ri0 and r1
♭ : ♭Ri0 . By
Theorem 6.1, (r0
♭ = r1
♭) is equivalent to ♭(r0 = r1), i.e. to ♭∅ and hence to ∅. In
other words, we have (r0
♭ 6= r1♭).
Now since ♭Ri0 is a crisp discrete set, by the flat LEM it has decidable equality.
Thus, there is a map f : ♭Ri0 → A with f(r♭0) = u and f(r1♭) = v. But the
inclusion ♭Ri0 → Ri0 is inverted by ♭ and hence also by ♯, so since A is codiscrete
our f extends to a map g : Ri0 → A with g(r0) = u and g(r1) = v. Now the
composite g ◦ η : Ri0 → sA has g(r0) = x and g(r1) = y; but as sA is discrete, g is
constant, so x = y. 
Corollary {LEM,C2} 10.3. For any crisp B we have s♯B = ‖B‖.
Proof. For any B we have B → s♯B, hence a map ‖B‖ → s♯B. But ♭B ≃ ♭♯B → s♯B
is surjective by Theorem 10.1, and factors through ‖B‖. Hence our map ‖B‖ → s♯B
is also surjective, thus an equivalence. 
Lawvere and Menni (2015) call the conclusion of Theorem 10.2 connected codis-
creteness, and Corollary 10.3 (proven there as Lemma 7.3) explicit connected codis-
creteness. In a homotopical context, however, it seems better to say contractible
codiscreteness. As before, since we can work in an arbitrary crisp context, we
automatically have “stable contractible codiscreteness”.
Remark 10.4. Unfortunately, the phrase “X is contractible” is used by Lawvere
and Menni (2015) to mean “‖s(Y → X)‖0 ≃ 1 for all Y ”, which conflicts with its
standard usage in homotopy type theory to mean “X ≃ 1”. (They don’t mention
the 0-truncation since they are working with 1-toposes.) The intution behind their
definition is that the sets ‖s(Y → X)‖0 are the hom-sets of a “strong homotopy
category” of types, analogous to the strong homotopy category of topological spaces
obtained by identifying homotopic maps, so this definition says that X is terminal
in that category. Since s is a functor from this strong homotopy category to the
category of discrete spaces and their 0-truncated hom-sets, and it preserves the
terminal object, if X is contractible in the sense of ibid. then sX ≃ 1, i.e. sX
is contractible in the sense of homotopy type theory. Thus, if we want to keep
“X is contractible” to mean X ≃ 1, we could use a phrase like strongly spatially
contractible for the “contractibility” of Lawvere and Menni (2015).
Conversely, if a punctually locally connected topos satisfies Theorem 10.2, then
we have an object, namely ♯2, for which s♯2 is contractible, but which has two
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unequal elements 02
♯ and 12
♯. (By Theorem 3.7 we have (02
♯ = 12
♯) ≃ ♯(02 =
12) ≃ ♯∅, which is empty by Theorem 8.11.) Thus, we can make Axiom C2 hold
by adding ♯2 to the collection of Ri’s; so Axiom C2 is exactly a type-theoretic
incarnation of (punctual local connectedness and) contractible codiscreteness.
We could now copy the proof of Lawvere and Menni (2015, Corollary 6.5) to show
that every type A embeds into a type B such that sB is contractible, there called
sufficient cohesion. I conjecture that Axiom R♭ and Axiom AC should together
also imply the property called continuity in Lawvere (2007) and Menni (2014) —
that the canonical map s(AS) → (sA)S is an equivalence for any crisp set A and
any crisp discrete set S — but I have not managed to prove this yet.
Axiom R♭ does not seem to have been studied yet in a topos-theoretic context.
Of course, it is much more restrictive even than Axiom C2; rather than defining a
general class of toposes for investigation, it singles out an important characteristic
of a single topos (or a small group of toposes) that we are already interested in.
11. Synthetic topology
As a warm-up for Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem, in this section we develop some
aspects of synthetic topology that stay in the world of sets (0-types). Here we can
already see the power of Axiom R♭, even before any homotopy theory enters: it
forces R to be connected in several senses. One such sense is the following.
Theorem {R♭} 11.1. If P : R → Prop is a “detachable subset” (i.e. for all x : R
we have P (x) ∨ ¬P (x)), then either ∀x, P (x) or ∀x, ¬P (x).
Proof. A detachable P : R→ Prop yields a function f : R→ 2, where f(x) = 12 if
P (x) and f(x) = 02 if ¬P (x). But 2 is discrete, so by Axiom R♭ f is constant. 
Put differently, if U and V are subsets of R such that U ∪V = R and U ∩V = ∅,
then either U = R or V = R. In other words, R cannot be “broken into two pieces”
nontrivially. Taylor (2010) calls this property compact connectedness. Combining
this with Axiom LEM, and also Axiom T from §8.3, we can prove a version of
the Intermediate Value Theorem (which is a sort of one-dimensional analogue of
Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem).
Theorem {LEM,R♭,T} 11.2 (Discontinuous IVT). Let f :: R → R be a crisp
function and c :: R a crisp real number. If there exist a, b : R such that f(a) < c <
f(b), then there exists an x : R such that f(x) = c.
Proof. Since the hypothesis of a and b is a crisp proposition, it is discrete. Thus all
our hypotheses may as well be crisp, so we may prove ♯
∥∥∥∑(x:R) f(x) = c∥∥∥ instead,
which by Corollary 8.12 is equivalent to ¬¬∑(x:R) f(x) = c. Thus, suppose for con-
tradiction ¬∑(x:R) f(x) = c, i.e. for all x : R we have f(x) 6= c. By Theorem 8.32,
for all x we have f(x)#c, hence either f(x) < c or f(x) > c. Let U = {x | f(x) < c}
and V = {x | f(x) > c}; then U ∪ V = R and U ∩ V = ∅. By Theorem 11.1, then,
either U = R or V = R, which is a contradiction since a ∈ U and b ∈ V . 
The crispness of the hypotheses f and c means that the point x does not vary
continuously with them. It is well-known that a continuous choice of x is impossible,
and that this is what prevents the classical version of IVT from holding construc-
tively (see, for instance, Taylor 2010). Our technology of spatial type theory enables
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us to state a “discontinuous” IVT, even in a world where all types are spaces, and
our axioms of classicality and real-cohesion allow us to prove it.
A more common way to constructivize the IVT is to strengthen the hypothesis
(e.g. that f “doesn’t hover” or is “locally non-constant”) or weaken the conclusion
(e.g. we only find an approximate solution). We can also use Axiom R♭ to prove
such a form of IVT, without the need for Axiom LEM or Axiom T.
First we show that R is connected in a different sense. The following proof
also introduces an idea that we will use repeatedly. Since s is a left adjoint, it
takes colimits of types to colimits in the subcategory of discrete types. Moreover,
since crisp discrete types are also coreflective, they are closed under colimits, so s
preserves crisp colimits of types. Similarly, using Corollary 8.25, crisp discrete sets
are also closed under set-colimits (i.e. 0-truncations of homotopy colimits). Thus,
if we write s0A for ‖sA‖0, then the functor s0 reflects sets into discrete sets, so
it preserves crisp set-colimits. We can then use facts about (set-)colimits of the
shapes of types to conclude things about the types themselves.
Theorem {R♭} 11.3. Let U, V :: R→ Prop be crisp subsets of R with U ∪ V = R.
If ‖U‖ and ‖V ‖, then also ‖U ∩ V ‖.
Proof. By Lemma 9.18, the assumption ensures that R is the pushout of U and
V over U ∩ V . Thus, the contractible type sR is the pushout of sU and sV under
s(U ∩ V ), and hence the contractible s0R is the set-pushout of s0U and s0V under
s0(U ∩ V ). But ‖U‖ and ‖V ‖, hence also ‖s0U‖ and ‖s0V ‖.
Now if x : s0U and y : s0V , their images in the contractible type s0R must be
equal. Using the explicit construction of this set-pushout as the set-quotient of
an equivalence relation of zigzags on s0U + s0V , we see that we must in particular
have ‖s0(U ∩ V )‖. Finally, since s(U ∩ V ) → s0(U ∩ V ) is 0-connected and hence
surjective, while (U ∩ V ) → s(U ∩ V ) is surjective by Corollary 9.12, we also have
‖U ∩ V ‖. 
Taylor (2010) calls the above property overt connectedness. Note that we have
only proven it for crisp subsets.
The 0-truncations in the above proof could be omitted, but if we left them
out, then instead of the set-based construction of set-pushouts we would need to
use the van Kampen theorem (UFP 2013, §8.7). The former needs only the fact
that the sets form a ΠW -pretopos (UFP 2013, Theorem 10.1.11), which requires
only function extensionality and propositional extensionality; whereas the latter in
general requires full univalence. Similar remarks apply to the proof of Theorem 11.5
below, but in Theorem 12.6 we will need to resort to univalence and van Kampen.
(Actually, based on intuition from classical topology, it is natural to conjecture that
sU is automatically a set for any subset U ⊆ R, but I do not know how to prove
this.)
Theorem {R♭} 11.4 (Approximate IVT). Let f :: R→ R be a crisp function and
c :: R a crisp real number. Then for any ε > 0, if there exist a, b : R such that
f(a) < c < f(b), then there exists an x : R such that |f(x)− c| < ε.
Proof. It suffices to consider the case when ε : Q+ is a positive rational number.
Then since Q+ is discrete, we may assume ε is also crisp. Therefore the sets
U :≡ {x : R | f(x) < c + ε} and V :≡ {x : R | f(x) > c − ε} are also crisp. We
have U ∪ V = R by locatedness of Dedekind reals, while by assumption a ∈ U and
b ∈ V . Thus, Theorem 11.3 supplies the desired x. 
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Note that although Theorem 11.4 eliminates classicality axioms, we still have
only crisp dependence on f and a. In fact, the approximate IVT (for continuous
functions) is contructively provable without any additional assumptions; the most
common proofs use countable choice or uniform continuity of f , but Frank (2017)
has recently given a proof avoiding both of these. So there is no topological reason
for this crispness restriction, but I do not know whether it can be removed using
our current methods.
On the other hand, Theorem 11.2 and Theorem 11.4 are statements about all
functions R → R. No explicit continuity hypothesis is required, because in our
synthetic world “all functions are continuous”. In fact, with a little more work we
can actually prove explicitly that all functions are continuous, thereby showing that
the axioms of real-cohesion really do nail down precisely the “topology” of R to be
the intended one.
Theorem {R♭,T} 11.5. Every crisp function f :: R→ R is ε-δ continuous at every
crisp real number a :: R.
Proof. We will need to assume given crisp b1 < a and b2 > a such that f(b1)#f(a)
and f(b2) # f(a). This can always be ensured by modifying f without changing it
near a. For instance, f(a+ 2) − f(a) is either > 12 or < 1 (and this is crisp since
it is a proposition); if the former we can take b2 = a+ 2, while if the latter we can
subtract max(0, x− a− 1) from f before taking b2 = a+ 2.
As before, we may assume ε :: Q+ is a crisp positive rational number. We may
also assume ε is less than both |f(b1)− f(a)| and |f(b2)− f(a)|. Define
U = {x : R | |f(x)− f(a)| < ε/2}
V = {x : R | |f(x)− f(a)| > ε/4}
Then U∪V = R, so that R is the pushout of U and V under U∩V . LetR1 = (−∞, a]
and R2 = [a,∞), and Ui = U ∩ Ri, Vi = V ∩ Ri for i = 1, 2, so that Ri = Ui ∪ Vi
and Ri is the pushout of Ui and Vi under Ui ∩ Vi. Note that a ∈ Ui and bi ∈ Vi for
i = 1, 2.
Consider the fibers of the map U → s0U ; these are the “spatially connected
components” of U . Let w be the image of a in s0U , and W the preimage of w
in U ; thus W is the “component of U containing a”. Similarly, define wi and Wi
for i = 1, 2 to represent the component of Ui containing a. Then the function
s0Ui → s0U maps wi to w, so that Wi is a subset of W . Similarly, let Zi be the
component of Vi containing bi, with image zi in s0Vi, for i = 1, 2.
Now as remarked above, s0 prerves crisp set-colimits. Thus, the contractible
s0R is the set-pushout of s0U and s0V under s0(U ∩ V ), and similarly for i = 1, 2.
In particular, wi and zi are identified in the set-pushout of s0Ui and s0Vi under
s0(Ui ∩ Vi), and so wi must be equal to the image of some element of s0(Ui ∩ Vi).
Since X → s0X is surjective by Corollary 9.12, Wi must contain an element of
Ui∩Vi. Let yi be such an element. Since yi ∈ Vi, we have in particular f(yi) 6= f(a),
and hence yi 6= a. By Theorem 8.32, yi # a; so since yi ∈ Ri we have y1 < a < y2.
Finally, since yi ∈ Ui, also yi ∈ U .
Let δ = min(y2−a, a−y1); I claim this is the δ to our ε. Thus, suppose x : R and
|x− a| < δ, hence x ∈ (y1, y2). (Note that x is not crisp.) Either |f(x)− f(a)| < ε
or |f(x) − f(a)| > ε/2; the first is what we want, so it suffices to show that the
second leads to a contradiction.
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Thus, suppose |f(x)−f(a)| > ε/2. Then since any p ∈ U satisfies |f(p)−f(a)| <
ε/2 by definition of U , we have f(p) 6= f(x), hence p 6= x. By Theorem 8.32,
therefore, p # x, and thus either p < x or x < p. In other words,
∏
(p:U)(p <
x) ∨ (x < p), which is equivalent to ∏(p:U)(p < x) + (x < p) since y cannot be
both greater and less than x. It follows that we can define a map q : U → 2 by
q(p) = 02 if p < x and q(p) = 12 if x < p. In particular, since y1 < x and x < y2,
we have q(y1) = 02 and q(y2) = 12. But y1 and y2 are also both in W , i.e. they
are identified in s0U . Since 2 is a discrete set, q : U → 2 must factor through s0U ,
and so q(y1) = q(y2), a contradiction. So it must be that the other case holds:
|f(x)− f(a)| < ε, as desired. 
The statement that all functions R → R are ε-δ continuous is sometimes called
“Brouwer’s theorem”, because Brouwer proved it in his “intuitionistic mathematics”
using choice sequences. Here we have proved a version of it using instead our
Axiom R♭ and Axiom T. (Both uses of Axiom T could also be replaced by the
assumption that f is “strongly extensional”, i.e. f(x) # f(y) implies x# y.)
Theorem 11.5 provides an almost complete answer to the question of “what is the
topology of R”, with “topology” interpreted in the sense relevant to our intended
model, namely “functions out of R”.
Corollary {LEM,R♭,T} 11.6. The canonical function ♭(R → R) → (♭R → ♭R) is
an injection, and coincides with the inclusion of the ε-δ continuous functions.
Proof. To show it is an injection, suppose given f, g :: R→ R such that ♭f = ♭g as
functions ♭R → ♭R, or equivalently ♯f = ♯g as functions ♯R → ♯R. We must show
that for any x : R we have f(x) = g(x); but since R is concrete by Theorem 8.20,
it suffices to show f(x)♯ = g(x)♯, which follows from ♯f = ♯g.
Now Theorem 11.5 implies that this injection lands inside the ε-δ continuous
functions. Conversely, suppose f : ♭R → ♭R is ε-δ continuous. By Axiom LEM
applied in the universe of discrete types, f is locally uniformly continuous therein
(meaning that it is uniformly continuous on all finite intervals). Since it suffices
to consider intervals with rational endpoints, while Q is discrete and discrete types
are closed under all logical operations, f is also locally uniformly continuous in
the world of all types. Therefore, so is the composite Q → ♭R f−→ ♭R → R. But it
can be proved constructively that any locally uniformly continuous function Q→ R
extends uniquely to R; see Troelstra and Dalen (1988, Theorem 5.6.2). And such an
extension restricts to f on ♭R, since the two agree onQ and both are continuous. 
It would be even better to characterize the “topology” of R → R itself and so
on, or equivalently the functions Rn → R for all n : N, but I don’t know how
to do this without additional axioms. However, the general method of proof of
Theorem 11.5 does have various further applications. Here we mention only one
more: the promised falsity of the analytic LLPO from §8.3.
Theorem {LEM,R♭} 11.7. It is not the case that for all x : R we have x ≤ 0∨x ≥ 0.
Proof. By Corollary 8.16, it suffices to show ¬♭(∀x : R.(x ≤ 0 ∨ x ≥ 0)). For
contradiction, suppose ♭(∀x : R.(x ≤ 0 ∨ x ≥ 0)), hence ∀x : R.(x ≤ 0 ∨ x ≥ 0)
crisply.
Let f : R → R be such that f(0) = 0 and f(x) = x sin(πx ) for any x # 0.
Such a function can be defined constructively without too much trouble, and since
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it needs no hypotheses it is crisp. Let U = {x : R | x ≥ 0 ∧ f(x) ≥ 0} and
V = {x : R | x ≥ 0 ∧ f(x) ≤ 0}; then U and V are also crisp. Our assumption
implies that U ∪ V = [0,∞).
Classically, U would be the disjoint union of {0} with the intervals [ 1n+1 , 1n ] for
even n, and V the similar union for odd n. (Here and subsequently, we adopt
the convention that when n = 0, the interval [ 1n+1 ,
1
n ] means [1,∞).) In fact,
Axiom LEM and Axiom C1 suffice to make this true, by the following argument.
Let N∞ be the type of functions N → 2 that take the value 12 at most once
(this is equivalent to the type of non-increasing sequences). Now, for any even n
and any x ∈ U , we have (x < 1n−1 ) ∨ (x > 1n ); but since x /∈ ( 1n , 1n−1 ), it follows
that (x ≤ 1n ) ∨ (x > 1n ). Similarly, (x ≥ 1n+1 ) ∨ (x < 1n+1 ), and so the proposition
x ∈ [ 1n+1 , 1n ] is decidable (given that x ∈ U). Thus, we can define p : U → N∞ by
p(x)n =
{
12 x ∈ [ 12n+1 , 12n ]
02 x /∈ [ 12n+1 , 12n ].
If we write n : N∞ for the characteristic sequence of n : N, and ∞ : N∞ for the
constantly-02 sequence, then p
−1(n) = [ 12n+1 ,
1
2n ] and p
−1(∞) = {0}. On the other
hand, as for any function, U ≃ ∑(n:N∞) p−1(n). But by LPO (Theorem 8.29),
N∞ = N+ 1, so we have
U ≃ {0}+∑(n:N)[ 12n+1 , 12n ] and similarly
V ≃ {0}+∑(n:N)[ 12n+2 , 12n+1 ].
Now as remarked above, s preserves coproducts of crisp types (such as the sum-
mands of U and V ). Similarly, for any P : N→ Type, by the generalization of UFP
2013, Theorem 7.3.9 to monadic modalities we have
s
(∑
(n:N)P (n)
) ≃ s(∑(n:N)sP (n))
≃∑(n:N)sP (n) (since this is already discrete, as N is).
Thus, sU ≃ 1+∑(n:N) s[ 12n+1 , 12n ] and similarly for V . But any closed interval [a, b]
is a retract of R, hence s[a, b] is a retract of sR and thus contractible. Therefore,
sU ≃ 1+ N and also sV ≃ 1+ N.
Recalling that [0,∞) = U ∪ V , it follows that [0,∞) is the pushout of U and
V under their intersection. However, this intersection is just {0} ∪ { 1n | n : N},
which is another copy of 1 + N. Since s preserves this pushout, the contractible
type s[0,∞) is the pushout of 1 + N and 1 + N under 1 + N. Moreover, the two
maps 1+ N ⇒ 1+ N in this pushout can be identified with the identity and with
“+1” acting on N, respectively (arising from the inclusions of 1n as the left endpoint
of one interval and the right endpoint of another). But the pushout of these two
maps is 2 rather than 1, since there is nothing to identify the elements of 1 (which
correspond to {0} in [0,∞)) with anything else. This is a contradiction, so our
assumption ♭(∀x : R.(x ≤ 0 ∨ x ≥ 0)) is false. 
Theorem 11.7 explains why classical “closed” cell complexes must be avoided
in real-cohesion, as mentioned in §9. Namely, the analytic LLPO claims that the
evident map (−∞, 0] + [0,∞) → R is surjective, which would be exactly what we
need in order to be able to glue (say) the endpoints of a closed interval together
seamlessly; its failure means that such a gluing will not give the desired answer.
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(Conversely, therefore, if one wants a “topological topos” in which classical cell
complexes do work, one has to give up on local connectedness, as done by Johnstone
(1979).)
12. The Brouwer fixed-point theorem
Finally we are ready to attack Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem. We confine our-
selves to the simplest version, which is about self-maps of the disc:
D2 :≡ {(x, y) : R× R | x2 + y2 ≤ 1}.
Recall from Theorem 9.19 that the boundary of the disc
∂D2 :≡ {(x, y) : R× R | x2 + y2 = 1}
is an equivalent definition of the topological circle S1; it is the only one we will use
in this section. Recall also from Theorem 9.17 that sS1 ≃ S1. We also have:
Lemma {R♭} 12.1. sD2 is contractible.
Proof. Since sR is contractible and s preserves finite products, s(R × R) is also
contractible. But D2 is a retract of R× R, by the function
(x, y) 7→
(
x
max(1,
√
x2 + y2)
,
y
max(1,
√
x2 + y2)
)
.
Hence sD2 is a retract of s(R× R), and thus also contractible. 
In particular, therefore, we have:
Lemma {UA,R♭} 12.2. S1 is not a retract of D2.
Proof. If it were, sS1 would be a retract of sD2 and hence contractible. But sS1 = S1,
which is not contractible since its loop space is Z (Licata and Shulman 2013). 
So much for the homotopy-theoretic part of the proof; we proceed to the topo-
logical part. This might be done in many ways, but we choose to be explicit and
calculational to make it obvious that the argument is constructive. Here is also
where the mysterious Axiom T from §8.3 reappears.
Lemma {LEM,C1,T} 12.3. If there is a map f : D2 → D2 with no fixed point,
then S1 is a retract of D2.
Proof. Our assumption is that for all z : D2 we have f(z) 6= z. Write z = (x, y) and
f(z) = (u, v); then f(z) 6= z means (x− u)2+(y− v)2 6= 0, hence by Theorem 8.32
(using Axiom T) (x− u)2 + (y − v)2 > 0.
Now the line through f(z) and z can be parametrized as
(12.1) (tx + (1− t)u, ty + (1− t)v)
with t = 0 being f(z) and t = 1 being z. We are interested in the intersections of
this line with S1, which are given by solving a quadratic equation:
(tx+ (1− t)u)2 + (ty + (1− t)v)2 = 1 ⇐⇒
((x− u)t+ u)2 + ((y − v)t+ v)2 = 1 ⇐⇒
((x − u)2 + (y − v)2)t2 + 2((x− u)u+ (y − v)v)t+ (u2 + v2 − 1) = 0
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The standard quadratic formula yields the solutions
t =
−B ±√D
A
where
B = ((x− u)u+ (y − v)v)
D = ((x− u)u+ (y − v)v)2 − ((x − u)2 + (y − v)2)(u2 + v2 − 1)
A = (x− u)2 + (y − v)2.
To ensure that this yields real solutions constructively, we need to know that A#0
andD ≥ 0. As we saw above, the former follows from our assumption that f(z) 6= z.
For the latter, we can compute
D = (x− u)2 + (y − v)2 − (vx − uy)2.
Now (x− u)2 + (y − v)2 is the squared length of one diagonal of the parallelogram
spanned by z and f(z) regarded as vectors originating at the origin, while (vx−uy)2
is the squared area of that parallelogram. The area of a parallelogram is at most
half the product of the lengths of its diagonals; thus D ≥ 0 as long as the other
diagonal of the parallelogram in question is ≤ 2. But this other diagonal is the
vector sum z + f(z), which has magnitude ≤ 2 since both z and f(z) lie in D2.
Thus we constructively have two real solutions to our quadratic equation for t.
We choose the one in which the ± sign is +. Substituting this value of t into the
equation (12.1) of our line, we obtain a formula for a point in R2 that is a function
of (x, y) and (u, v), hence (recalling that (u, v) = f(x, y)) of z = (x, y) : D2 only.
Moreover, by construction, this point always lies in S1. Let us denote it r(z); thus
we have r : D2 → S1.
It remains to show that r is a retraction of the obvious inclusion, i.e. that if
z = (x, y) lies in S1, then r(z) = z. For this, it suffices to show that if x2 + y2 = 1,
then our chosen value of t becomes equal to 1. This is equivalent to asking that
A + B =
√
D, and this in turn is equivalent to asking that A + B ≥ 0 and that
(A+B)2 −D = 0. For the first, we compute
A+B = x2 + y2 − ux− vy
= 1− (ux+ vy)
But ux+vy is the dot product of z and f(z), which is ≤ 1 since both have magnitude
≤ 1. Finally, for the second we compute
(A+ B)2 −D = ((x − u)2 + (y − v)2)(x2 + y2 − 1)
which clearly vanishes if x2 + y2 = 1. 
Combining Lemma 12.2 and Lemma 12.3, we see that an arbitrary f : D2 → D2
cannot fail to have a fixed point. To deduce a positive statement from this, we
invoke Axiom LEM.
Theorem {UA,LEM,R♭,T} 12.4 (Sharp Brouwer Fixed-Point Theorem). For any
function f : D2 → D2, we have ♯
∥∥∥∑(x:D2) f(x) = x∥∥∥. That is, any self-map of D2
sharply has a fixed point.
Proof. By Corollary 8.12, the claim is equivalent to ¬¬∑(x:D2) f(x) = x. But this
is what we have just proven. 
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Equivalently, we can say:
Corollary {UA,LEM,R♭,T} 12.5 (Crisp Brouwer Fixed-Point Theorem). For any
crisp function f :: D2 → D2, there exists x : D2 such that f(x) = x.
Proof. If f is crisp, then so is the fixed point asserted by Theorem 12.4, so we can
strip the ♯ from it. 
Topologically, these formulations both say the same thing: every continuous self-
map of D2 has a fixed point, but such a fixed point cannot be selected continuously.
Since the existential in both theorems is propositionally truncated, even if the ♯
or crispness could be omitted we would not be asserting the existence of a single
continuous function selecting fixed points. However, according to Remark 7.8, we
would be asserting that such a function exists locally, i.e. that any given function
has a neighborhood of functions on which fixed points can be selected continuously;
and this is just as impossible. Thus, the versions of the theorem that we have proven
really are the strongest we can expect.
On the other hand, just as we did with the Intermediate Value Theorem in
§11, we can eliminate Axiom LEM and Axiom T by constructing an approximate
fixed point. Our proof of this will also involve more synthetic homotopy theory: in
addition to π1(S
1) = Z, we will use the van Kampen theorem for pushouts.
Theorem {UA,R♭} 12.6 (Approximate Brouwer Fixed-Point Theorem). For any
crisp function f :: D2 → D2 and ε > 0, there exists an x : D2 such that |f(x)−x| <
ε.
Proof. As before, we may assume that ε is rational, and hence that it is crisp. We
may also assume ε < 1. Define
g(x) =
{
f(x) · min(|f(x)|,1−ε/2)|f(x)| if |f(x)| > 1− ε
f(x) if |f(x)| < 1− ε/2
The case division is constructively valid by Lemma 9.18, since one of the two cases
must be true, and if both are true then the two definitions agree. And since ε < 1,
if |f(x)| > 1− ε then |f(x)| > 0, so that min(|f(x)|,1−ε/2)|f(x)| makes sense.
Now this definition ensures that |f(x) − g(x)| < ε/2, so it suffices to find an
x : D2 such that |g(x)− x| < ε/2. Moreover, we have |g(x)−x| > ε/4 for all x : S1.
Let U = {x : D2 | |g(x) − x| > ε/4} and V = {x : D2 | |g(x) − x| < ε/2}. Then
U ∪ V = D2, exhibiting D2 as a crisp pushout of U and V under their intersection.
Therefore the contractible type sD2 is also the pushout of sU and sV under s(U∩V ).
However, S1 is contained in U by the construction of g, and the construction of
the retraction r in Lemma 12.3 works for all x : U . Thus, S1 is a retract of U , and
so sS1 is a retract of sU . But since sS1 = S1, it contains a nonidentity identification,
and hence so does sU . On the other hand, this identification must be mapped to
the identity in the contractible type sD2.
Now recall that the van Kampen theorem (UFP 2013, §8.7) identifies the 0-
truncated equality types of a (homotopy) pushout as a certain set-quotient. In-
specting this construction we see that the only way two identifications in sU can
become equal in sU ⊔s(U∩V ) sV is if we have ‖sV ‖. Hence, by Corollary 9.12, we
also have ‖V ‖. 
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As in Theorem 11.4, there seems no topological reason for the crispness of f ,
but I do not know how to remove it. Note that although the technique is similar to
that in Theorem 11.3 and Theorem 11.5, here we need to use s rather than s0, and
likewise we need the van Kampen theorem for pushouts that are not sets (whose
proof also involves the full univalence axiom).
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